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Abstract: This article examines the long, contentious history of the Ore-
gon & California Land Grant that produced federal forest lands now 
managed by the Bureau of Land Management. It discusses how these 
lands revested to the federal government following decades of corruption 
and scandal and analyzes the resulting congressionally created manage-
ment structure that supported local county governments through the 
over-harvesting of lands for a half-century. The article proceeds to trace 
the fate of O&C lands through the “spotted owl wars” of the 1990s, the 
ensuing Northwest Forest Plan—which this Article explains in detail—the 
timber salvage rider of 1995, and the George W. Bush Administration’s 
unsuccessful attempts to change the compromise reached in the NWFP. 
The article then explains how decreases in timber harvesting and de-
clines in federal payments have brought the counties reliant on these 
lands to the brink of insolvency and analyzes two current legislative pro-
posals aimed at bolstering flagging economies through increased harvests 
on O&C lands. The article concludes by identifying significant economic 
and environmental flaws in both of these proposals and suggests several 
alternative revenue-producing options that could provide economic secu-
rity and diversity to the counties without eviscerating the key environ-
mental protections provided by the NWFP and other federal environ-
mental protection statutes. 
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An opinion poll during World War II showed that only half of the population 
had ever heard of the railroad land grants, and most of them thought the 
railroads had paid for the land. Since then, another half-century has passed, 
and the land grants have an even smaller place in our social memory. With-
out an awareness of the past, and an understanding of how it affects the pre-
sent, we will continue to suffer the continuing impacts of the land grant leg-
acy. 
—George Draffan, 19981 
Introduction 
 In the nineteenth century, the U.S. government granted railroad 
companies (and state governments for railroads) some 179 million 
acres of public land in return for building multiple railroads.2 The gov-
ernment enlisted the recipient railroads in the effort to settle the West 
by calling upon them to sell the land to settlers and convey government 
lands to private owners as surrogates for the federal General Land Of-
fice (GLO).3 Among the largest of the railroad grants was an over 3.7 
million acre grant to the Oregon & California Railroad (“O&C R.R.”) 
to build a line from Portland to San Francisco.4 
 Many of the railroad grant lands were later forfeited to the federal 
government.5 The grant conditions generally included a requirement 
to sell land to bona fide settlers and meet established construction 
schedules, both of which proved problematic.6 Between 1867 and 1890, 
                                                                                                                      
1 George Draffan, R.Rs. & Clearcuts Campaign, Taking Back Our Land: A His-
tory of Railroad Land Grant Reform 33 (1998) (footnote omitted), available at http:// 
www.landgrant.org/takingback.pdf. 
2 Id. at 5–6 (nearly forty-nine million acres to states for railroads; 130.4 million acres 
directly to railroads); id. at 6 (claiming that “[t]he railroad land grants covered ten percent 
of the continental United States,” but 179 million acres is roughly 7.8 percent of the total 
2.3 billion acres of land of the contiguous United States). The discrepancy is due to the 
fact that about twenty-five percent of the granted lands were never transferred to the rail-
roads because of violations of grant conditions. Id. at 8. 
3 Id. at 8–9. This was Alexander Hamilton’s prescription for settling the western lands: 
grant large tracts to those who held the Revolutionary War debt, which Hamilton consoli-
dated in the federal government, allowing them to profit from frontier land sales to set-
tlers when the land appreciated in value. See Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton 299 
(2004). 
4 See Act of July 25, 1866, ch. 242, 14 Stat. 239, amended by Act of June 25, 1868, ch. 80, 
15 Stat. 80, Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 27, 16 Stat. 47, and Act of May 4, 1870, ch. 69, 16 Stat. 
94; Draffan, supra note 1, at 5; infra note 70 and accompanying text. George Draffan lists 
the Oregon and California grant as the eighth largest of the federal railroad grants. Draf-
fan, supra note 1, at 5. 
5 Draffan, supra note 1, at 11–19. 
6 See id. at 4. 
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the railroads forfeited some thirty-five million acres.7 Often these for-
feitures were due to clauses contained in post-1866 grants that called 
for maximum sale prices to “actual settlers” of $2.50 per acre and a 
maximum sale of 160 acres.8 In 1890, Congress enacted the Railroad 
Land Grant Forfeiture Act,9 reclaiming another 5.6 million acres—only 
a fraction of the fifty million acres in granted lands the Populist Party 
sought to reacquire in 1892.10 
 Land fraud associated with public land grants became the subject 
of public trials in the early twentieth century, leading to over a hundred 
convictions, including a number of high government officials.11 Follow-
ing closely on the heels of the Oregon land fraud scandal, the federal 
government began to rein in the O&C R.R.’s illegal disposition of its 
grant land.12 In 1908, the federal government sought to enforce the 
terms of the grant against the O&C R.R.—then owned by Southern Pa-
cific Railroad—because only slightly more than fifteen percent of the 
sales made by the railroad actually complied with applicable acreage 
and price conditions.13 This enforcement led to the O&C R.R. revest-
ing 2.9 million acres of valuable forestland to the federal government, a 
result confirmed by a Supreme Court decision in 1915.14 Managed to-
day by the federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM), this revested 
land is now known as the Oregon and California lands (“O&C lands”) 
and has been the source of continuous controversy for at least the past 
quarter-century.15 
                                                                                                                      
 
7 See id. at 8; David Maldwyn Ellis et al., Comments on “The Railroad Land Grant Legend in 
American History Texts,” 32 Miss. Valley Hist. Rev. 557, 558 (1946) (comment by David 
Maldwyn Ellis). By forfeiting the land grants, the railroad companies divested the land 
without compensation. See Black’s Law Dictionary 722 (9th ed. 2010). 
8 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 27, 16 Stat. 47; see also Draffan, supra note 1, at 10. 
9 Railroad Land Grant Forfeiture Act of 1890, ch. 1040, 26 Stat. 496 (codified at 43 
U.S.C §§ 904–907 (2006)). 
10 Draffan, supra note 1, at 21. The Railroad Land Grant Forfeiture Act of 1890 re-
claimed lands from eleven railroads, including two million acres from the Northern Pa-
cific, over a million acres from the Southern Pacific, and over a half-million acres each 
from the Gulf Ship Island and the Mobil and Girard. Id. The House of Representatives 
passed Populist-sponsored bills in both 1892 and 1894, but the Senate blocked both, and 
the forfeiture movement died. See id. 
11 See infra notes 85–114 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 115–133 and accompanying text. 
13 See United States v. Or. & Cal. R.R., (O&C R.R. I ), 186 F. 861, 873–74 (C.C.D. Or. 
1911); Draffan, supra note 1, at 22 (noting that the railroad sold only 813,000 acres of its 
3.7 million acre grant, of which just 127,000 acres were in parcels of 160 acres or fewer and 
sold at less than $2.50 per acre). 
14 Or. & Cal. R.R. v. United States, (O&C R.R. II ), 238 U.S. 393, 409, 438–39 (1915). 
15 See infra notes 158–206 and accompanying text (describing legal challenges begin-
ning in the late 1980s, all the way through 2011); infra notes 207–361 and accompanying 
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 Because Congress agreed to share timber sale revenues from the 
BLM lands with localities at a higher rate than adjacent forestlands 
managed by the U.S. Forest Service (USFS),16 county governments 
quickly became dependent on timber-sale receipts.17 This dependence 
led to apparent over-harvesting of the lands through the 1980s,18 when 
a lawsuit successfully alleged that BLM’s environmental evaluation of its 
timber sales failed to satisfy the National Environmental Policy Act, and 
thus halted harvesting.19 Environmentalists also successfully sought pro-
tection of the northern spotted owl through the citizen petition process 
of the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA),20 because federal timber 
sales were liquidating the late-successional (old-growth) forests that the 
northern spotted owl depended on for its habitat.21 Although the fed-
eral government initially denied protection for the northern spotted 
                                                                                                                      
text (describing the Northwest Forest Plan and the George W. Bush Administration’s failed 
attempts to end it). 
16 See Relating to the Revested Oregon and California Railroad and Reconveyed Coos Bay Wagon 
Road Grant Lands Situated in the State of Oregon: Hearings on H.R. 5858 Before the H. Comm. on 
the Public Lands, 75th Cong. 61–62, 73 (1937) (comments by Rep. James W. Mott, Member, 
H. Comm. on the Pub. Lands, Rep. Compton I. White, Member, H. Comm. on the Pub. 
Lands, Rufus G. Poole, Assistant Solicitor, Dep’t of Interior) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 
5858] (noting that the laws and regulations governing national forests managed by the 
USFS allocated a certain percentage of timber sales to counties, but that this amount was 
insufficient because it did not reimburse the counties for lost taxation revenues); id. at 99–
103 (comments by L. F. Kneipp, Assistant Chief, U.S. Forest Serv.) (discussing the USFS 
counter-proposal to the then unenacted Oregon & California Lands Act of 1937 (OCLA), 
ch. 876, 50 Stat. 874, which would have terminated and liquidated the state and county 
interests in the O&C lands over the course of a nine-year period and placed the land into 
national forest status, as opposed to disbursing fifty percent of timber revenues to the 
counties in perpetuity). 
17 See Paul G. Dodds, The Oregon and California Lands: A Peculiar History Produces Envi-
ronmental Problems, 17 Envtl. L. 739, 740–41 (1987). In 1984, for example, the Oregon and 
California counties received almost sixty-six million dollars in revenues under the OCLA. 
Id. at 741. 
18 See infra notes 158–168 and accompanying text. 
19 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006); Port-
land Audubon Soc’y v. Lujan, 712 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (D. Or.), aff’d, 884 F.2d 1233 (9th 
Cir. 1989). 
20 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544, 1533(b)(3)(A) (2006); N. 
Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 482 (W.D. Wash. 1988). 
21 Portland Audubon Soc’y, 712 F. Supp. at 1485, 1488–89. “Late-successional” forests are 
areas where the primary goal is to maintain and increase old-growth forests. See J.B. Ruhl & 
Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 424, 450 (2010). 
“Old-growth” forests are home to pristine, intact forest ecosystems that once harvested 
cannot be replaced. U.S. Forest Serv. & Bureau of Land Mgmt., Record of Decision 
for Amendments to Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management Planning 
Documents Within the Range of the Northern Spotted Owl 2 (1994) [hereinafter 
1994 ROD], available at http://www.blm.gov/or/plans/nwfpnepa/FSEIS-1994/newroda.pdf 
(quoting President William J. Clinton). 
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owl under the ESA, a court overturned that decision,22 and the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) listed the northern spotted owl as a 
threatened species in 1990.23 A subsequent attempt to exempt the spot-
ted owl from the ESA also failed.24 
 With the listing threatening to shut down timber harvests through-
out the Pacific Northwest,25 in 1993, the newly elected Clinton Admini-
stration convened a “Northwest Forest Conference.” The conference led 
to the creation of the 1994 Northwest Forest Plan (NWFP), an innova-
tive ecosystem-management plan that promised to protect listed species 
while allowing for continued, but reduced, timber harvests.26 Reflecting 
the controversial nature of the NWFP, Congress soon weighed in by en-
acting the Timber Salvage Rider in 1995, which grandfathered in several 
BLM timber sales from the NWFP.27 This appropriations rider had sig-
nificant on-the-ground effects causing environmental and human dam-
age.28 
 A half-decade later, Congress stepped in to provide relief to county 
governments affected by declining timber sale receipts by passing the 
Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000 
                                                                                                                      
22 Hodel, 716 F. Supp. at 482. In 1987, the FWS decided not to list the spotted owl. En-
dangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Finding on Northern Spotted Owl Petition, 
52 Fed. Reg. 48,552 (Dec. 23, 1987) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). Environmentalists chal-
lenged the FWS’s inaction, and a federal district court found the agency’s decision arbi-
trary and capricious. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. at 483. 
23 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Threatened Sta-
tus for the Northern Spotted Owl, 55 Fed. Reg. 26,189 ( June 26, 1990) (codified at 50 
C.F.R. pt. 17). 
24 See infra notes 193–194 and accompanying text. 
25 The listing of the spotted owl applied to all forestlands in the Northwest, not just the 
O&C lands. See Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1084, 1096 (W.D. Wash.), 
aff’d, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991) (enjoining timber sales on USFS lands); see also Portland 
Audubon Soc’y v. Lujan, 795 F. Supp. 1489, 1510 (D. Or. 1992), aff’d sub nom. Portland Audu-
bon Soc’y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1993) (enjoining timber sales by BLM that af-
fected the spotted owls). 
26 See infra notes 228–254 and accompanying text. The NWFP provided salmon as well 
as owl protection. See Steven Lewis Yaffee, The Wisdom of the Spotted Owl: Policy 
Lessons for a New Century 141–43 (1994). The plan “anticipated” that 1.1 billion board 
feet of timber would be harvested, a decline of nearly seventy-five percent from the 1980s. 
1994 ROD, supra note 21, fig.1. 
27 See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Assistance, for Anti-
Terrorism Initiatives, for Assistance in the Recovery from the Tragedy that Occured at 
Oklahoma City, and Rescissions Act, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-19, §§ 2001–2002, 109 Stat. 194, 
240–47. 
28 See Patti A. Goldman & Kristen L. Boyles, Forsaking the Rule of Law: The 1995 Logging 
Without Laws Rider and Its Legacy, 27 Envtl. L. 1035, 1087–88 (1997). These hastily-
planned, often below-cost sales resulted in increased landslides, threatened city drinking 
water supplies, and degraded fisheries. Id. at 1088. 
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(SRSA).29 This program supplemented revenue already provided to the 
counties under the Payment In Lieu of Taxes Act (PILT).30 In 2008, 
Congress reauthorized SRSA payments for four more years.31 The 2008 
SRSA extension expired at the end of fiscal year (FY) 2011,32 and PILT 
funding was set to expire at the end of FY 2012.33 In July 2012, however, 
Congress restored SRSA funding for FY 2012 and extended PILT fund-
ing through FY 2013.34 
 Dissatisfied with the stringency of the NWFP, and with the end of 
congressional subsidies in sight, the George W. Bush Administration 
sought to increase timber harvests from the O&C lands through various 
attempts at revising the NWFP, but all proved to be unsuccessful.35 The 
most notable of these efforts was the proposed Western Oregon Plan 
Revision (WOPR).36 The Bush Administration did not complete the 
plan revision before leaving office, however, and the Obama Admini-
stration withdrew all WOPR proposals because it determined the pro-
posals could not survive judicial review under the ESA.37 
                                                                                                                      
29 Pub. L. No. 106-393, § 2(a)(8), 114 Stat. 1607, 1608 (codified as amended at 16 
U.S.C. §§ 7101–7153 (2006 & Supp. 2008)). 
30 Pub. L No. 94-565, 90 Stat. 2262 (1976), amended by Pub. L. No. 103-397, 108 Stat. 
4156 (1994) (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6907 (2006)). 
31 See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 601, 122 
Stat. 3765, 3896 (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 7111) (amending § 101(b) of The Secure 
Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000). 
32 See id. The U.S. government fiscal year begins on October 1 and ends on September 
30. Fiscal Year, U.S. Senate, http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/fiscal_year.htm 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2013). 
33 See Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 
§ 100111, 126 Stat. 405, 906 (2012) (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 6906) (noting extension 
from 2012 to 2013). 
34 Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act § 100101(a) (revising SRSA sec-
tions 101, 102, 203, 207, 208, 304, and 402 to strike “2011” and insert in its place “2012”); 
id. § 100111 (revising 31 U.S.C. § 6906 to strike “2012” and insert “2013”). 
35 See infra notes 289–312 and accompanying text (discussing the failed attempt to de-
lete the Survey & Management requirement in the NWFP); infra notes 313–335 and ac-
companying text (reviewing the failed attempt to delete the Aquatic Conservation Strategy 
in the NWFP); infra notes 336–361 and accompanying text (considering the failed attempt 
to create a new management plan for the O&C lands). 
36 Douglas Timber Operators, Inc. v. Salazar, 774 F. Supp. 2d 245, 249 (D.D.C. 2011) 
appeal dismissed, No. 11-5137, 2011 WL 2618209 (D.C. Cir. June 24, 2011); see also With-
drawn Records of Decision Archive, Bureau of Land Mgmt., http://www.blm.gov/or/plans/ 
wopr/rod/index.php (to view the respective plans, follow “Resource Management Plan” 
hyperlink in each district) (last visited Jan. 10, 2013). 
37 Memorandum from Acting Director, Land and Minerals Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the 
Interior, to the Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Inte-
rior 1 ( July 16, 2009), [hereinafter WOPR Withdrawal Memo], available at http://pacific 
rivers.org/files/wopr/exhibit%20A.pdf/at_download/file. 
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 In 2012, the continued inability of the O&C lands to provide 
county revenues led to widespread reports that some of the Oregon 
and California counties (“O&C counties”) would become insolvent— 
notably Curry County along the southern Oregon coast.38 This appar-
ent crisis produced proposals in Congress to significantly revise federal 
land management in western Oregon.39 The most prominent of these 
measures—a proposal co-sponsored by Representatives Peter DeFazio 
(D-Or.), Kurt Schrader (D-Or.), and Greg Walden (R-Or.)—would di-
vide the O&C lands into a private timber trust and a public conserva-
tion zone.40 If enacted, the plan would not only revolutionize federal 
timber harvests in western Oregon, but also public land law in general. 
 This Article investigates the long controversy over what are now 
the O&C lands. Part I explores the railroad grant itself and its after-
math, including the Oregon land fraud trials of the early twentieth cen-
tury, the case that eventually led the U.S. Supreme Court to require the 
O&C lands to be revested, and the ensuing congressional reactions.41 
Part II explains how the harvest practices of the O&C lands led to nu-
merous lawsuits in the late 1980s and early 1990s.42 Part III examines 
the NFWP, designed to respond to that litigation, and the congressional 
response to the NFWP in the 1995 Timber Rider.43 Part IV turns to the 
legal assault the Bush Administration mounted on the NWFP in the 
2000s, its surprising legal ineffectiveness, and the Obama Administra-
tion’s unwillingness to pursue the Bush WOPR.44 Part V briefly outlines 
concurrent county payment statutes, explaining how the drying up of 
those funds has pushed rural Oregon counties to the brink of insol-
vency.45 Part VI assesses two congressional proposals for completely re-
vamping O&C land administration and outlines several alternative 
revenue generating schemes.46 The Article concludes that the long his-
tory of contentiousness over the O&C lands suggests that proposals to 
                                                                                                                      
38 See, e.g., Eric Mortenson, Rural Oregon Counties Scramble as Timber Payments Dry Up, While 
Critics Say It’s Time They Paid for Services, Oregonian, Mar. 4, 2012 [hereinafter Mortenson, 
Rural Oregon Counties Scramble], http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/2012/ 
03/oregon_timber_counties_scrambl.html. Curry County has among the lowest real estate 
taxes in the state. 
39 See infra notes 388–420 and accompanying text (detailing the two most prominent 
proposals). 
40 See infra notes 388–409 and accompanying text. 
41 See infra notes 47–157 and accompanying text. 
42 See infra notes 158–206 and accompanying text. 
43 See infra notes 207–284 and accompanying text. 
44 See infra notes 285–361 and accompanying text. 
45 See infra notes 362–375 and accompanying text. 
46 See infra notes 376–525 and accompanying text. 
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revolutionize O&C land management threaten the future of public 
land law by privatizing a resource the public has controlled, although 
not always well, since the founding of the nation. 
I. Background 
 The O&C lands have a long and checkered past, full of fraud, in-
trigue, and legal uncertainty. Because of this history, any solution to the 
issues currently facing the O&C lands must be informed by their his-
tory. The O&C land controversy began in the 1860s and has raged ever 
since. 
A. The O&C Land Grant 
 As a part of its push to settle the West, Congress established a land 
grant in 1866 to connect Portland, Oregon to California by rail.47 Con-
gress also authorized the Oregon Legislature to determine the com-
pany that would build the line.48 Congress anticipated that an Oregon 
railroad would build a line from Portland to the Oregon-California 
border, and a California railroad would build a line from the Central 
Valley north to the same state border.49 Because railroad construction 
facilitated settlement, Congress granted the railroad companies the 
right to earn a land patent to every odd-numbered, alternate section of 
non-mineral public land within twenty miles on each side of the con-
structed railway line.50 If the government had previously disposed of 
the railroad’s land selections, the railroad could acquire “in lieu” land 
sections within ten miles of the original railway corridor.51 After obtain-
ing land patents, the railroad company could sell the lands, but only to 
“bona fide and actual settlers under the pre-emption laws of the United 
States.”52 
 In the 1866 Act, Congress envisioned that the state would select 
the railroad companies within a year, and that construction of the line 
                                                                                                                      
47 Act of July 25, 1866, ch. 242, § 1, 14 Stat. 239, 239; see Deborah Scott & Susan Jane 
M. Brown, The Oregon and California Lands Act: Revisiting the Concept of “Dominant Use,” 21 J. 
Envtl. L. & Litig. 259, 262–63 (2006). 
48 Act of July 25, 1866 § 1. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. §§ 2, 4 (providing that once the railroads reported to the federal government, 
and the government confirmed that twenty consecutive miles of line had been laid, the 
railroads received patents for the grant lands). A land patent is an official document grant-
ing public land to a private person. Black’s Law Dictionary 1234 (9th ed. 2010). 
51 Act of July 25, 1866 § 2. 
52 Id. 
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would be complete by 1875.53 Importantly, the Act specified that failure 
to follow the terms of the grant would result in reversion of all granted 
lands to the United States.54 
 In October 1866, a Portland, Oregon-based company, the West 
Side Company, organized the Oregon Central Railroad Company.55 
Shortly thereafter, the Oregon Legislature designated the West Side 
Company as a beneficiary of the 1866 Act.56 The West Side Company 
then filed for a patent with the U.S. Department of the Interior (“Inte-
rior”).57 Although the West Side Company initially won the rights to 
build the railway, a group of California promoters organized the East 
Side Company in Salem, Oregon in 1867, challenging the validity of 
the West Side Company’s incorporation.58 Due to this dispute between 
the two companies, Congress extended the deadlines established in the 
1866 grant.59 
 In 1868, as a result of a heated political battle, the Oregon Legisla-
ture reversed course and decided to award the rights to build the railway 
to the East Side Company.60 The West Side Company lost its designation 
because of the legislature’s decision.61 Even with the state’s approval, 
however, the East Side Company could not file for a patent from Inte-
rior under the terms of the 1866 grant because the deadline to file had 
                                                                                                                      
53 Act of July 25, 1866, ch. 242, § 6, 14 Stat. 239, 241. 
54 Id. § 8 (mandating that if the companies fail to “comply with the terms and condi-
tions required . . . this act shall be null and void, and all the lands not conveyed by patent 
to said company or companies . . . shall revert to the United States”). 
55 O&C R.R. I, 186 F. at 868. The “West Side Company” was so named because it pro-
posed to construct a railway from Portland to McMinnville on the west side of the Wil-
lamette River. Id. 
56 H.J. Res. 13, 4th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1866). 
57 See O&C R.R. I, 186 F. at 868. Under the grant, the state-approved railroad company 
had to file its assent to the Act with Interior within one year of the act’s passage. Act of July 
25, 1866 § 6. 
58 O&C R.R. I, 186 F. at 868; David Maldwyn Ellis, The Oregon and California Railroad 
Land Grant, 1866–1945, 39 Pac. Nw. Q. 253, 255 (1948). 
59 See Act of June 25, 1868, ch. 80, 15 Stat. 80 (extending deadline to complete first 
twenty miles until late 1869, and extending the deadline for completion of the entire line 
until 1880). 
60 H.J. Res. 16, 5th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1868); see Staff of S. Comm. on Inte-
rior and Insular Affairs, 86th Cong., Rep. on the Disposition of the Public Domain 
in Oregon 38 (Comm. Print 1960) (Ph.D. dissertation of Jerry A. O’Callaghan, Stanford 
University, published in the committee print) [hereinafter O’Callaghan] (describing the 
political battle to obtain designation from the Oregon Legislature); Ellis, supra note 58, at 
255. 
61 O’Callaghan, supra note 60. 
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expired.62 In 1869, Congress amended the 1866 grant by extending the 
filing period until April 1870, thus resolving the East Side Company’s 
problem.63 Importantly, in the 1869 amendment, Congress also reaf-
firmed that the railroad company could sell its patented land only to 
actual settlers, in parcels no larger than one-quarter sections (160 
acres), and for no more than $2.50 per acre.64 
 In 1870, the East Side Company organized into the O&C R.R. and 
finished consolidating the West Side Company’s O&C-related holdings 
in 1874.65 By 1873, the O&C R.R. had built 197 miles of railway, extend-
ing from Portland to Roseburg, Oregon.66 From 1873 through the early 
1880s, the O&C R.R. experienced financial difficulties, frequently 
halted construction, and even entered receivership after defaulting on 
bond repayments.67 Finally, in 1887, Southern Pacific Railroad ac-
quired the O&C R.R.68 Construction of the line resumed that year and 
reached the California border by June 1888—nearly eight years after its 
slated completion date.69 
 By the time the line became operational in 1888, the O&C R.R. 
had earned nearly 3,728,000 acres of land, even though it was techni-
                                                                                                                      
62 Id. The state-designated railroad company had to file its assent with Interior by July 
25, 1867, under the original terms of the 1866 Act. See Act of July 25, 1866, ch. 242, § 6, 14 
Stat. 239, 241. 
63 Act of April 10, 1869, ch. 27, 16 Stat. 47. The East Side Company proceeded to make 
the proper filings in late 1869. O&C R.R. I, 186 F. at 869. 
64 16 Stat. at 47. These provisions mirrored the Homestead Act of 1862. See ch. 75, § 1, 
12 Stat. 392, 392 (repealed 1976). After the East Side Company filed its assent with Inte-
rior, the West Side Company ceased to be involved in the O&C railroad construction, al-
though it did receive a later grant to build a railway from Portland to Astoria. Act of May 4, 
1870, ch. 69, § 1, 16 Stat. 94, 94; O’Callaghan, supra note 60, at 39. The Act reiterated that 
the West Side Company could sell its patented lands to actual settlers only, in parcels no 
greater than 160 acres, for no more than $2.50 per acre. Act of May 4, 1870 § 4. During the 
1870s, the West Side Company built forty-seven miles of railway from Portland to McMinn-
ville. O&C R.R. I, 186 F. at 871. 
65 O&C R.R. I, 186 F. at 869, 871; O’Callaghan, supra note 60, at 40. 
66 O&C R.R. I, 186 F. at 871. 
67 Scott & Brown, supra note 47, at 263–64. The O&C R.R. issued five million dollars in 
bonds in both 1881 and 1883 that allowed the railroad to resume construction of the line. 
O&C R.R. I, 186 F. at 871. The O&C R.R. used this money to extend the line to Ashland, 
Oregon by 1884. Id. However, the railroad defaulted on the payment of both bonds, and 
thus entered receivership in 1885. Id. 
68 O&C R.R. I, 186 F. at 872. In 1887, Southern Pacific negotiated a buy-out with the 
O&C R.R. and its bondholders. Id. The result of this contract was to merge the O&C R.R. 
into Southern Pacific. Id. 
69 Id. at 873; Act of June 25, 1868, ch. 80, 15 Stat. 80 (setting a completion date of July 
1, 1880). 
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cally entitled to 4,220,000 acres.70 Despite “owning” these vast tracts of 
land, the railroad had incentives not to patent its lands,71 and was oth-
erwise largely unsuccessful in selling land to settlers in the 1870s and 
1880s.72 As a result, by 1890, the O&C R.R., and its successor, Southern 
Pacific, had patented only 323,184 acres, leaving over three million 
acres of unpatented land.73 Of the patented acreage, just three hun-
dred thousand acres had been sold to settlers, as required by the terms 
of the grant, meaning that some twenty-three thousand acres had been 
sold to non-settlers.74 
 By the mid-1890s, the perceived value of the O&C timberlands 
shifted dramatically. Around this time, the Great Lakes timber industry 
began to exhaust its supply of timber.75 As a result, much of the na-
tion’s timber industry moved from the Midwest to the Northwest.76 Be-
tween 1893 and 1906, the O&C R.R. patented 2,450,000 acres of its 
grant.77 By 1900, the 1866 grant lands had an estimated worth of $30–
$50 million.78 Because its grant land contained valuable timber, the 
railroad began selling off large swaths, often in blatant disregard of the 
                                                                                                                      
70 United States v. Or. & Cal. R.R. (O&C R.R. III ), 8 F.2d 645, 650, 660 (D. Or. 1925); 
see Scott & Brown, supra note 47, at 264. The disparity was a result of settlement pressures 
along the railway route. Ellis, supra note 58, at 254. In the alluvial lands of Oregon’s Wil-
lamette Valley, homesteaders had already preempted much of the available land. Id. More-
over, once the line route was announced, speculators rushed in to buy land. Id. This prac-
tice forced the O&C R.R. to select grant lands in the more distant indemnity zone. 
O’Callaghan, supra note 60, at 41. As a result, the railroad was not allotted its full entitle-
ment. Id. 
71 The O&C R.R. was slow to patent its grant lands because until a patent passed from 
the federal government to the railway, the O&C R.R. could avoid taxes and fees on the 
land. Ellis, supra note 58, at 260. 
72 See O’Callaghan, supra note 60, at 41. From 1874 to 1881, the O&C R.R. was unsuc-
cessful in its efforts to market and sell its lands to settlers. Id. at 40. This included failed 
marketing efforts in the eastern United States and Europe, where the land was offered at 
$1.25 per acre. Id. At that time, the prevailing view was that these lands were of low value 
because they were located in rugged, mountainous, timber-covered terrain. Id. at 41. Since 
the original intention was to facilitate agricultural settlement, this understanding as to the 
character of the land did not help the O&C R.R. dispose of lands. See Ellis, supra note 58, 
at 260–61. 
73 O’Callaghan, supra note 60, at 41; Scott & Brown, supra note 47, at 264. 
74 O’Callaghan, supra note 60, at 41. These small parcels conformed to the acreage 
and “actual settler” provisions of the grant, although some parcels were sold for more than 
allowed. Ellis, supra note 58, at 260 (noting sales during this period at $1.25 to $7 per 
acre). 
75 Scott & Brown, supra note 47, at 264. 
76 See Ellis, supra note 58, at 261. 
77 O&C R.R. I, 186 F. at 873. 
78 O’Callaghan, supra note 60, at 41. 
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grant’s “actual settler,” acreage, and price provisions.79 By 1903, the 
O&C R.R. and Southern Pacific had sold 5306 tracts, totaling approxi-
mately 820,000 acres.80 These sales ranged from $5 to $40 per acre, and 
the railroad sold some 524,000 acres of the patented land in parcels 
greater than 160 acres, including several huge sales.81 
                                                                                                                     
 In 1903, Southern Pacific withdrew all the O&C lands from sale in 
an effort to hold reserves until stumpage prices— “the value of stand-
ing timber”82—rose even higher.83 But in the early 1900s, Oregon was a 
hotbed for the anti-monopolistic Progressive movement, and the deci-
sion to withdraw the O&C lands gave Oregonians a negative perception 
of railroad companies and railroad grants.84 The withdrawal would 
prove fateful for Southern Pacific and the O&C lands, especially as the 
Oregon land fraud scandals brought Oregon timberland disposition 
into the national spotlight. 
B. The Oregon Land Fraud Scandal and Changing Public Opinion 
 The booming, illegal sales of O&C lands were a microcosm of the 
pervasive land fraud dynamics plaguing early twentieth-century Ore-
gon. Beginning in 1902, the Theodore Roosevelt Administration began 
investigating widespread land fraud in Oregon and California,85 prin-
cipally under the Timber and Stone Act of 187886 and the Forest Man-
agement Act of 1897.87 These investigations eventually led to the in-
dictment of over one thousand people, including both of Oregon’s 
U.S. Senators, a U.S. Congressman, a U.S. District Attorney, a GLO 
Commissioner, several Oregon State Senators and Assistant Attorneys, 
 
79 Id. Under the federal grant, the O&C R.R. could sell its patented land only to actual 
settlers, in parcels no larger than one-quarter sections (160 acres) and for no more than 
$2.50 per acre. Act of April 10, 1869, ch. 27, 16 Stat. 47. 
80 O&C R.R. I, 186 F. at 873. 
81 Id. The O&C R.R. made a number of sales in excess of one thousand acres, includ-
ing one of forty-five thousand acres. Id. 
82 Black’s Law Dictionary 1560 (9th ed. 2010). 
83 Ellis, supra note 58, at 261. The chief executive of Southern Pacific stated the com-
pany’s motives for the withdrawal: “[t]he agricultural land we will sell, but the timber-land 
we will retain, because we must have ties and bridge timbers, and we must retain our tim-
ber for future supply . . . .” Id. 
84 Scott & Brown, supra note 47, at 265 (noting that Oregonians already distrusted rail-
roads for their tax avoidance techniques); Dodds, supra note 17, at 749. 
85 John Messing, Public Lands, Politics, and Progressives: The Oregon Land Fraud Trials, 
1903–1910, 35 Pac. Hist. Rev. 35, 35, 37 (1966); see also S. Rep. No. 58-189, at v (1905) 
(asking the Public Lands Commission to recommend changes necessary to correct the 
land fraud). 
86 Ch. 151, 20 Stat. 89 (repealed 1955). 
87 Ch. 2, § 1, 30 Stat. 11, 36 (repealed 1905). 
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and countless other businessmen and officials in the state.88 The scan-
dal catalyzed a sea change in timberland disposition policies that would 
ultimately seal the fate of the O&C lands. 
 According to a U.S. Senate Report, the federal government ob-
served an “unusual increase in the number of entries” under the Tim-
ber and Stone Act around the turn of the century.89 Under the statute, 
an applicant applied to a local land office for a patent, alleging that the 
land was “chiefly valuable for its timber or stone.”90 Assuming no one 
protested the claim, the claimant was eventually issued a patent, al-
though not required to reside on or cultivate the land.91 Consequently, 
a speculator could enlist locals to apply for patents and agree to buy the 
land for more than $2.50 per acre.92 Moreover, a well-placed bribe by a 
powerful politician could quickly expedite the process.93 
 Many speculators also capitalized on the creation of new forest re-
serves.94 Under the “in lieu” provision of the Forest Management Act, 
people who had previously settled or owned lands within these reserves 
obtained the option to keep their land—as an inholding—or to select 
an equal amount of land outside the reserve.95 Speculators invested in 
lands near potential reserves and bribed officials to include those lands 
in the boundaries of the reserves.96 This use of the “in lieu” provision 
was quite prevalent in Oregon, where President Roosevelt enlarged 
Oregon’s forest reserves to thirteen million acres in the early 1900s.97 
 The land fraud scandal began to materialize in 1902 when a pro-
gressive advocate employed by the GLO received letters from a disgrun-
tled former employee of a California-based land fraud ring.98 Despite 
GLO Commissioner Binger Hermann’s attempts to sabotage the inves-
tigation, the GLO sent special agents to both California and Oregon to 
                                                                                                                      
88 Draffan, supra note 1, at 22. 
89 S. Rep. No. 58-189, at vi. 
90 Timber and Stone Act of 1878 §§ 1–2; see also S. Rep. No. 58-189, at vi (describing 
how speculators manipulated the Act). 
91 S. Rep. No. 58-189, at v–vi. 
92 Id. The Supreme Court was familiar with the scheme, even if it could not prove it. 
See United States v. Budd, 144 U.S. 154, 155–57, 161 (1892). 
93 Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction 
and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 Wash. L. Rev. 479, 489–90 (1987) (“With a few well placed 
bribes, the applications would be approved and the settlers would then transfer their deeds 
in exchange for a modest payoff.”). 
94 See Messing, supra note 85, at 37. 
95 Forest Management Act of 1897, ch. 2, § 1, 30 Stat. 11, 36 (repealed 1905). 
96 See Messing, supra note 85, at 37. 
97 See Elmo Richardson, BLM’s Billion-Dollar Checkerboard: Managing the 
O & C Lands 10 (1980); Messing, supra note 85, at 37. 
98 See Messing, supra note 85, at 38–39. 
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investigate the allegations.99 In Oregon, the agents discovered the so-
called “11–7” and “24–1” land fraud schemes, headed by Steven Puter.100 
When Puter’s claims did not receive patents, he traveled to Washington, 
D.C. and bribed Oregon Senator John H. Mitchell to have Commis-
sioner Hermann expedite the claims.101 Although Puter was indicted for 
fraud in both schemes in October 1903, Senator Mitchell and many 
other politicians might have avoided prosecution if not for the ap-
pointment of special prosecutor Francis J. Heney.102 After Heney arrived 
in Portland in 1903, he discovered that the U.S. Attorney for Oregon, 
John H. Hall—who was up for reappointment—intended to prosecute 
Puter for the weaker “24–1” claim, but not for the “11–7” claim.103 
When Heney changed course, Puter was convicted of fraud for the “11–
7” claim.104 After Senator Mitchell convinced Hall to drop charges 
against Puter’s co-conspirators while publicly castigating him, Puter 
turned on the Senator.105 Implicated by a long paper trail, a jury con-
victed the Senator in July 1905, and he received a sentence of six 
                                                                                                                      
99 See id. at 39–40. 
100 See id. at 40–42. The “11–7” tract was a remote piece of land located on Mt. Jeffer-
son in the soon-to-be-incorporated Cascade Forest Reserve. Id. at 42. Puter and his cohorts 
convinced non-settlers to enter homestead claims, and then paid $3800 for 12 claims. See 
Jerry A. O’Callaghan, Senator Mitchell and the Oregon Land Frauds, 1905, 21 Pac. Hist. Rev. 
255, 256 (1952). Puter then paid C.E. Loomis, an investigator in the Oregon City district 
land office, $1000 to favorably investigate the claims. Id. at 257. Despite Loomis’s positive 
report, the GLO commissioned another investigator; Puter again paid this investigator 
$500. See id. The “24–1” scheme essentially repeated the same process, although the ring 
used actual settlers. See Messing, supra note 85, at 43. Puter and his ring then paid $100 
each to the GLO Commissioner for the Eugene Land Office to expedite the claims. See id. 
101 See O’Callaghan, supra note 100, at 257. Recognizing Senator Mitchell’s interest in 
women, Puter also brought along Emma Watson, the person to whom the “11–7” deed had 
been issued. See id.; see also Perdue, supra note 93, at 489 (describing Mitchell’s publicly-
exposed affair with his second wife’s younger sister). Watson signed an affidavit claiming 
that she was a widow and that she would lose her investment if the claims were not expe-
dited. See O’Callaghan, supra note 100, at 257. Although Mitchell initially rejected the of-
fer, he finally relented, and spoke with Commissioner Hermann, who then promptly ap-
proved the patents. See id. at 257–58. With the patents approved, Puter returned to Oregon 
and sold the patents to Frederick Kribs for $10,080. See id. at 258. Although Senator 
Mitchell denied the bribery allegations, records eventually surfaced that Kribs paid the 
Senator’s private law firm the amount alleged. See id. at 259. 
102 See O’Callaghan, supra note 100, at 258. Heney received his appointment because 
he was not sympathetic to the local interests in the case. See id. President Roosevelt and 
Gifford Pinchot, the head of the United States Forest Service at the time, staunchly sup-
ported Heney. See Draffan, supra note 1, at 22. 
103 See Messing, supra note 85, at 45. Hall likely felt pressure to acquiesce to the Oregon 
congressional delegation, as he needed their support in order to gain reappointment. Id. 
104 See id. at 49–50. Although prosecutors planned to prosecute the “24–1” count, the 
court stayed the case. Id. at 50. 
105 See id.; O’Callaghan, supra note 100, at 259. 
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months in jail and a fine of one thousand dollars.106 By Heney’s request, 
U.S. Attorney Hall was also dismissed immediately before the Mitchell 
indictment.107 On the other hand, Commissioner Hermann, as a result 
of a conveniently timed earthquake in 1906, avoided conviction in this 
and other land fraud cases, and was in fact later elected to Congress.108 
                                                                                                                     
 Although the Mitchell trial was the most notable, a number of 
other Oregon land fraud scandals infiltrated all levels of Oregon gov-
ernment and business. A second major land fraud trial involved U.S. 
Representative John Williamson, his partner in a sheep grazing busi-
ness, and a U.S. Lands Commissioner in the Prineville, Oregon dis-
trict.109 In order to maintain prime summer sheep grazing areas, Wil-
liamson and his partner bribed the Prineville commissioner to hire set-
tlers, who would then enter fake claims under the Timber and Stone 
Act in the desired areas, and then ensure that the false claims were pat-
ented.110 The grand jury indicted the group in February 1905 and, af-
ter two hung juries, a third jury convicted Williamson and the Land 
Commissioner in October 1905, sentencing them to jail and imposing 
fines.111 
 In a third major scheme, which led to indictments in February 
1905, a number of state senators purchased lands in the hope that they 
would be included in proposed forest reserves, thus making the sena-
tors eligible to receive “in lieu” selections under the Forest Reserves 
Act.112 A fourth trial involved a similar scheme involving a major Ore-
 
106 See Messing, supra note 85, at 56; O’Callaghan, supra note 100, at 261. 
107 See O’Callaghan, supra note 100, at 259. 
108 In connection with the land fraud investigations, Hermann destroyed a number of 
key files before he was forced to resign as Land Commissioner. See Messing, supra note 85, 
at 40. Immediately thereafter, Hermann was elected as a U.S. Representative from Oregon. 
See O’Callaghan, supra note 100, at 261. Heney intended to prosecute Hermann for record 
destruction. See Messing, supra note 85, at 61–62. The trial was originally set for April 25, 
1906. Id. at 59. However, when the San Francisco earthquake struck on April 18, 1906, 
Heney traveled to San Francisco in an effort to locate his three sisters who lived in the city. 
Id. After confirming the trial was to begin on June 11, 1906, Heney traveled to Arizona to 
complete some business. Id. Hermann’s lawyers then convinced the court to commence 
the trial on June 7, 1906, making it impossible for Heney to try the case. Id. This resulted 
in Hermann avoiding trial until 1910. See id. at 61. Although he was finally tried in 1910, 
the jury was unable to reach a verdict. Id. at 62. 
109 See Messing, supra note 85, at 53. 
110 See id. 
111 Id. at 57–58. Williamson and the Land Commissioner received jail sentences of ten 
months each and were ordered to pay five hundred dollars each. See id. at 58. Williamson’s 
sheep herding partner was sentenced to five months in jail, and ordered to pay a one 
thousand dollar fine. Id. 
112 See id. at 53. State Senators George Sorenson, Willard Jones, H.A. Smith, and F.P. 
Mays all received indictments for their roles in this scheme. Id. 
16 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 40:1 
gon livestock company.113 In addition to permeating all levels of Ore-
gon society, the Oregon land fraud scandals led to the repeal of the “in 
lieu” provision in the Forest Reservation Act and may have influenced 
the outcome of the 1912 Presidential election.114 
C. Litigation over the Reversion of the O&C Lands to the Federal Government 
 The timber-related intrigue and the attention created by the Ore-
gon land fraud scandals, Southern Pacific’s decision to remove the 
O&C lands from sale, and public concern over railroad monopolies, 
sparked interest in the O&C land grant.115 In 1904, during the heart of 
the land fraud trials, The Oregonian newspaper—a primary instigator in 
the anti-corporate, Progressive movement in Oregon—published no-
tice of a “homestead” clause in the 1869 Coos Bay Wagon grant.116 Al-
ready angry about Southern Pacific’s withdrawal of land from sale, 
“land hungry,” anti-monopoly Oregonians began to attack the rail-
road.117 Noticing that the O&C grant was nearly identical to the Coos 
                                                                                                                      
113 See id. at 54 (describing case against Butte Creek Land, Livestock and Lumber 
Company). Heney did not prosecute any of the cases after the Williamson verdict, as he 
was called to Washington D.C. to prosecute California land fraud cases and a case against 
Commissioner Hermann for his role in destroying files. Id. at 58. 
114 Congress repealed the “in lieu” provision in the Forest Management Act of 1897 in 
1905. Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1495, 33 Stat. 1264 (repealing the “Forest Lieu Act,” Act of 
June 4, 1897, ch. 2, § 1, 30 Stat. 34). Shortly before leaving office, President William How-
ard Taft pardoned Oregon State Senator Willard Jones for his role in the Oregon land 
fraud scandal, and condemned Heney’s (and by implication, former President Roose-
velt’s) methods. See William R. Hunt, Front-Page Detective: William J. Burns and 
the Detective Profession, 1880–1930, at 107 (1990); Charges of Hon. Oscar E. Keller 
Against the Attorney General of the United States Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 
143 (1922) (statement of former President William Howard Taft). In the 1912 electoral 
cycle, although Theodore Roosevelt handily won the primaries, half of Oregon’s delegates 
voted for Taft at the Republican national convention. Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore 
Roosevelt: An Autobiography 406 (Da Capo Press 1985) (1913). In dissecting his loss of 
the Republican nomination, Roosevelt noted that 146 former Oregon land fraud trial 
defendants, including Willard Jones, dominated the Oregon political machine. Id. 
115 See Ellis, supra note 58, at 262; Draffan, supra note 1, at 22. 
116 See Richardson, supra note 97; Ellis, supra note 58. The Act of March 3, 1869 
granted lands to the state of Oregon for the construction of the Coos Bay wagon road, 
from Coos Bay, Oregon to Roseburg, Oregon. Ch. 150, § 1, 15 Stat. 340, 340. The state 
subsequently granted the Coos Bay Wagon Road Company all “lands, right of way privi-
leges, and immunities” associated with the grant in exchange for the construction of the 
road. See S. Or. Co. v. United States, 241 F. 16, 17 (9th Cir. 1917). In 1917, ninety-six thou-
sand acres of this land revested to the federal government because the Wagon Company 
violated the homestead, price, size, and timber-cutting restriction terms of the grant. Id. at 
17, 19–20, 24. 
117 See Dodds, supra note 17, at 749. 
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Bay Wagon grant in these respects,118 the competing Booth-Kelley 
Lumber Company—in need of new timber supplies—pounced.119 In-
stead of paying market prices for Northwest timber, Booth-Kelley be-
lieved it could acquire timber for no more than $2.50 per acre from the 
O&C lands.120 But the anti-railroad, Progressive public sentiment of the 
time, together with the competitive advantage sought by Southern Pa-
cific competitors, catalyzed the forfeiture movement.121 
 Once the issue gained momentum: Oregonians mobilized to “res-
cue the public interest” from the railroad monopoly.122 The issue be-
came a hot-ticket item for Governor—and later U.S. Senator—George 
Chamberlain, the Oregon legislature, and the media.123 In 1908, Con-
gress got involved, directing the U.S. Attorney General (AG) to enforce 
the terms of the O&C grant.124 Shortly thereafter, the AG filed suit, 
seeking forfeiture of all unsold O&C grant lands to the federal gov-
ernment.125 In the alternative, the AG sought 1) appointment of a re-
ceiver to carry out the 1869 Act’s sale price, size, and actual settler con-
ditions, or 2) sale of the remaining O&C grant lands in compliance 
with the Act.126 
 In 1911, the Circuit Court for the District of Oregon held that the 
whole 1866 grant to the O&C R.R. was subject to forfeiture because it 
                                                                                                                      
118 Like the O&C grant, the Coos Bay Wagon grant required the company to sell land 
at up to $2.50 per acre, in parcels less than 160 acres. See Act of Mar. 3, 1869 § 1. Although, 
the law required only that lands “shall be sold to any one person,” as opposed to “actual 
settlers only.” See id. 
119 See Ellis, supra note 58, at 263. 
120 See id. 
121 See id at 263–64. 
122 See Richardson, supra note 97. The Oregonian’s well-timed publication in 1904, 
combined with Booth-Kelley’s economic motives, catalyzed a movement in Oregon to re-
claim the O&C lands from the “tyranny of the railroad monopoly.” See id. 
123 See Ellis, supra note 58, at 263–64. Recognizing that public sentiment was against the 
railroads, Governor George Chamberlain quickly took up the forfeiture cause and argued 
that the lands should be sold to settlers under the homestead clause. See id. at 263. In early 
1907, the Oregon Senate passed a joint resolution to the President and Congress, urging the 
federal government to make Southern Pacific Railroad forfeit the O&C lands. S.J. Memorial 
3, 24th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 1907 Or. Laws 516–17 (Or. 1907); O’Callaghan, supra note 
60, at 43. In 1907, The Oregonian summed up public opinion regarding the O&C lands: “[t]he 
reign of broken pledges and greedy grab of nonresident landlords should end. Oregon as-
pires to a nobler destiny than striving for the pleasure and profit of these barons.” See 
O’Callaghan, supra note 60, at 43 (citing Oregonian, May 24, 1907). 
124 S.J. Res. 18, 60th Cong., 35 Stat. 571 (1908). 
125 O&C R.R. I, 186 F. at 865–66. In September of 1908, the AG filed suit against the 
O&C R.R. (owned by Southern Pacific), and 45 individual purchasers. See O’Callaghan, 
supra note 60, at 43. 
126 O&C R.R. I, 186 F. at 874–75; see April 10, 1869, ch. 27, 16 Stat. 47. 
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had not followed the “conditions subsequent” established in the 1869 
Act when it sold tracts greater than 160 acres in size to non-settlers for 
more than $2.50 per acre.127 Southern Pacific appealed and stopped 
paying taxes to the counties.128 These tax amounts were significant.129 
In 1912, Congress responded to public concerns about the effects of 
the lower court decision on O&C land purchasers by providing buyers 
an opportunity to obtain clear title to the lands they purchased from 
the O&C R.R. or its successor, Southern Pacific, prior to 1908.130 
 In 1915, the Supreme Court decided the fate of the remaining un-
sold O&C grant lands. First, the court enjoined the railroad from fur-
ther disposing of O&C lands or cutting any timber from them.131 The 
Court did not agree that violations of the 1869 Act conditions led to 
forfeiture, however, deciding that the grants contained enforceable 
covenants that when breached, led to injunctive relief, not forfeiture.132 
Thus, instead of ruling that Southern Pacific forfeited the grant land, 
the Supreme Court in effect remanded the land disposition and com-
pensation issues to Congress.133 
                                                                                                                      
127 O&C R.R. I, 186 F. at 921–22, 924, 933 (concluding that under the terms of the 
1866 grant, as amended in 1869, the O&C R.R. was allowed to sell the land only to actual 
settlers, in parcels up to 160 acres, for up to $2.50 per acre). “Conditions subsequent” are 
conditions, which if not followed, “entail a forfeiture of the lands granted for nonobser-
vance of the condition.” Id. at 890. 
128 See Scott & Brown, supra note 47, at 266. 
129 See Hearings on H.R. 5858, supra note 16, at 141. Prior to 1916, the railroad compa-
nies paid the O&C counties around five hundred thousand dollars annually in land taxes. 
Id. (statement of Guy Cordon, representative for the O&C counties). 
130 See Forgiveness Act of 1912, ch. 311, § 4, 37 Stat. 320, 321. Under the Forgiveness 
Act, buyers sued by the government could agree to forfeit their purchased land to the 
government, with the stipulation that if the buyers then paid the federal government $2.50 
per acre for the previously forfeited lands, the government would then issue patents to 
those buyers for the lands. Id.; see also Draffan, supra note 1, at 23. 
131 O&C R.R. II, 238 U.S. at 438–39; see Ellis, supra note 58, at 267. 
132 O&C R.R. II, 238 U.S. at 419, 431, 438; see Richard R. Powell & Patrick J. Ro-
han, Powell on Real Property § 676, at 60-112 (rev. vol. 1992); Scott & Brown, supra 
note 47, at 266. 
133 O&C R.R. II, 238 U.S. at 438–39 (“[T]he lands invite now more to speculation than 
to settlement, and we think, therefore, that the railroad company should [be enjoined 
from any further disposition] . . . until Congress shall have a reasonable opportunity to 
provide by legislation for their disposition in accordance with such policy as it may deem 
fitting under the circumstances and at the same time secure to the defendants all the value 
the granting acts conferred upon the railroads.”). In support of this conclusion, the Court 
noted that forfeiture would have led to a liquidation of the remaining unsold lands at 
$2.50 per acre, thus benefiting speculators, not settlers. See id. at 438; Ellis, supra note 58, at 
267. 
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D. Congressional Response to Management of the O&C Lands 
 As Congress deliberated on a solution, timberland speculators, in-
cluding Steven Puter, again ran wild.134 The Oregon public hoped that 
the land would be sold at the original grant price of $2.50 per acre, 
while county governments championed a solution that would afford 
them much-needed tax relief.135 The Chamberlain-Ferris Act of 1916 
(“the 1916 Act”) was the first attempt at a resolution.136 Under the 1916 
Act, all unsold O&C lands as of July 1, 1913—2,891,000 acres— 
revested in the United States.137 Southern Pacific received compensa-
tion under the Act.138 
 Congress instructed Interior to categorize these lands as either 
“timberlands,” power sites, or agricultural lands.139 If classified as tim-
berlands, the GLO had discretion to sell the timber, although Congress 
instructed the agency to do so “as rapidly as reasonable prices [could] 
be secured” through a public bidding process.140 Congress apportioned 
income generated from these sales in the following order: 1) Southern 
Pacific was to receive 4.1 million dollars for land the O&C R.R. earned 
from construction of the line;141 and 2) the U.S. Treasury was to be re-
paid the money it advanced to the O&C counties after Southern Pacific 
                                                                                                                      
134 See Ellis, supra note 58, at 268–69. In 1916, speculators filed between forteen thou-
sand and fifteen thousand applications with the railroad company to buy land. Id. at 268. 
Among these speculators was Steven Puter, who reportedly earned one million dollars in 
fees while representing those trying to locate new claims. See id. at 269; O’Callaghan, supra 
note 60, at 45. In addition, squatters rushed to stake out claims, believing that this would 
somehow provide them priority. See O’Callaghan, supra note 60, at 45. 
135 See id.; Ellis, supra note 58, at 271. Prior to the 1911 district court’s decision ruling 
that the O&C R.R. forfeited its lands—which prompted the railroads to stop paying tax-
es—the counties assessed the O&C R.R. property taxes at rates higher than $2.50 per acre. 
Ellis, supra note 58, at 271. After the railroads stopped paying taxes, the counties accumu-
lated over 1.3 million dollars in tax arrears between 1913 and 1916. See 53 Cong. Rec. 8593 
(1916) (written statement of Rep. Willis Chatman Hawley). 
136 See ch. 137, 39 Stat. 218. 
137 Id. § 1; see O’Callaghan, supra note 60, at 46; Ellis, supra note 58, at 267. 
138 See infra note 141 and accompanying text (describing the amount received by 
Southern Pacific). Although Congress paid compensation, the Act was in effect a condem-
nation because it gave the railroad no other options. 
139 Chamberlain-Ferris Act of 1916 § 2. The statute defined “[t]imberlands” as lands 
with three hundred thousand or more board feet of timber per forty acres. Id. 
140 Id. § 4. The GLO did have the right to reject bids it deemed insufficient, but the 
1916 Act set no minimum price. Id. 
141 The O&C R.R. earned 3,728,000 acres of land from construction. See supra note 70 
and accompanying text. Multiplied by $2.50 per acre, this amounted to $9.32 million. At 
the time of the reversion, the O&C R.R. and Southern Pacific had earned $5.24 million 
from land sales, timber, and interest. O&C R.R. III, 8 F.2d at 660 (providing a full account-
ing). The $4.1 million received by Southern Pacific reflected this balance. Id. 
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stopped paying property taxes on the O&C lands in 1911.142 The 1916 
Act required distribution of the remainder to the Oregon public school 
fund, to the O&C counties (in lieu of taxes), Federal Reclamation 
Fund, and U.S. Treasury general fund.143 The 1916 Act did not work as 
Congress intended, however. 
 The woefully underfunded and undermanned GLO, responsible 
for administering the 1916 Act, had few resources to facilitate and ad-
ministrate timber sales.144 Moreover, much of the O&C timber was not 
cheaply or easily accessible, especially when compared to other sources 
of Northwest timber.145 As a result, few sales occurred, and most O&C 
counties received no payments in lieu of taxes between 1916 and 
1926146 when Congress again intervened, enacting the Stanfield Act.147 
Under this statute, Interior was to pay the O&C counties $7.135 million 
from future timber sales—an amount equal to what they would have 
earned from railroad taxes between 1916 and 1926, if the O&C lands 
had not revested to the United States.148 But like the 1916 Act, the 
Stanfield Act proved unsuccessful in solving the counties’ financial 
problems. Between 1926 and 1937, the O&C counties received $3.86 
million in lieu of taxes, and the government owed them another $2 
million.149 By 1937, the Stanfield Act’s O&C Fund disbursed $18 mil-
lion to Southern Pacific, the U.S. Treasury, and the O&C counties, but 
timber sales from the O&C lands had raised only $8.3 million in reve-
nue for the fund.150 
 In an effort to provide a permanent fix, Congress enacted the 
Oregon & California Lands Act of 1937 (OCLA).151 OCLA declared 
that all O&C timberlands: 
                                                                                                                      
142 Chamberlain-Ferris Act of 1916, ch. 137, §§ 9–10, 39 Stat. 218, 221–22. From 1913 
to 1915, the U.S. Treasury lent over 1.5 million dollars to the counties to cover taxes owed 
to them on the O&C lands. Ellis, supra note 58, at 272. 
143 Chamberlain-Ferris Act of 1916 § 10. The Act earmarked 25% for the Oregon pub-
lic school fund, 25% for the counties (for schools, roads, and transportation infrastruc-
ture), 40% for the Federal Reclamation Fund, and the last 10% to the U.S. Treasury. Id. 
144 See Scott & Brown, supra note 47, at 267 (describing the resources available to the 
GLO as it attempted to facilitate sales under the 1916 Act). 
145 See Hearings on H.R. 5858, supra note 16, at 141–42 (statement of Guy Cordon, Rep-
resentative for the O&C counties). 
146 Ellis, supra note 58, at 275; Scott & Brown, supra note 47, at 267. 
147 Stanfield Act of 1926, ch. 897, § 1, 44 Stat. 915, 915–16. 
148 Id. §§ 1, 4; see Ellis, supra note 58, at 275. 
149 See Ellis, supra note 58, at 275. 
150 See id. 
151 Ch. 876, 50 Stat. 874 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1181a–1181j (2006)). 
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[S]hall be managed [by the GLO] . . . for permanent forest 
production, and the timber thereon shall be sold, cut, and 
removed in conformity with the principal of sustained yield 
for the purpose of providing a permanent source of timber 
supply, protecting watersheds, regulating stream flow, and 
contributing to the economic stability of local communities 
and industries, and providing recreational facilities.152 
The OCLA stated that until the GLO set the annual sustained yield ca-
pacity for the O&C lands, no more than five hundred million board 
feet of timber was to be cut.153 Once the GLO set the annual sustained 
yield, however, Congress directed the agency to make annual timber 
sales of “not less than one-half billion feet board measure, or not less 
than the annual sustained yield capacity [once set] . . . or so much 
thereof as can be sold at reasonable prices on a normal market.”154 The 
OCLA also authorized the GLO to subdivide the land into sustained 
yield forest units.155 Congress directed the agency to distribute revenue 
produced from O&C land sales according to the following formula: 
50% to the O&C counties; 25% to the federal treasury for payments in 
lieu of taxes that had been advanced to the counties—until the debt 
was extinguished—and then to the counties; and 25% for administra-
tive expenses.156 Congress later amended the formula twice; by 1981, 
the O&C counties and the U.S. Treasury were each entitled to 50% of 
timber receipts.157 
 Beginning with the contentious battle as to who would build the 
line, through the railroad’s sale of lands in violation of the original 
                                                                                                                      
152 43 U.S.C § 1181(a). In 1937, the O&C lands contained forty-six billion board feet of 
timber, or three percent of the nation’s total timber supply. S. Rep. No. 75-1231, at 2 
(1937). Despite protests from the USFS that it was better suited to manage the land, Con-
gress kept Interior—and its subdivision, the GLO—as the land manager. See Scott & 
Brown, supra note 47, at 276–77. 
153 See 43 U.S.C § 1181a. The provision did not specifically state that the GLO (through 
Interior) was the agency responsible for setting the annual sustained yield, but that is easily 
implied from the provision. See id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. § 1181f(a)–(c). 
157 After the GLO fully reimbursed the U.S. Treasury in 1952, Congress amended this 
formula by reserving up to one-third of the counties’ share for county road and capital main-
tenance programs on the O&C lands. See Act of July 31, 1953, ch. 298, § 1, 67 Stat. 261, 263; 
see also Bureau of Land Mgmt., FY 2005 Budget Justifications, at VIII-2 (2005), available 
at http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/wo/Business_and_Fiscal_Resources/just- 
ification.Par.1963.File.dat/2005Justification.pdf. Congress further amended the formula in 
1981 to split the revenue evenly. See Scott & Brown, supra note 47, at 278. 
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grant, the O&C lands engendered continuous controversy. The lands 
became part of a nationwide movement to eliminate fraudulent land 
disposition practices and may have influenced the outcome of the 1912 
presidential election. In the mid-1910s, at the direction of the U.S. Su-
preme Court, the lands revested in the government. Thereafter, Con-
gress and the courts attempted to shape a management regime that 
would repay the federal government for its tax relief, support the tim-
ber-reliant local communities, and produce a sufficient supply of tim-
ber. As a result of these efforts, culminating in the enactment of the 
OCLA in 1937, O&C land management was relatively non-contentious 
for nearly fifty years. That would all change, however, in the late 1980s. 
II. BLM Management of the O&C Lands and Increasing 
Management Controversy 
 From 1937 until the late 1980s, the General Land Office (GLO) 
(now the Bureau of Land Management (BLM))158 managed the 
revested lands in Oregon and California (“O&C lands”) with a great 
deal of unchallenged administrative discretion.159 Although the Ore-
gon & California Lands Act of 1937 (OCLA) articulated “multiple use” 
and sustained yield themes,160 BLM consistently contended that the 
OCLA, in fact, established a “dominant use” regime that elevated tim-
ber production above all other values.161 Consistent with this policy, the 
BLM managed the O&C lands for nearly a half-century, with the goal of 
maximizing timber harvests.162 Many Oregonians favored this policy 
because timber harvesting produced considerable revenue for the 
eighteen Oregon and California counties (“O&C counties”) in western 
                                                                                                                      
158 Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1946 created the BLM, and it inherited the responsibili-
ties of the GLO—including land management authority over the revested railroad grant 
lands. See James Muhn & Hanson R. Stuart, Opportunity and Challenge: The Story of 
BLM 54 (1988). 
159 See Michael C. Blumm & Jonathan Lovvorn, The Proposed Transfer of BLM Timber 
Lands to the State of Oregon: Environmental and Economic Questions, 32 Land & Water L. Rev. 
353, 363 (1997); Dodds, supra note 17, at 756–61. 
160 See Dodds, supra note 17, at 755 (claiming that the OCLA was the first federal law to 
require multiple-use management of federal public lands). 
161 See Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why “Multiple Use” 
Failed, 18 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 405, 424 (1994) (noting that the OCLA produced “a de 
facto ratification of dominant use principles”). As viewed by the House of Representatives, 
the OCLA “establishe[d] a vast, self-sustaining timber reservoir for the future. . . .” H.R. 
Rep. No. 75-1119, at 4 (1937). 
162 Dodds, supra note 17, at 756–61. 
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Oregon.163 In fact, one commentator suggested that the significance of 
OCLA revenues played a large role in preventing Oregon from enact-
ing a sales tax.164 Beginning in the late 1980s, however, a number of 
people began to question whether the BLM was complying with envi-
ronmental directives in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(FLPMA),165 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),166 and the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA).167 
 Under FLPMA—governing management of all the BLM’s public 
lands—the BLM must manage all public domain lands “on the basis of 
multiple use and sustained yield unless otherwise specified by law.”168 A 
savings clause in FLPMA, however, may exempt the O&C lands from its 
coverage: 
Notwithstanding any provision of this Act, in the event of con-
flict with or inconsistency between this Act and the Acts of 
August 28, 1937, and May 24, 1939, insofar as they relate to 
management of timber resources, and disposition of revenues 
from lands and resources, the latter Act shall prevail.169 
From 1977 to 1981, the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior 
(“Interior”) issued several opinions concluding that the OCLA was a 
“dominant use” statute, and that FLPMA’s “multiple-use” mandate con-
flicted with the OCLA, and thus did not apply to the O&C lands.170 
Two Ninth Circuit decisions in the 1970s and 1980s also assumed that 
the OCLA established a timber-dominant scheme for the O&C lands.171 
                                                                                                                      
 
163 See id. at 740–41. In 1984, for example, the O&C counties received almost sixty-six 
million dollars in revenues under the OCLA. Id. at 741. 
164 See id. at 741. 
165 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1785 (2006). 
166 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006). 
167 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006). 
168 43 U.S.C § 1701(a)(7). 
169 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, § 701(b), Pub. L. No. 94–579, 
90 Stat. 2743, 2786 (uncodified) (citations omitted). 
170 U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Solicitor’s Opinion: Review of BLM Policy 
Statement for Multiple Use Management of the Oregon and California Railroad 
and Coos Bay Wagon Road Revested Lands (O & C Lands) 94–95 (1981) (citing and 
confirming previous Solicitor memoranda from 1977 and 1979 that found the OCLA was a 
“dominant use” statute that might conflict with FLPMA’s broader management mandate); 
see Blumm & Lovvorn, supra note 159, at 365–66; Dodds, supra note 17, at 756–59. 
171 See O’Neal v. United States, 814 F.2d 1285, 1287 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting—in a per-
sonal injury action caused by the collapse of one of BLM’s roads—that the OCLA “make[s] it 
clear that the primary use of the revested lands is for timber production”); Skoko v. Andrus, 
638 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting in passing—in a dispute concerning Interior’s 
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Nonetheless, environmental groups in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
continued to argue for the applicability of FLPMA to the O&C lands, as 
well as the interaction of the OCLA with NEPA and the ESA. 
A. Headwaters v. Bureau of Land Management—An Early Victory for 
Dominant Use Management 
 In 1989, Headwaters, Inc. was the first to challenge a BLM timber 
sale on O&C lands. The environmental group asserted that the BLM 
had not fulfilled its NEPA obligation on the sale and claimed that 
FLPMA’s multiple-use mandate applied to the O&C lands.172 The U.S. 
District Court for the District of Oregon rejected both of these 
claims.173 Appealing to the Ninth Circuit, Headwaters argued that the 
BLM violated NEPA by not drafting an Environmental Impact State-
ment (EIS) on the timber sale in 1986.174 BLM had prepared an EIS on 
the land management plan Jackson and Klamath Sustained Yield Unit 
in 1979 and wrote an environmental assessment (EA), resulting in a 
finding of no significant impact for the timber sale in 1986. But Head-
waters argued that the BLM had not adhered to the requirements of 
NEPA because it had not performed a site-specific EIS on the land 
sale.175 Although Headwaters raised various environmental concerns, 
including new evidence establishing the presence of ESA-listed (as of 
June 1990) spotted owls in the sale area, the Ninth Circuit rejected all 
six of Headwaters’ NEPA claims.176 
                                                                                                                      
 
obligation to disburse disputed O&C funds—that the OCLA “provided that most of the O & 
C lands would henceforth be managed for sustained-yield timber production”). 
172 Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 
21,159, 21,160 (D. Or. May 23, 1989), aff’d, 914 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1990) (challenging the 
Wilcox Peak timber sale in southern Oregon). 
173 Id. at 21,162 (rejecting the NEPA claim); id. at 21,164 (rejecting the FLPMA claim). 
174 Headwaters, Inc., 914 F.2d at 1176. 
175 Id. Under NEPA, an agency must prepare an EIS for “major Federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006); see 
also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.11 (2011). If the agency finds that the action will not create a signifi-
cant impact to the environment, it need only perform a less rigorous EA. See id. § 1508.13; 
see also id. § 1508.9 (describing EAs). 
176 First, the court determined that new information on spotted owl habitat at the site did 
not trigger the need for an EIS. Headwaters, Inc., 914 F.2d at 1177–78. Next, river sedimenta-
tion caused by the timber harvest at the site did not trigger the need for a site-specific EIS. Id. 
at 1178. Third, timber harvesting’s effects on fire hazards did not trigger the need to per-
form a site-specific EIS. Id. at 1179. Fourth, new information regarding the site did not make 
the EA outdated. Id. Fifth, the BLM had considered a sufficient range of alternatives to the 
logging proposal. Id. at 1180–81. NEPA requires a federal agency to provide a “detailed 
statement . . . on . . . alternatives to the proposed action . . . [and to] study, develop, and de-
scribe appropriate alternatives.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), (E). Finally, the court held that the 
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 The second main issue in the case was whether the multiple-use 
management mandate in FLMPA applied to the O&C lands. Relying on 
dicta in prior cases, the district court ruled that the O&C lands were 
dominant-use lands, and therefore FLPMA’s mandate did not apply.177 
Headwaters argued on appeal that the OCLA’s directive to manage the 
O&C lands for “permanent forest production” included both timber 
production and non-timber values like wildlife conservation.178 The 
Ninth Circuit rejected this argument on the assumption that if “forest 
production” included non-timber habitat values, the sustained timber 
yield command in the OCLA would not be fulfilled.179 Consequently, 
the court equated “forest production” with “timber production” and 
held that other non-timber values were not on par with timber produc-
tion.180 Further, in analyzing the OCLA’s legislative history, the Ninth 
Circuit found “no indication that Congress intended ‘forest’ to mean 
anything beyond the aggregation of timber resources.”181 The court, 
however, identified no evidence that “forest” actually meant “timber.”182 
Moreover, this interpretation conflicted with the plain text of the 
OCLA, which lists five co-equal values to be managed for sustained 
yield.183 Finally, the court did not address the context in which the 
                                                                                                                      
site-specific EA adequately considered cumulative impacts from the construction of logging 
roads. Headwaters, Inc., 914 F.2d at 1181. “Cumulative impacts” are the collective impacts of all 
“past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7. The U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service added the northern spotted owl to the Endangered Species List on June 
26, 1990. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Threatened 
Status for the Northern Spotted Owl, 55 Fed. Reg. 26,114, 26,189 ( June 26, 1990). 
177 See Headwaters, Inc., 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) at 21,164 (citing O’Neal, 814 
F.2d at 1287) (“The weight of authority on the issue suggests that [the O&C] lands are to 
be managed with timber production as the dominant use . . . .”). 
178 Headwaters, Inc., 914 F.2d at 1183 (emphasis added) (relying on language in 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1181(a) (2006)). 
179 Id.; see 43 U.S.C. § 1181a (requiring that “timber . . . shall be sold, cut, and removed 
in conformity with the principal [sic] of sustained yield”). 
180 Headwaters, Inc., 914 F.2d at 1184 (“Congress intended to use ‘forest production’ 
and ‘timber production’ synonymously. Nowhere does the legislative history suggest that 
wildlife habitat conservation or conservation of old-growth forest is a goal on a par with 
timber production, or indeed that it is a goal of the O & C Act at all. The BLM did not err 
in construing the O & C Act as establishing timber production as the dominant use.”). 
181 Id. at 1183 (concluding that the purpose of the OCLA was to provide a stable fund-
ing source for the counties and to prevent timber clearcut harvesting without replanting). 
182 See Blumm & Lovvorn, supra note 159, at 370. 
183 Under OCLA, all O&C timberlands “shall be managed [by the GLO] . . . for per-
manent forest production, [in conformance with the principle of] sustained yield for the 
purpose of providing [1] a permanent source of timber supply, [2] protecting watersheds, 
[3] regulating stream flow, and [4] contributing to the economic stability of local commu-
nities and industries, and [5] providing recreational facilities.” 43 U.S.C § 1181a; see Scott 
& Brown, supra note 47, at 299–300. 
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OCLA arose.184 Although the BLM prevailed in Headwaters, subsequent 
cases would soon greatly curtail the agency’s power to manage the O&C 
lands so one-dimensionally. 
B. Portland Audubon Society v. Lujan and Seattle Audubon Society v. 
Lyons:The End of Unfettered BLM Management Discretion on the O&C Lands 
 In 1987, Portland Audubon Society and other groups mounted 
another challenge to the BLM’s timber management program on the 
O&C lands, alleging that the agency was in violation of several statutes 
including NEPA and the OCLA.185 Congressional appropriations riders 
with provisions that temporarily exempted timber harvests in the 
Northwest from judicial review delayed the litigation.186 Although the 
district court agreed that the BLM violated NEPA in 1989 by refusing to 
supplement the previous EISs in light of the newly discovered informa-
tion on spotted owls, it ruled that the 1987 and 1988 appropriation rid-
ers precluded any corrective action.187 
 However, in 1991, a federal court in Washington state enjoined 
logging in all suitable spotted owl habitats on U.S. Forest Service 
(USFS) lands.188 Once the congressional riders expired in 1992, the 
Oregon district court held that the BLM had also violated NEPA by not 
preparing a supplemental EIS (SEIS) in light of new information re-
garding spotted owl habitats.189 In so ruling, the court rejected the 
BLM’s argument that it could not comply with NEPA because doing so 
would be inconsistent with the OCLA’s provision requiring the agency 
                                                                                                                      
184 See Scott & Brown, supra note 47, at 301 (noting that Congress enacted the 1937 
OCLA while the nation was still reeling from the Dust Bowl, and fearful of a timber drought). 
185 Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Lujan, 795 F. Supp. 1489, 1492 (D. Or. 1992), aff’d sub 
nom. Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1993). 
186 Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. 701, 747 (1989) (“Congress hereby 
determines . . . that management of [the O&C lands] . . . is adequate . . . .”); Department 
of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 100-446, § 314, 102 
Stat. 1774, 1825–26 (1988). Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals initially held that 
these riders were unconstitutional, the Supreme Court reversed and upheld the riders. 
Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311, 1317 (1990), rev’d, 503 U.S. 429 
(1992). See generally Michael C. Blumm, Ancient Forests and the Supreme Court: Issuing a Blank 
Check for Appropriation Riders, 43 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 35 (1993). 
187 Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Lujan, 712 F. Supp. 1456, 1485, 1488–89 (D. Or.), aff’d, 
884 F.2d 1233 (9th Cir. 1989). 
188 Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1096 (W.D. Wash.), aff’d, 952 
F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991) (enjoining violations of the National Forest Management Act, 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1600–1671 (2006) (amending Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Plan-
ning Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-378, 88 Stat. 476 (1974))). 
189 Portland Audubon Soc’y, 795 F. Supp. at 1497, 1510–11. 
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to annually sell at least five hundred million board feet (MMBF) of tim-
ber.190 The district court also decided that nothing in the OCLA au-
thorized the BLM to exempt the O&C lands from NEPA.191 The court 
therefore enjoined the BLM from logging in “suitable” spotted owl 
habitats, or making timber sales that “may affect” the spotted owl.192 
 The BLM initially obtained a limited “God Squad” exemption 
from section 7 of the ESA for thirteen of forty-four timber sales in Ore-
gon one month before the district court issued its holding.193 The Clin-
ton Administration, however, ultimately withdrew the exemption re-
quest after environmentalists convinced a court that the George H.W. 
Bush Administration might have exerted undue influence on the God 
Squad.194 Shortly after the Clinton Administration withdrew the God 
Squad exemption request, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court 
decision in Portland Audubon Society, rejecting the BLM’s argument that 
Headwaters removed any obligation the agency had to supplement 
EISs.195 The Ninth Circuit distinguished Headwaters—in which the 
court held that a timber sale did not need a site-specific EIS because 
the site had already been examined in a programmatic EIS—from a 
                                                                                                                      
190 Id. at 1505–07 (“There is not an irreconcilable conflict in the attempt of the BLM 
to comply with both NEPA and the [OCLA].”). 
191 Id. at 1506. The court concluded that in setting annual timber harvest levels under 
section 1181a of the O&C Act,“ the BLM must comply with all applicable laws, including 
NEPA.” Id. 
192 Id. at 1509–10. The injunction was to remain in effect until the BLM submitted a 
SEIS examining how logging would affect the spotted owls. Id. at 1510–11. 
193 See John Lowe Weston, The Endangered Species Committee and the Northern Spotted Owl: 
Did the “God Squad” Play God?, 7 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 779, 808 (1993). The Endangered Spe-
cies Committee, or “God Squad,” is an executive-level committee authorized to grant ex-
emptions for federal agency actions that would otherwise violate the ESA. 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1536(e)–(n) (2006). 
194 Immediately before the district court issued its decision, the BLM formed a commit-
tee to address alternative solutions to the spotted owl issue. See Weston, supra note 193, at 805–
06. This committee proposed a draft alternative plan that would have allowed the agency to 
offer timber sales on forty-four tracts of BLM forestland in Oregon protected by the judicial 
injunctions. See id. at 805–08. The BLM apparently knew this new plan would not satisfy the 
ESA, and so it petitioned for an exemption from section 7. Id. at 806–08. The God Squad 
ultimately exempted thirteen sales from the ESA in 1992. Decision, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,405, 
23,405 ( June 3, 1992). Shortly thereafter, however, the Ninth Circuit held that the George 
H.W. Bush Administration may have improperly influenced the God Squad through ex parte 
communications, and remanded the original exemption decision to the God Squad. Port-
land Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1538, 1550 (9th Cir. 
1993). The newly elected Clinton Administration then decided to withdraw the exemption 
request altogether. John W. Steiger, The Consultation Provision of Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered 
Species Act and Its Application to Delegable Federal Programs, 21 Ecology L.Q. 243, 259 n.83 
(1994). 
195 See Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705, 709 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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situation in which the BLM failed to supplement the programmatic EIS 
governing the region’s timber management plans.196 Thus, the BLM 
could no longer claim that the OCLA exempted it from complying with 
NEPA or other environmental statutes like the ESA.197 
ion.202 
                                                                                                                     
 A year later, in Seattle Audubon Society v. Lyons,198 a federal judge in 
Washington upheld the 1994 Northwest Forest Plan (NWFP), expand-
ing on Portland Audubon Society and other pertinent cases.199 The dis-
trict court held that the ESA requires all agencies, including the BLM, 
to ensure that all of their activities are not likely to “jeopardize” ESA-
listed species or cause the destruction or modification of their critical 
habitat.200 The court also explicitly recognized that the BLM must “ful-
fill conservation duties imposed by other statutes,” such as NEPA and 
the ESA, in managing the O&C lands.201 In contrast to Headwaters, the 
district court also concluded that the OCLA required the BLM to man-
age the O&C lands for all of the values listed in the statute, not just 
timber product
 The 1995 Timber Salvage Rider temporarily authorized a number 
of federal timber sales in contravention of these decisions.203 Once the 
rider expired in late 1996, however, these important rulings took full 
 
196 Id. (“Here, however, plaintiffs are challenging the Secretary’s decision not to sup-
plement the EISs underlying the timber management plans that control myriad land use 
decisions with new information relating to the possible extinction of a species through the 
systematic implementation of the BLM’s timber-sale program throughout its lands.”). 
197 Blumm & Lovvorn, supra note 159, at 373–74. 
198 See 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1299–1300 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff’d sub nom. Seattle Audubon 
Soc’y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996). 
199 See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1473, 1483–84 (W.D. Wash. 
1992), aff’d sub nom. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that 
the USFS’ SEIS on their guidelines for the management of spotted owl habit violated NEPA); 
Lane Cnty. Audubon Soc’y v. Jamison, No. 91–6123–JO, 1991 WL 354885 (D. Or. Sept. 11, 
1991), aff’d in part and remanded in part, 958 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding the BLM vio-
lated section 7 of the ESA by failing to consult with the FWS regarding its logging strategy); 
see also infra notes 208–284 and accompanying text (discussing the Northwest Forest Plan). 
200 Seattle Audubon Soc’y v Lyons, 871 F. Supp. at 1314 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) 
(2006)). 
201 Id. (citing Portland Audubon Soc’y, 795 F. Supp. at 1500–02, 1505–07). Presumably, 
this holding extends to other federal environmental statutes. See Blumm & Lovvorn, supra 
note 159, at 376–77. 
202 See Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. at 1314 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1181a 
(2006)) (“Management under [the OCLA] must look not only to annual timber produc-
tion but also to protecting watersheds, contributing to economic stability, and providing 
recreational facilities.”). 
203 See infra notes 265–284 and accompanying text (discussing timber salvage rider in 
detail); see also Ross W. Gorte, Cong. Research Serv., 96-569 ENR, The Salvage Timber 
Sale Rider: Overview and Policy Issues (1996), available at http://www.cnie.org/nle/ 
crsreports/forests/for-17.cfm. 
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effect.204 Recent case law has affirmed the notion that the BLM’s NEPA 
and ESA obligations are not subservient to the OCLA, even if greater 
timber sales would yield economic benefits in conformance with the 
OCLA.205 As a result of these cases, the NWFP essentially superseded 
the OCLA as the primary management directive for the O&C lands.206 
III. The Northwest Forest Plan and the Backlash  
Against the Plan 
 In 1993, responding to the timber-harvesting injunctions issued in 
Portland Audubon Society v. Lujan and Seattle Audubon Society v. Lyons, 
high-level members of the newly elected Clinton administration— in-
cluding President Clinton, Vice President Al Gore, and three cabinet-
level federal secretaries—convened a nationally-televised Northwest 
Forest Conference to resolve the spotted owl controversy.207 Noticeably 
absent from the conference were the chief of the U.S. Forest Service 
(USFS), the director of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and 
Oregon’s congressional delegation.208 As the conference continued, its 
scope broadened beyond resolution of the spotted owl controversy to 
include salmon protection issues and forest management reform.209 At 
the close of the conference, President Clinton stated that any manage-
ment changes necessary to address the economic needs of timber 
communities and protect long-term forest health would be based on 
sound science, provide sustainable and predictable timber harvests, 
                                                                                                                      
204 The powers created by the rider expired on December 31, 1996. Emergency Sup-
plemental Appropriations for Disaster Assistance, for Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, for Assis-
tance in the Recovery from the Tragedy that Occured at Oklahoma City, and Rescissions 
Act, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-19 § 2001(j), 109 Stat. 194, 246. 
205 See, e.g., Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Boody, No. 03-3124-CO, 2004 WL 
1146538, at *8 (D. Or. May 18, 2004) (finding that the “public’s interest in ensuring that 
resources are not irretrievably committed without observance of required [NEPA] proce-
dures” outweighs the economic benefits from the sale of O&C land timber). 
206 Blumm & Lovvorn, supra note 159, at 377. 
207 Ross W. Gorte, Cong. Research Serv., 93-664 ENR, The Clinton Administra-
tion’s Forest Plan for the Pacific Northwest (1993), available at http://cnie.org/ 
NLE/CRSreports/forests/for-3.cfm; Yaffee, supra note 26; Michael C. Blumm, The Am-
phibious Salmon: The Evolution of Ecosystem Management in the Columbia River Basin, 24 Ecol-
ogy L.Q. 653, 669 (1997) [hereinafter Blumm, The Amphibious Salmon]. 
208 See Yaffee, supra note 26; Jack Ward Thomas et al., The Northwest Forest Plan: Origins, 
Components, Implementation Experience, and Suggestions for Change, 20 Conservation Biology 
277, 278 (2006), available at http://www.courses.washington.edu/esrm315/pdfs/NWFP.pdf. 
209 Yaffee, supra note 26, at 142–43. 
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and end government gridlock.210 The President also created three in-
ter-agency working groups, tasking them with crafting an “ecosystem 
management” solution for the Northwest forests.211 
 The most notable of these groups was Forest Ecosystem Manage-
ment Assessment Team (FEMAT).212 Although originally meant to be 
comprised of fifteen people, FEMAT quickly ballooned to a coalition of 
over one hundred scientists.213 FEMAT’s goal was to develop a set of 
management options that would comply with federal environmental 
laws, promote biological diversity, and produce a sufficient amount of 
timber.214 Specifically, FEMAT aimed to maintain and restore habitat 
conditions for the northern spotted owl, the marbled murrelet, and 
salmon stocks by establishing a “connected, interactive old-growth for-
est ecosystem.”215 In short, FEMAT’s mission was to view the Northwest 
forest system through a landscape ecosystem management lens as a 
complex, fragile, interrelated, and dynamic system that would be man-
aged in its entirety to protect the forests and its species.216 
 After months of work, FEMAT produced ten options for managing 
federal forestland in western Washington, western Oregon and north-
ern California.217 In developing these options, FEMAT studied their 
effects on over one thousand species of plants and animals.218 At the 
high end, Option 7 predicted 1.8 billion board feet of annual timber 
harvest, while at the low end, Option 1 anticipated an annual harvest of 
only 0.1 billion board feet.219 Ultimately, FEMAT recommended Op-
tion 9, which allowed for adaptive management and thinning of young 
                                                                                                                      
210 Forest Ecosystem Mgmt. Assessment Team, Forest Ecosystem Management: 
An Ecological, Economic, and Social Assessment 3–4 (1993), available at http://www. 
blm.gov/or/plans/nwfpnepa/FEMAT-1993/1993_%20FEMAT-ExecSum.pdf. 
211 See id.; John Mumma & Paul Grigsby, A Vision for Yellowstone’s Forests, 15 Pub. Land 
L. Rev. 11, 37 (1994). 
212 See Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1303 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff’d 
sub nom. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 80 F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996); Cameron B. Alston, 
Note, Oregon Natural Resources Council Action v. United States Forest Service, 27 Ecology 
L.Q. 727, 732–33 (2000). 
213 Kathie Durbin, Tree Huggers: Victory, Defeat & Renewal in the Northwest 
Ancient Forest Campaign 202 (1996). 
214 Forest Ecosystem Mgmt. Assessment Team, supra note 210, at 4–5. 
215 See Thomas et al., supra note 208, at 280–81. 
216 See Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of Ecosystem Man-
agement, 65 U. Colo. L. Rev. 293, 299, 302 (1994); Thomas et al., supra note 208, at 278; 
Alston, supra note 212, at 732. 
217 Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. Rey, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (W.D. Wash. 2005); 1994 
ROD, supra note 21, at 17–24; Thomas et al., supra note 208, at 281. 
218 See Thomas et al., supra note 208, at 281. 
219 1994 ROD, supra note 21, at fig.ROD-1. 
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monocultural stands in old-growth areas when those activities would 
enhance old-growth conditions.220 Option 9 also enlarged buffers for 
intermittent streams and created reserves around existing owl habitat 
in so-called “matrix” areas that allowed timber harvests.221 
 Option 9 predicted that up to 1.1 billion board feet of timber could 
be harvested; nearly seventy-five percent less than the annual harvest 
between 1980 and 1989.222 In April 1994, after the Department of the 
Interior (“Interior”) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture completed 
a supplemental environmental impact statement (SEIS), the USFS and 
BLM formally endorsed Option 9 as the best alternative for meeting 
President Clinton’s goals.223 The selection formed a regional forest 
management plan and amended the land planning documents for two 
USFS regions, nineteen national forests, and seven BLM districts within 
the range of the northern spotted owl.224 Covering 24.5 million acres of 
federal forestland in the Northwest,225 the Northwest Forest Plan 
(NWFP) was “the first systematic, broad-scale attempt by any administra-
tion to apply an ecosystem approach to resolve a natural resource man-
agement issue.”226 Importantly, under the NWFP, the primary goal for 
managing federal forests in the Northwest shifted from production of a 
sustained yield of timber to conserving biodiversity and species.227 
A. The NWFP: Land Classifications and Protective Measures 
 The 1994 Record of Decision (ROD) creating the NWFP consisted 
of extensive standards, guidelines, and land allocations meant to 
                                                                                                                      
220 Id. at 28. 
221 See Thomas et al., supra note 208, at 281. BLM defined “matrix” areas as those fed-
eral lands within the range of the Northern Spotted Owl but outside the six, specifically-
defined areas in the Record of Decision. 1994 ROD, supra note 21, at 7. 
222 1994 ROD, supra note 21, at fig.ROD-1. 
223 Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. at 1303–04; see 1994 ROD, supra note 21, 
at 26 (“[W]e adopt the alternative that will both maintain the late-successional and old-
growth forest ecosystem and provide a predictable and sustainable supply of timber, rec-
reational opportunities, and other resources at the highest level possible. Alternative 9, as 
slightly modified herein, best meets these criteria.”). 
224 Conservation Nw. v. Rey, 674 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1237 (W.D. Wash. 2009); Nw. Ecosys-
tem Alliance, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 1182; Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. at 1303–04. 
225 Nw. Ecosystem Alliance, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 1182; 1994 ROD, supra note 21. 
226 James Pipkin, The Northwest Forest Plan Revisited 2 (1998), available at http:// 
www.reo.gov/library/reports/NFP_revisited.htm (emphasis added); see 1994 ROD, supra 
note 21, at 1 (“[The NWFP] represents the first time that two of the largest federal land 
management agencies, the Bureau of Land Management and the Forest Service, have 
developed and adopted a common management approach to the lands they administer 
throughout an entire ecological region.”). 
227 See Thomas et al., supra note 208. 
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achieve President Clinton’s multi-faceted management goals.228 The 
NWFP created three primary categories of land: reserves, “matrix” 
lands, and adaptive management areas (AMA).229 As a threshold mat-
ter, the NWFP recognized nearly 8.8 million acres within the manage-
ment area that Congress and the agencies had already reserved from 
timber harvests.230 The NWFP then set aside an additional 7.4 million 
acres of the area as “late successional reserves” (LSR) to protect and 
enhance old-growth forest conditions.231 Within LSRs, forests more 
than 80 years old cannot be clearcut unless doing so will create benefi-
cial old-growth conditions.232 
 The NWFP also established 2.63 million acres of “riparian re-
serves.”233 Riparian reserves protect aquatic systems and the species 
dependent on them, enhance habitat for species transitioning between 
riparian and upslope areas, improve travel corridors, and enhance the 
overall connectivity of late-successional forest habitat.234 Next, the 
NWFP created four million acres of “matrix” lands where most timber 
harvest activities would take place.235 Finally, the NWFP created 1.5 mil-
lion acres of AMAs where land managers may explore alternative man-
agement techniques.236 Of the total plan area, approximately 77% of 
the land is in reserves, 16% is in matrix lands, and 6% is in AMAs.237 
 In addition to zoning the land into these categories, the NWFP 
added important mitigation requirements to “increase protection of 
habitat for species whose habitat assessments were relatively low under 
                                                                                                                      
228 See Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Altar of Appropriations 
Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 457, 470–71 (1997). 
229 See 1994 ROD, supra note 21, at 2, 6–7; Zellmer, supra note 228. For an instructive 
visual map demarcating these land classifications within the NWFP boundaries, see Tho-
mas et al., supra note 208, at 282. 
230 The NWFP recognized 7.3 million acres of national parks and monuments, wilder-
ness areas, wild and scenic rivers, national wildlife refuges, Department of Defense lands, 
and other lands with congressional designations that prohibited timber harvests within the 
area of the plan. 1994 ROD, supra note 21, at 6. In addition, the NWFP incorporated al-
most 1.48 million acres of existing administratively-designated recreational and visual ar-
eas, back country, and other areas not scheduled for timber harvest. Id. at 7. 
231 Id. at 6, 8. 
232 Id. at 8. 
233 Id. at 7. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 6. 
236 1994 ROD, supra note 21 at 6. Only modest amounts of experimentation have oc-
curred on AMAs, and so this category of land will not be discussed in detail. See Thomas et 
al., supra note 208, at 283. 
237 1994 ROD, supra note 21, at 2. 
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[Option 9 of the FEMAT report].”238 The first of these measures is 
known as “Survey & Manage” (S&M). Under S&M, the primary mitiga-
tion measures are: “(1) manage known sites of rare organisms; (2) sur-
vey [sites on the ground] for the presence of rare organisms prior to 
conducting ground-disturbing activities; (3) conduct surveys to identify 
locations and habitats of rare species; and (4) conduct landscape-level 
regional surveys for rare species.”239 As originally promulgated, the S&M 
measures applied to over four hundred species of rare amphibians, 
bryophytes, lichens, mollusks, vascular plants, fungi, and arthropods 
that could be studied only on-the-ground.240 Although the agencies up-
dated and streamlined the S&M requirements, in 2001, the revisions 
retained these key components.241 The requirements to survey and 
manage indicator species go well beyond protections under the Endan-
gered Species Act (ESA).242 Largely due to the S&M requirements, the 
amount of timber available for commercial harvest plummeted from 4.5 
billion board feet per year in the late 1980s to approximately 0.96 billion 
board feet per year in the 2000s.243 
 The second major mitigation measure in the NWFP is the Aquatic 
Conservation Strategy (ACS). The ACS calls for the restoration of “eco-
logical health of watersheds and aquatic ecosystems contained within 
them on all public lands,” and provides nine objectives for restoring 
and maintaining functioning aquatic habitats.244 The ACS has four 
                                                                                                                      
 
238 U.S. Forest Serv. & Bureau of Land Mgmt., Vol. ii, Final Supplemental Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement on Management of Habitat for Late-Successional and 
Old-Growth Forest Related Species Within the Range of the Northern Spotted 
Owl, at B-143 (1994), [hereinafter 1994 FSEIS], available at http://www.blm.gov/or/plans/ 
nwfpnepa/FSEIS-1994/FSEIS-1994-II.pdf. 
239 1994 ROD, supra note 21, at 11; see also 1994 FSEIS, supra note 238, at B-143 to B-
144 (describing standards in detail). 
240 See 1994 FSEIS, supra note 238, at B-150 to B-162 (listing species). 
241 U.S. Forest Serv. & Bureau of Land Mgmt., Record of Decision and Standards 
and Guidelines for Amendments to the Survey and Manage, Protection Buffer, and 
Other Mitigation Measures Standards and Guidelines 6–7 (2001), [hereinafter 2001 
S&M ROD], available at http://www.reo.gov/s-m2006/2001/RODjan01.pdf. 
242 See Susan Jane M. Brown, Note, “The Forest Must Come First:” Gifford Pinchot’s Conser-
vation Ethic and the Gifford Pinchot National Forest—the Ideal and the Reality, 11 Fordham 
Envtl. L. Rev. 137, 193–96 (1999). Compare 1994 FSEIS, supra note 238, at B-150 to B-162, 
with 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11–.12 (2011) (ESA-listed endangered and threatened animals and 
plants). 
243 See Conservation Nw., 674 F. Supp. 2d at 1238–39 (noting the effects of the NWFP on 
Northwest timber harvests in a case challenging the legality of changes to the S&M re-
quirements). 
244 1994 FSEIS, supra note 238, at B-81. In managing land within the NWFP bounda-
ries, decision-makers are to maintain and restore (1) watershed features on which aquatic 
species depend, (2) habitat “connectivity within and between watersheds,” (3) “physical 
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main components: riparian reserves, designated “key watersheds,” a 
watershed analysis, and a watershed restoration program.245 First, in 
designated riparian reserves, most timber harvesting, road building, 
grazing, mining, and off-road vehicle usage is restricted within one 
hundred to three hundred feet of a riparian area, which includes the 
body of water itself and may include adjacent vegetation, the one hun-
dred year floodplain, and landslide prone areas.246 
 Second, under the ACS, designated key watersheds aim to provide 
high quality refuge habitat for at-risk aquatic species.247 Key watersheds 
are either “Tier 1” —if they directly provide habitat for at-risk species— 
or “Tier 2” —if they do not provide habitat but do enhance water qual-
ity to the benefit of those species.248 In key watersheds, no new roads 
may be built in “inventoried roadless areas,” and no net increase of 
roads may occur in roaded areas.249 
 Third, under the ACS, a watershed analysis must precede all non-
categorically excluded management activities within key watersheds, 
inventoried roadless areas in non-key watersheds, and riparian re-
                                                                                                                      
integrity of the aquatic system,” (4) water quality necessary for “healthy riparian, aquatic, 
and wetland ecosystems,” (5) historical sediment regimes under which species evolved, (6) 
“in-stream flows” necessary for “riparian, aquatic, and wetland habitats,” (7) “timing, vari-
ability, and duration of floodplain inundation and water table elevation in meadows and 
wetlands,” (8) “species composition and structural diversity of plant communities in ripar-
ian areas and wetlands,” and (9) “habitat to support well-distributed populations of native 
plant, invertebrate, and vertebrate riparian-dependent species.” Id. at B-82 to B-83. 
245 1994 ROD, supra note 21, at 9–10; see also Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. 
Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 265 F.3d 1028, 1032 (9th Cir. 2001). 
246 See 1994 ROD, supra note 21, at 9; 1994 FSEIS, supra note 238, at B-16 to B-17, B-85 
tbl.B6-1. 
247 1994 FSEIS, supra note 238, at B-91. 
248 Id. The NWFP designated 8.1 million acres as Tier 1 watersheds, one million acres 
as Tier 2 watersheds, and 15.3 million acres as non-key watersheds. 1994 ROD, supra note 
21, at 10. 
249 1994 FSEIS, supra note 238, at B-92; see Blumm, The Amphibious Salmon, supra note 207, 
at 670 (inventoried roadless areas are areas determined by the USFS to not have roads, but 
that have not received congressional wilderness area designation); see Christopher Cumings, 
Comment, Judicial Iron Triangles: The Roadless Rule to Nowhere—and What Can Be Done to Free the 
Forest Service’s Rulemaking Process, 61 Okla. L. Rev. 801, 805–06 (2008) (describing how these 
“roadless” areas came to be inventoried). These areas are also protected by the USFS’s 
“roadless rule.” See Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 661 F.3d 1209, 1272 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(determining that the Wyoming district court’s nationwide injunction of the roadless rule 
was an abuse of judicial discretion); California v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 575 F.3d 999, 1020 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (reinstating the original “roadless rule,” which had been repealed and replaced by 
the Bush Administration). 
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serves.250 A watershed analysis is a “systematic procedure” meant to 
“characterize the aquatic, riparian, and terrestrial features within a wa-
tershed.”251 The information gained from this analysis forms the basis 
of an assessment of current watershed conditions; it can also refine ap-
propriate riparian reserve boundaries, plan for likely future conditions 
and restoration needs, and develop monitoring evaluation programs 
for the watershed.252 Importantly, a watershed analysis is not a decision 
document, but instead is scientifically-based guidance meant to bridge 
site-specific plans and broad regional National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA) analyses.253 Consequently, watershed analysis is a critical 
part of implementing the ACS and NWFP in general.254 
B. Backlash Against the NWFP: Challenges in the Courts and a Congressional 
Circumvention of the Plan 
 Almost immediately after the NWFP became effective, it came un-
der attack. First, the implementing agencies, unaccustomed to having 
their discretion curtailed, pushed back against the plan.255 Moreover, a 
timber industry group challenged the FEMAT working group for alleg-
edly violating the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).256 Al-
though a district court agreed that FEMAT violated FACA, it refused to 
enjoin the government from using and relying on the FEMAT re-
port.257 The plan itself was challenged by both environmentalists—who 
argued that the plan did not adequately protect old-growth dependant 
species— and the timber industry—which argued that it was too restric-
tive on timber harvesting.258 In Seattle Audubon Society v. Lyons, these 
challenges were consolidated in the Western District of Washington.259 
                                                                                                                      
 
250 1994 ROD, supra note 21, at 10; 1994 FSEIS, supra note 238, at B-93. Some actions 
that require ACSs are categorically excluded from NEPA compliance requirements. See 40 
C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2012) (defining categorical exclusions). 
251 1994 ROD, supra note 21, at 10. 
252 1994 FSEIS, supra note 238, at B-94 to B-95. 
253 Id. at B-93; see Blumm, The Amphibious Salmon, supra note 207, at 670. 
254 See 1994 FSEIS, supra note 238, at B-93. 
255 See Lauren M. Rule, Note, Enforcing Ecosystem Management Under the Northwest Forest 
Plan: The Judicial Role, 12 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 211, 215–16 (2000) (noting that the im-
plementing agencies resisted strict adherence to the NWFP in its early years, instead trying to 
change the plan’s standards to increase their discretion). 
256 Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Espy, 846 F. Supp. 1009, 1010 (D.D.C. 1994) (citing 5 
U.S.C. App. 2 (1994)). 
257 Id. at 1015; see News from the Circuits: FACA Violation Justifies an Injunction Against Any 
Publication or Use of Report, Admin. & Reg. L. News, Fall 1994, at 6. 
258 Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. at 1300, 1312. In addition to the actions 
consolidated into the Western District of Washington, industry groups also challenged the 
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 In 1994, the court upheld the challenged NWFP, noting that the 
late-successional and riparian reserves were important aspects of the 
plan.260 The court concluded that “any more logging sales than the 
plan contemplates would probably violate the laws.”261 The court also 
stated that “[w]hether the plan and its implementation will remain le-
gal will depend on future events and conditions.”262 In recognizing a 
“massive” effort of the USFS and BLM “to meet the legal and scientific 
needs of forest management,” the court determined that the NWFP 
provided just enough environmental protection to comply with federal 
statutes such as the ESA and NEPA.263 This decision proved dispositive 
in eliminating the remaining legal challenges to the NWFP.264 
 Congress, however, quickly went on the offensive, attaching a tim-
ber salvage rider (“1995 rider”)265 to an emergency appropriations act 
that also provided relief for the victims of the 1995 Oklahoma City 
bombing.266 The 1995 rider included three provisions aimed at increas-
                                                                                                                      
NWFP in a number of other courts around the country. See, e.g., Nw. Forest Res. Council v. 
Dombeck, No. 94-1031-TPJ (D.D.C.) (complaint filed May 11, 1994) (challenging the NWFP 
itself); Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Thomas, No. 94-1032-TPJ (D.D.C.) (complaint filed May 11, 
1994) (challenging the application of the NWFP to USFS lands in Oregon and Washington); 
Association of O & C Counties v. Babbitt, Civ. No. 94-1044 (D.D.C. June 30, 1994) (order). 
259 Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. at 1300. First, the District Court for the 
District of Columbia transferred Northwest Forest Resources Council v. Thomas, to the Western 
District of Washington and stayed Northwest Forest Resources Council v. Dombeck. Nw. Forest 
Res. Council v. Dombeck, 107 F.3d 897, 899–900 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The plaintiffs voluntarily 
dismissed the Thomas case without prejudice; however, defendants cross-claimed and the 
district court ruled on motions for summary judgment. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F. 
Supp. at 1300. 
260 Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. at 1300, 1314. 
261 Id. at 1300, 1314. 
262 Id. at 1300. 
263 Id. at 1300, 1303. 
264 The court’s validation of the NWFP in Seattle Audubon Society v. Lyons ultimately re-
sulted in the dismissal of the remaining case challenging the NWFP—Northwest Forest Resources 
Council v. Dombeck. In Seattle Audubon Society v. Lyons, the court issued a declaratory judgment 
against the Northwest Forest Resource Council (NFRC) on nine of the original eleven claims, 
declaring the NWFP valid as against those claims. See 871 F. Supp. at 1325. The U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia barred NFRC’s remaining claims in Dombeck based on stare 
decisis. Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Dombeck, 107 F.3d at 900 (explaining the district court’s deci-
sion). Although the D.C. Circuit concluded that the remaining claims in Dombeck were not 
actually barred by stare decisis, on remand the district court determined that NFRC’s remain-
ing claims were barred by res judicata and the “doctrine of virtual representations.” Am. For-
est Res. Council v. Shea, 172 F. Supp. 2d 24, 27–28 (D.D.C. 2001). 
265 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Assistance, for Anti-Terrorism 
Initiatives, for Assistance in the Recovery from the Tragedy that Occured at Oklahoma City, 
and Rescissions Act, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-19, §§ 2001–2002, 109 Stat. 194, 240–47. 
266 Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in Envi-
ronmental Law, 94 Geo. L.J. 619, 643 (2006). 
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ing salvage logging in the Northwest: (1) calling the federal land man-
agers to rely on preexisting environmental review documents; (2) re-
stricting the scope and timing of judicial review; and (3) giving timber 
contracts priority.267 In addition to allowing for salvage harvest, the 
rider directed the USFS and BLM to expedite “Option 9” sales under 
the NWFP “notwithstanding any other law” and did not include any 
documentation or review requirements.268 The timber industry success-
fully argued that the rider precluded all judicial review of Option 9 
sales.269 The 1995 rider also permitted completion of all timber harvest 
contracts originally offered—but not completed—or unawarded under 
section 318 of an appropriations rider from 1989 (“1989 rider”).270 
 In addition, the timber industry sought to compel the completion 
of all timber sales offered prior to the 1995 rider’s enactment on all 
public lands within the geographic scope of section 318 of the 1989 
rider.271 The District Court for the District of Oregon and the Ninth 
Circuit agreed with the timber industry’s interpretation of the 1995 
                                                                                                                      
267 § 2001(b)–(f), 109 Stat. at 241–45. 
268 Id. § 2001(d), 109 Stat. at 244. “Option 9” sales were those sales originating in the 
adoption of the NWFP (which was the ninth harvest mix option proposed by FEMAT). See 
Goldman & Boyles, supra note 28, at 1050, 1075–76; supra notes 220–224 and accompany-
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269 Or. Natural Res. Council v. Thomas, 92 F.3d 792, 796–97 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding 
that because the 1995 rider eliminated all possible federal environmental claims, there was 
no freestanding “arbitrary and capricious” cause of action). 
270 § 2001(k), 109 Stat. at 246 (“[T]he Secretary concerned shall act to award, release, 
and permit to be completed in fiscal years 1995 and 1996, with no change in originally 
advertised terms, volumes, and bid prices, all timber sale contracts offered or awarded 
before that date in any unit of the National Forest System or district of the Bureau of Land 
Management subject to section 318 of Public Law 101-121 (103 Stat. 745).”). Section 318 
of Public Law 101-121, an Interior appropriations rider, exempted timber sales in thirteen 
Oregon and Washington national forests from judicial review and stringent environmental 
compliance and required the USFS and BLM to meet timber sales quotas in FY 1989 and 
FY 1990. See Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for Fis-
cal Year 1990, § 318(a)(1)–(2), Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 701, 745 (1989) (setting 
harvest quotas); id. § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. at 747 (“Congress hereby determines and 
directs that management of areas . . . on the thirteen national forests in Oregon and Wash-
ington and Bureau of Land Management lands in western Oregon known to contain 
northern spotted owls is adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the statutory 
requirements . . . . The guidelines [in this rider] shall not be subject to judicial review 
. . . .”); see also Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, No. 95-6244 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
13300, at *2–7 (D. Or. Sept. 13, 1995), aff’d, 82 F.3d 825, 828 (9th Cir. 1996) (describing 
interaction of the two laws). Many of these authorized sales, however, were never offered, 
awarded, or executed due to concerns about their impacts on listed species. See, e.g., Lone 
Rock Timber Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 842 F. Supp. 433, 440–41 (D. Or. 1994); see also 
Goldman & Boyles, supra note 28, at 1075–76; Zellmer, supra note 228, at 469. 
271 See Goldman & Boyles, supra note 28, at 1070; Zellmer, supra note 228, at 472. 
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rider’s effect on section 318, ordering the USFS and BLM to complete 
all pending timber sales in western Oregon and Washington.272 Thus, 
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 1995 rider resurrected all un-
completed section 318 sales offered between October 1, 1989—the 
date section 318 went into effect—and July 27, 1995—the date of the 
1995 rider.273 Finally, the 1995 rider directed the agencies to log old-
growth forests, even if doing so conflicted with environmental laws— 
unless listed species were “known to be nesting” in the area.274 
 As a result of these rulings, the USFS and BLM completed a num-
ber of hastily planned sales.275 Although it is unclear how much timber 
the agencies actually sold under the 1995 rider, the Ninth Circuit’s de-
cisions in Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Glickman authorized the 
USFS and BLM to complete sixty-two additional section 318 sales, total-
ing 230 million board feet (MMBF) of timber.276 Moreover, the Ninth 
Circuit’s unwillingness to review the legality of Option 9 sales and the 
old-growth timber sale authorization in section 2001(k) of the 1995 
rider also led to more sales.277 Although the Clinton Administration 
tried to stall some section 2001(k) sales with a creative interpretation of 
the “known to be nesting” language,278 the 1995 rider ultimately en-
abled a number of section 318, Option 9, and section 2001(k) sales, 
including some that harvested healthy trees under the “salvage” provi-
                                                                                                                      
272 See Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d at 829, 835–36; see also Nw. Forest Res. 
Council v. Pilchuck Audubon Soc’y, 97 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that the 
1995 rider effectively resurrected previously cancelled timber sales). 
273 Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d at 831, 839; see § 318, 103 Stat. at 745. 
274 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Assistance, for Anti-Terrorism 
Initiatives, for Assistance in the Recovery from the Tragedy that Occured at Oklahoma City, 
and Rescissions Act, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-19, § 2001(k)(1)–(2), 109 Stat. 240, 246. This pro-
vision to log old-growth forests included one exception: no sales could go forward “if any 
threatened or endangered bird species is known to be nesting within the acreage that is the 
subject of the sale unit.” Id. § 2001(k)(2), 109 Stat. at 246. 
275 See Goldman & Boyles, supra note 28, at 1056–59; Zellmer, supra note 228, at 472–73. 
276 Zellmer, supra note 228, at 472–73; see Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 97 F.3d 
1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 1966). 
277 See Or. Natural Res. Council v. Thomas, 92 F.3d at 796; Goldman & Boyles, supra note 
28, at 1079. 
278 § 2001(k)(2), 109 Stat. at 246. Although the Clinton Administration ultimately did 
not prevail on the issue, it argued that if a listed bird had flown through a forest unit, that 
was sufficient proof that it was occupying the stand. Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 
No. 95–6244-HO, at *3–7, *21 (D. Or. Jan. 19, 1996); Disposal of National Forest System 
Timber, 61 Fed. Reg. 14,618, 14,619–20 (Apr. 3, 1996) (noting the court rejected the gov-
ernment’s interpretation of the § 2001(k)(2) “known to be nesting” requirement); see also 
Slade Gordon & Julie Kays, Legislative History of the Timber and Salvage Amendments Enacted in 
the 104th Congress: A Small Victory for Timber Communities in the Pacific Northwest, 26 Envtl. L. 
641, 645 (1996). 
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sion.279 Many of these sales were also below-cost and made in defiance 
of existing forest plans.280 Ultimately, these sales resulted in significant 
on-the-ground effects, including increased landslides, unsafe city drink-
ing water supplies, degraded fisheries, and new ESA species listings.281 
 However, once the 1995 rider expired, environmentalists again 
began to use the NWFP to challenge timber sales in the late 1990s. For 
example, in Oregon Natural Resources Council Action v. U.S. Forest Service, 
the District Court for the Western District of Washington enjoined one 
hundred MMBF of timber sales because the agencies failed to meet 
their S&M requirements prior to undertaking ground-disturbing ac-
tions.282 In so ruling, the court emphasized the importance of adhering 
to the S&M requirements.283 Thus, by the end of the 1990s and the 
close of the Clinton Administration, the force and effect of the NWFP 
was becoming clear. The plan had passed muster in the courts and sur-
vived the 1995 rider. The courts even recognized the substantive teeth 
contained in the NWFP’s provisions.284 This success, however, quickly 
drew the attention of the incoming Bush Administration. 
IV. The Bush Administration’s Failed Attempts to Amend  
the Northwest Forest Plan 
 For the next eight years, the Bush Administration repeatedly tried 
to weaken the Northwest Forest Plan (NWFP). The administration at-
tempted to eliminate the Survey & Manage (“S&M”) requirements285 
and to delete and amend key aspects of the Aquatic Conservation Strat-
egy (ACS).286 Ultimately, however, these efforts failed to survive judicial 
review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Adminis-
                                                                                                                      
279 See Goldman & Boyles, supra note 28, at 1056. Under the 1995 rider, “salvage” was 
broadly defined to include trees “imminently susceptible” to fire and insect attack—thus 
providing the agencies with a great deal of discretion. § 2001(a)(3), 109 Stat. at 241. 
280 See Goldman & Boyles, supra note 28, at 1058–59. 
281 See id. at 1068, 1087–88. 
282 59 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1093 (W.D. Wash. 1999); Alston, supra note 212, at 728. 
283 Or. Natural Res. Council Action, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1093. The court noted: “[f]ar from 
being minor or technical violations, widespread exemptions from the survey requirements 
would undermine the management strategy on which the ROD depends.” Id. The purpose 
of the S&M requirements is “to identify and locate species . . . before logging starts.” Id. 
Under exemptions, “plants and animals listed in the ROD will face a potentially fatal loss 
of protection.” Id. 
284 See id. (enjoining federal timber sales that failed to perform adequate pre-sale sur-
veys). 
285 See infra notes 289–312 and accompanying text. 
286 See infra notes 313–335 and accompanying text. 
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trative Procedure Act (APA), and Endangered Species Act (ESA).287 
Consequently, after a decade of court challenges, the protections of-
fered by the NWFP remain intact, largely because of the strong, persua-
sive, and scientifically justified positions articulated by the Clinton Ad-
ministration in the original NWFP documents.288 
A. Failed Attempts to Eliminate the S&M Requirement 
 After a few years of implementing the NWFP, the U.S. Forest Ser-
vice (USFS) and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) claimed that the 
S&M requirements were presenting “unanticipated difficulties in land 
management”289 because the requirements “were not clear, efficient, or 
practicable.”290 Thus, in 2000, the agencies undertook a full study of 
the S&M requirements and determined that these difficulties left them 
“unable to fully meet the original purpose and need of the [NWFP].”291 
In 2001, the agencies responded by streamlining the S&M standards, 
while at the same time maintaining the key tenets of the S&M require-
ments from the original 1994 Record of Decision (ROD) that imple-
mented the NWFP.292 Immediately thereafter, timber and environ-
                                                                                                                      
287 See, e.g., Conservation Nw. v. Rey, 674 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1248–49 (W.D. Wash. 2009) 
(finding a violation of NEPA); Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Nat’l Marine Fish-
eries Serv. (PCFFA III ), 482 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1254–55 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (finding viola-
tions of NEPA, the APA, and the ESA); Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. Rey, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 
1192–93 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (finding a violation of NEPA). 
288 See, e.g., Nw. Ecosystem Alliance, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 1192 (“[T]he FEMAT team’s and the 
Agencies’ respective analysis in 1994 was thorough.”). The Clinton Administration’s diligence 
in creating detailed findings has protected other environmental achievements from attack. 
For example, President Clinton proclaimed Giant Sequoia National Monument using his 
authority under the Antiquities Act of 1906. Proclamation No. 7295, 3 C.F.R. § 60 (2001). 
Tulare County challenged the monument as too big. Tulare Cnty. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1138, 
1142 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The court rejected this contention, noting “the complaint fails to iden-
tify the improperly designated lands with sufficient particularity to state a claim.” Id.; see also 
Mark Squillace, The Monumental Legacy of the Antiquities Act of 1906, 37 Ga. L. Rev. 473, 507–14 
(2003) (describing President Clinton’s aggressive use of the Antiquities Act to create a num-
ber of new national monuments). 
289 Conservation Nw., 674 F. Supp. 2d at 1239. 
290 Bureau of Land Mgmt. & U.S. Forest Serv., I Final Supplemental Environ-
mental Impact Statement to Remove or Modify the Survey and Manage Mitiga-
tion Measure Standards and Guidelines 17 (2004), [hereinafter 2004 FSEIS], available 
at http://www.blm.gov/or/plans/nwfpnepa/FSEIS-2004/SM-Vol1.pdf. 
291 Bureau of Land Mgmt. & U.S. Forest Serv., I Final Supplemental Environ-
mental Impact Statement for Amendment to the Survey & Manage, Protection 
Buffer, and Other Mitigation Measures Standards and Guidelines 9 (2000), available 
at http://www.blm.gov/or/plans/nwfpnepa/FSEIS-2000/FSEIS-Vol-1.pdf. The NWFP’s ini-
tial purpose, as originally stated in 1994, was to respond to the need for forest habitat and 
forest products. Id. 
292 2001 S&M ROD, supra note 241. 
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mental groups challenged the revised S&M ROD.293 The new Bush 
Administration settled with the timber companies, agreeing to consider 
completely eliminating the S&M requirement in a new supplemental 
environmental impact statement (SEIS).294 
 In 2002, the Bush Administration proposed to remove the S&M 
requirements from the NWFP.295 Then, in January 2004, the BLM and 
USFS released a final SEIS on the issue that recommended eliminating 
the S&M requirements.296 In March 2004, the BLM and USFS formally 
eliminated the S&M standard,297 which environmentalists promptly 
challenged as a violation of NEPA and the APA.298 Ultimately, the envi-
ronmentalists prevailed on three of their six NEPA challenges to the 
2004 ROD that eliminated the S&M requirement in Northwest Ecosystem 
Alliance v. Rey.299 
                                                                                                                      
 
293 Douglas Timber Operators v. Rey, No. 01–6378-AA (D. Or. 2001) (timber operator chal-
lenge); Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. Rey, 380 F. Supp. 2dat 1183 (environmentalist challenge). 
294 Nw. Ecosystem Alliance, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 1183 (citing Douglas Timber Operators, No. 
01-6378-AA); see Laura Hartt, New Mexico Cattle Growers Association v. United States Fish 
& Wildlife Service and Other Efforts to Undermine Critical Habitat Designation Essential for Spe-
cies Recovery, 28 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 799, 847 (2004). The environmental 
groups dismissed their suit pending the completion of the new SEIS. Nw. Ecosystem Alliance, 
380 F. Supp. 2d at 1183. 
295 National Forests and Bureau of Land Management Districts Within the Range of 
the Northern Spotted Owl; Western Oregon and Washington, and Northwestern Califor-
nia; Removal of Survey and Manage Mitigation Measure Standards and Guidelines, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 64,601, 64,601 (Oct. 21, 2002). 
296 2004 FSEIS, supra note 290, at 15; To Remove or Modify the Survey and Manage 
Mitigation Measure Standards and Guidelines, 69 Fed. Reg. 3316, 3316 ( Jan. 23, 2004). 
The environmental impact statement (EIS) analyzed three alternatives: 1) retain the S&M 
standard (the no-action alternative); 2) eliminate the S&M standard; or 3) retain the S&M 
standard but with less protective modifications. 2004 FSEIS, supra note 290, at 15. The 
third option proposed removing provisions for uncommon species, elimination of the pre-
disturbance survey requirement for young forest stands, and changes to the review process 
for exempting known sites from management. Id. Elimination of the S&M requirement 
was the preferred alternative. Id. at 11. 
297 Bureau of Land Mgmt. & U.S. Forest Serv., Record of Decision to Remove or 
Modify the Survey and Manage Mitigation Measure Standards and Guidelines in 
Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management Planning Documents Within the 
Range of the Northern Spotted Owl 7 (2004), available at http://www.blm.gov/or/ 
plans/nwfpnepa/FSEIS-2004/ROD/SM_ROD-2004FSEIS.pdf. 
298 Nw. Ecosystem Alliance, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 1184 (citing Native Ecosystems Council v. 
Dombeck, 304 F.3d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 2002)). In determining whether an agency acted 
“arbitrarily and capriciously” under the APA, courts consider whether “the [agency] deci-
sion was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a 
clear error of judgment.” Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989) 
(quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
299 380 F. Supp. 2d at 1197–98. The plaintiffs asserted that the agencies violated NEPA 
for the following reasons: 
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 In response to Northwest Ecosystem Alliance, the agencies prepared a 
draft SEIS in July 2006.300 Also in 2006, the BLM lost another S&M case 
in which the Ninth Circuit ruled that the agency’s decision to down-
grade the red tree vole’s designation under the S&M requirement vio-
lated both NEPA and the Federal Land Policy Management Act 
(FLPMA).301 In 2007, the agencies issued a SEIS revising the 2004 
SEIS,302 once again attempting to remove the S&M requirements from 
the NWFP.303 The agencies claimed that this decision reduced the cost, 
time, and effort required to conserve rare species, and provided “new 
information” and “additional background material” as compared to the 
                                                                                                                      
1) the purpose and need statement in the 2004 SEIS is unreasonably narrow 
because it failed to analyze whether the existing Survey and Manage standard 
is effective, 2) the 2004 SEIS failed to consider in detail a reasonable alterna-
tive that Plaintiffs had proposed, 3) the environmental effects analysis is ille-
gally predicated on uncertain possible events, namely that the 152 eligible 
species will be included in the Agencies’ SSS Programs, 4) the Agencies’ as-
sumption that the Survey and Manage species will be adequately protected by 
the Reserve system is false and misleading, 5) the disclosures in the 2004 SEIS 
related to fire are false and misleading, and 6) the cost rationale in the 2004 
SEIS is subterfuge and the figures inflated. 
Id. at 1185. First, the court determined that the agencies failed to consider in the 2004 
SEIS what would happen if the USFS and BLM exercised their discretion so that the spe-
cies previously covered by S&M standards were not included in or later removed from the 
agencies’ alternative administration protection programs. Id. at 1190. Second, the court 
concluded that the agencies failed to evaluate how most species protected by late-
successional reserves would be otherwise protected if the agencies eliminated the S&M 
requirement. Id. at 1190. After noting that the analysis underlying the 1994 NWFP was 
“thorough” and that the S&M standard was necessary to satisfy the plan’s “foundational 
objectives,” the court observed that the 2000 environmental impact statement (EIS) con-
cluded that “new information . . . would warrant a more fundamental shift.” Id. at 1192 
(internal quotation marks omitted). The court concluded that the USFS and BLM “failed 
to provide a thorough analysis of [the decision to eliminate the S&M standard] to permit 
the public and the decisionmakers to make a reasonably informed decision.” Id. at 1192–
93. Before the agencies could eliminate the S&M, they had a NEPA obligation “to disclose 
and explain on what basis they deemed the standard necessary before but assume it is not 
now.” Id. at 1193; see also Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fey Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 
U.S. 800, 808 (1973). Because they did not provide this reasoned explanation, the 2004 
EIS did not provide enough analysis to make a reasonably informed decision. Nw. Ecosystem 
Alliance, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 1193. The court therefore concluded that the agencies had not 
complied with their NEPA obligations in issuing the 2004 EIS. Id. at 1181. 
300 Conservation Nw., 674 F. Supp. 2d at 1240. 
301 Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Center v. Boody, 468 F.3d 549, 562–63 (9th Cir. 2006). 
302 Conservation Nw., 674 F. Supp. 2d at 1240. 
303 Id.; Bureau of Land Mgmt., Record of Decision to Remove the Survey and 
Manage Mitigation Measure Standards and Guidelines from Bureau of Land Man-
agement Resource Management Plans Within the Range of the Northern Spotted 
Owl 12 (2007), available at http://www.reo.gov/s-m2006/2007/BLM_Record_of_Decision. 
pdf. 
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2004 SEIS.304 Environmental groups promptly challenged the 2007 
SEIS.305 
 The district court reviewed the 2007 SEIS and accompanying ROD 
to ensure that the agencies took a “hard look” at the pertinent factors 
and thoroughly evaluated the proposal’s environmental conse-
quences.306 The court reiterated that in order to eliminate the S&M 
requirements in compliance with NEPA, the agencies had to discuss in 
detail why they no longer thought the standard necessary.307 Although 
the agencies claimed that five categories of new information demon-
strated “fundamentally different” forest conditions compared to those 
existing in 1994 when they first approved the NWFP, the court dis-
agreed and concluded that “all of [this information] say[s] that [S&M] 
is working.”308 
 Although employing a “cabined standard of review,” the court 
nonetheless proceeded to determine that the agencies’ methods lead-
ing to the elimination of the S&M requirement was “flawed enough to 
be a violation of NEPA.”309 The court emphasized that the agencies’ 
decision would adversely affect S&M-dependent species without suffi-
cient justification.310 In July 2011, the parties reached a settlement con-
cerning the S&M requirements311 in which the Obama Administration 
set aside the 2007 attempt to remove the S&M requirement and rein-
stated the S&M requirements from the 2001 ROD.312 Thus, after a dec-
                                                                                                                      
304 Bureau of Land Mgmt., supra note 303, at 5–8. The agencies also claimed that the 
2007 final SEIS addressed all of the salient points raised in Douglas Timber Operators v. Rey, 
Nw. Forest Alliance, and Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Boody. Id. 
305 Conservation Nw., 674 F. Supp. 2d at 1240–41. 
306 Id. at 1241 (citing Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Serv., 137 F.3d 1372, 
1376 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
307 Id. at 1247 (citing Nw. Ecosystem Alliance, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 1192). 
308 Id. at 1248. Independent reviews of the NWFP reached similar conclusions. See 
Thomas et al., supra note 208, at 283–84. In fact, after ten years of implementation, the 
NWFP achieved more old-growth forest conditions than projected, improved watershed 
conditions, and resulted in smaller-than-projected timber harvests. See id. 
309 Conservation Nw., 674 F. Supp. 2d at 1249. 
310 Id. (“The Agencies cannot abandon fifty or more species whose viability may still be 
dependent on the continued implementation of Survey and Manage . . . [especially since 
t]here is not enough new information disclosed that would ensure the public that elimina-
tion of Survey and Manage is warranted.”). 
311 U.S. Forest Serv. & Bureau of Land Mgmt., 2011 Settlement Agreement in 
Litigation over the Survey and Manage Mitigation Measure in Conservation 
Northwest et al. v. Sherman et al., Case No. 08-1067-JCC (W.D. Wash) (2011), available 
at http://www.blm.gov/or/efoia/fy2011/im/p/im-or-2011-063.pdf. 
312 Id. at 1. The settlement also acknowledged existing exemptions, updated the 2001 
S&M species list, established a transition period for application of the species list, and es-
tablished new exemption categories. Id. 
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ade of attempts to undercut the S&M requirement, the NWFP stood on 
the same ground as it had when the Bush Administration took office. 
B. Failed Attempts to Undermine the ACS Requirements 
 In addition to failing to eliminate the S&M requirements from the 
NWFP due to non-compliance with NEPA and the APA, the Clinton 
and the Bush Administrations were also unsuccessful in their attempts 
to amend the plan’s ACS requirements. In 1997, the National Marine 
Fisheries Service (NMFS) issued a programmatic biological opinion 
(“BiOp”) under the ESA.313 The BiOp concluded that USFS and BLM 
logging operations in watersheds within the NWFP were unlikely to 
jeopardize species listed under the ESA if logging operations were con-
sistent with ACS objectives.314 Commercial fishermen challenged this 
BiOp in 1998, and the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Washington concluded that “[b]efore a project can proceed, the USFS 
and BLM must find that their actions either meet, or do not prevent 
attainment of, the ACS objectives.”315 In response, the NMFS assessed 
ACS consistency at the watershed level over a long-term period.316 
 In 1999, a group of commercial fishermen and environmental or-
ganizations challenged four NMFS BiOps for the Umpqua River water-
shed in Oregon, asserting that twenty-four sales in the basin were in-
consistent with the ACS because they would harm ESA-listed fish spe-
cies.317 Although the district court upheld the agency’s programmatic 
BiOp, it concluded that the agency failed to ensure the timber sales 
complied with the ACS on a site-specific or project level.318 The court 
                                                                                                                      
313 Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Endangered Species Act Section 7 Conference 
Opinion on Continued Implementation of U.S. Forest Service Land and Resource 
Management Plans and Bureau of Land Management Resource Management Plans, 
Consultation Number [711] (1997). 
314 Id. at 23–24; see PCFFA III, 482 F. Supp. 2d at 1257. 
315 Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (PCFFA I ), 
No. C97-775R, 1998 WL 1988556, at *1, *12 (W.D. Wash. May 29, 1998). 
316 Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (PCFFA II ), 71 
F. Supp. 2d 1063 (W.D. Wash. 1999), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 253 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 
2001), amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, 265 F.3d 1028. 
317 See id. at 1065. 
318 Id. at 1073. Around the same time, a similar situation unfolded in Oregon. In 2000, 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) issued a BiOp, concluding that USFS and BLM 
logging operations would not likely cause jeopardy to listed bull trout. Cascadia Wildlands 
Project v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 219 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1145 (D. Or. 2002). Environ-
mentalists challenged this BiOp. Id. The District Court of Oregon issued a preliminary 
injunction on the BiOp, concluding that there were “serious questions” as to whether the 
FWS’ determinations were arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 1149–50. In response, the FWS 
subsequently withdrew the questionable BiOps. PCCFA III, 482 F. Supp. 2d at 1259. 
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emphasized that the NMFS acted arbitrarily and capriciously by assess-
ing ACS compliance only at a watershed level and failing to consider 
the short-term degradation that timber harvesting could have on these 
aquatic areas.319 
 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the relative difference in 
scale between watersheds and project areas.320 The court upheld the 
district court’s decision, commenting that “it does not follow that the 
NMFS is free to ignore site degradations because they are too small to 
affect the accomplishment of that goal at the watershed scale,” and that 
the NMFS had not provided sufficient support for limiting the review to 
the watershed scale alone.321 Thus, the proper measure of compliance 
with the ACS occurs at “both the watershed and project levels.”322 
 The Ninth Circuit also addressed whether it was appropriate for 
the NMFS to consider consistency with the ACS over a period of ten to 
twenty years.323 The court emphasized that such a long time period ig-
nores the short and sensitive life cycle of salmon.324 In addition, the 
court rejected the NMFS’s claim that tree re-growth would offset these 
effects.325 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court, 
concluding that the NMFS could not support its decision to analyze 
effects over a longer time period.326 
 Despite the clarity of these judicial decisions, the USFS and BLM 
began amending the ACS requirements in 2002 in response to the de-
mands of the timber industry.327 Then, in 2003, the USFS and BLM 
proposed to amend and delete key language from the ACS objec-
tives.328 In 2004, the agencies adopted this proposal,329 which fisher-
                                                                                                                      
319 PCFFA II, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 1073. 
320 Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 265 F.3d at 1035. 
The largest watershed at issue in the sales was 350 square miles, whereas most sales en-
compass only a few acres. Id. 
321 Id. at 1035–36. 
322 Id. at 1036. 
323 Id. at 1037. 
324 Id. (“This generous time frame ignores the life cycle and migration cycle of ana-
dromous fish. In ten years, a badly degraded habitat will likely result in the total extinction 
of the [species in that stream].”). 
325 Id. at 1037–38. 
326 Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 265 F.3d at 1038. 
327 PCFFA III, 482 F. Supp. 2d at 1259–60. 
328 U.S. Forest Serv. & Bureau of Land Mgmt., Draft Supplemental Environ-
mental Impact Statement: Clarification of Language in the 1994 Record of Decision 
for the Northwest Forest Plan; National Forests and Bureau of Land Management 
Districts Within the Range of the Northern Spotted Owl 15–19 (2003), available for 
download at http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/xmlui/handle/1957/12160; see PCFFA III, 482 
F. Supp. 2d at 1260. 
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men and environmentalists promptly challenged.330 Echoing the judi-
cial sentiment expressed in the S&M context,331 the district court again 
emphasized that where an agency decided to adopt a standard and 
then proposes a different standard, it has a NEPA obligation to explain 
why the previously necessary standard is no longer needed.332 The 
court noted that the 2003 environmental impact statement (EIS) per-
formed by the agencies “wholly fail[ed] to meet the standards for ade-
quate disclosure and discussion of dissenting scientific opinions.”333 
The court then proceeded to set aside the ACS amendments promul-
gated by the agencies.334 In response, the USFS and BLM recognized 
that compliance with the ACS required adherence to the nine values 
outlined in the original ACS standard.335 
C. The Western Oregon Plan Revisions: Its Birth, Death, and  
Living-Dead Status 
 In late 2008, after years of frustration in its efforts to revise the 
NWFP, the Bush Administration’s Department of the Interior (“Inte-
rior”) adopted six revised resource management plans (RMPs)—known 
collectively as the Western Oregon Plan Revisions (WOPR)—to address 
2.5 million acres of BLM forestland in western Oregon.336 These plans 
mostly covered revested lands from the Oregon & California Land 
Grant (“O&C lands”).337 The RODs approving the WOPR would have 
increased timber harvest in these six districts to a combined 502 million 
board feet (MMBF)—up from approximately 200 MMBF allowed un-
                                                                                                                      
329 See PCFFA III, 482 F. Supp. 2d at 1260–61. 
330 See id. at 1256. 
331 See supra notes 295–310 and accompanying text. 
332 PCFFA III, 482 F. Supp. 2d at 1252 (citing Nw. Ecosystem Alliance, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 
1192). 
333 Id. at 1254. 
334 Id. at 1255 (citing the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006), the En-
dangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006), and the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006)). The court also set aside a FWS 
and NMFS 2004 BiOp on the 2004 ACS Amendments, and a BLM and USFS final SEIS on 
the 2004 ACS Amendments. Id. 
335 U.S. Forest Serv. & Bureau of Land Mgmt., Compliance with the Aquatic 
Conservation Strategy 1–2 (2007), available at http://www.blm.gov/or/efoia/fy2007/ 
im/p/im-or-2007-060.pdf; see supra note 244 and accompanying text (outlining nine ACS 
standards). 
336 Douglas Timber Operators, Inc. v. Salazar, 774 F. Supp. 2d 245, 249 (D.D.C. 2011) 
appeal dismissed, No. 11-5137, 2011 WL 2618209 (D.C. Cir. June 24, 2011); see also With-
drawn Records of Decision Archive, supra note 36. 
337 WOPR Withdrawal Memo, supra note 37. 
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der previous RMPs.338 At the time the agencies introduced the WOPR, 
the O&C lands produced only an average of 140 MMBF of timber per 
year.339 Thus, the WOPR would have essentially authorized a quadru-
pling of timber harvesting in the O&C lands. 
 The BLM justified the WOPR on the ground that the agency failed 
to achieve harvest levels under existing resource management plans.340 
Citing Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Management, the BLM claimed 
that increasing harvest levels on the O&C lands would be consistent 
with the dominant use, timber-centric management mandate of the 
Oregon & California Lands Act of 1937.341 Under the WOPR, the BLM 
excluded thinning and treatment only within sixty feet of perennial 
and fish-bearing streams, and within thirty-five feet of intermittent 
streams, thus undercutting the extensive riparian buffers provided for 
in the NWFP.342 Moreover, the WOPR redefined the boundaries of sev-
eral late-successional reserves and allowed salvage logging in late-
successional management areas where the NWFP previously limited 
logging.343 
 After the environmental review process, the BLM concluded that 
the revisions to the RMPs contained in the WOPR would “have no ef-
                                                                                                                      
338 Douglas Timber Operators, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 2d at 249; see Bureau of Land Mgmt., I 
Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Revision of the Resource Man-
agement Plans of the Western Oregon Bureau of Land Management, at ch. 1-4 
(2008), [hereinafter 2008 WOPR FEIS], available at http://www.blm.gov/or/plans/wopr/ 
final_eis/index.php (follow “Volume I” hyperlink to download this portion of the final 
EIS). 
339 See Eric Mortenson, Logging Reversal Deepens State’s Rift, Oregonian, July 6, 2011, at 
C3 [hereinafter Mortenson, Logging Reversal]. 
340 2008 WOPR FEIS, supra note 338, at ch. 1-3. 
341 Id. at Summary-2 n.1, Summary-3 (citing Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 
914 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1990), discussed supra notes 177–184 and accompanying text). 
342 See id. at ch. 2-24. The NWFP provided extensive riparian protections, including 
stream buffers ranging from one hundred to three hundred feet. See 1994 ROD, supra note 
21, at 9–10. 
343 2008 WOPR FEIS, supra note 338, at 2-24, 2-32. One management objective of late 
successional reserves under the WOPR was to “[r]ecover economic value from timber har-
vested after a stand-replacement disturbance, such as a fire, windstorm, disease, or insect 
infestation.” Id. at 2-28. Although the 1994 EIS underlying the NWFP did not preclude 
salvage logging in late-successional forests, it also did not include salvage logging as an 
appropriate response, and instead described how dead trees benefit ecosystem recovery 
following a disturbance. 1994 FSEIS, supra note 238, at B-49 to B-50 (“The surviving trees 
are important elements of the new stand . . . providing structural diversity and a potential 
source of additional large snags during the development of new stands. Furthermore, trees 
injured by disturbance may develop cavities, deformed crowns, and limbs that are habitat 
components for a variety of wildlife species.”). 
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fect to listed species or critical habitat.”344 The EIS also explained that 
the WOPR revisions were not self-executing and “[did] not authorize 
any on-the-ground action . . . . As such, further Federal decision-making 
[wa]s required before the BLM . . . c[ould] conduct ground-disturbing 
activit[ies].”345 Thus, because the agencies determined there would be 
“no impact” on ESA-listed species, BLM did not initiate an ESA section 
7 consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to identify how 
the WOPR could affect listed species under the ESA.346 
 In October 2008, timber operators challenged BLM’s failure to 
initiate ESA section 7 consultation for the WOPR as a violation of a 
2003 settlement agreement between the parties.347 Although the dis-
trict court in Washington D.C. did not require the BLM to complete 
ESA consultation, in July 2009, the Acting Assistant Secretary of Inte-
rior issued a two-page memorandum to the Acting Director of BLM 
withdrawing the WOPR RODs “[b]ecause BLM’s ‘no effect’ determina-
tion was legal error.”348 This withdrawal was effective immediately.349 
                                                                                                                      
344 See, e.g., Bureau of Land Mgmt., Record of Decision and Resource Management 
Plan: Coos Bay District 9 (2008), available at http://www.blm.gov/or/plans/wopr/rod/ 
index.php (follow “Coos Bay Record of Decision” Hyperlink.); see also Douglas Timber Opera-
tors, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 2d at 249; Letter from Edward W. Shepard, State Dir. Or./Wash., Bu-
reau of Land Mgmt., to Ren Lohoefener, Reg’l Dir., U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. 2 (Oct. 6, 
2008) (on file with author). 
345 Bureau of Land Mgmt., supra note 344; see also 2008 WOPR FEIS, supra note 338, 
at ch. 1-19 to 1-20 (“[N]o specific on-the-ground activity would actually be proposed in the 
revised RMPs . . . .”). 
346 Douglas Timber Operators, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 2d at 249. When a federal agency, such as 
BLM “authorize[s], fund[s], or carrie[s] out” any agency action, it must consult with the 
FWS to insure that the action “is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any 
endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modifica-
tion of [critical] habitat.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006). 
347 Am. Forest Res. Council v. Caswell, 631 F. Supp. 2d 30, 31 (D.D.C. 2008); Douglas 
Timber Operators, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 2d at 249 (discussing Am. Forest Res. Council v. Caswell by 
the name of Am. Forest Res. Council v. Abbey). In 2003, timber companies voluntarily dis-
missed a suit against the BLM contingent on BLM’s agreement to revise the RMPs by the 
end of 2008. Douglas Timber Operators, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 2d at 249. In 2008, the timber 
companies alleged that BLM’s failure to initiate consultation violated the agency’s obliga-
tion of good faith and fair dealing underlying the 2003 settlement agreement. Am. Forest 
Res. Council, 631 F. Supp. 2d at 31. The timber operators likely wanted the BLM to consult 
(and issue a finding of no significant impact), so that they could resume harvesting. Three 
other cases dealt with BLM’s failure to consult. See Or. Wild v. Shepard, No. 3:09-00060 (D. 
Or. resolved by stipulated order Oct. 15, 2009); Forest Serv. Emp. for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. 
Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 6:09-06019 (D. Or. dismissed Sept. 21, 2009); Pac. Rivers Council 
v. Shepard, No. 3:09-00058 (D. Or. dismissed Sept. 1, 2009); see also Memorandum Opinion 
at 22 n.1, Douglas Timber Operators, Inc. v. Salazar, Civ. No. 09-1704-JDB (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 
2011) (describing the three cases regarding failure to consult). 
348 WOPR Withdrawal Memo, supra note 37, at 1–2. 
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Environmentalists, who believed that the Bush Administration had 
been “trying to cut corners scientifically and legally” in avoiding ESA 
section 7 consultation, heralded the decision to withdraw the WOPR.350 
Timber industry advocates, however, decried the decision claiming that 
it was “outrageous” for BLM to withdraw “five years of the best planning 
and science,” leaving BLM without “clear direction going forward.”351 
                                                                                                                     
 In Douglas Timber Operators, Inc. v. Salazar, timber companies and 
related associations challenged the Interior Secretary’s 2009 adminis-
trative withdrawal of the WOPR, claiming that the agency’s failure to 
follow FLPMA’s public notice provision violated the APA.352 In March 
2011, the district court in Washington D.C. struck down the Obama 
Administration’s administrative withdrawal, determining that Interior 
had no inherent authority to withdraw RMPs under FLPMA without 
complying with the Act’s formal notice and comment requirements.353 
The district court noted that even if the BLM had authority to withdraw 
RMPs, the agency’s failure to provide a public participation period 
prior to withdrawing the plan was inconsistent with FLPMA.354 Thus, 
the court concluded that the Secretary’s failure to comply with 
FLPMA’s procedures was arbitrary and capricious under the APA.355 
 Although the district court found the 2009 withdrawal arbitrary 
and capricious, it remanded the decision to Interior to “shed additional 
light” on the agency’s rationale for withdrawing the WOPR.356 Far from 
reinstating the WOPR, this order merely required that the BLM allow 
public participation prior to withdrawing the plan.357 This December 
23, 2011 decision briefly awakened the WOPR from the dead.358 After 
the court reinstated the WOPR, environmental groups renewed their 
 
349 Id. at 2. Interior did not, however, provide a formal notice and comment period 
prior to withdrawing the WOPR. Douglas Timber Operators, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 2d at 250. 
350 See Mortenson, Logging Reversal, supra note 339 (quoting conservation groups). 
351 See id. (quoting timber industry groups). 
352 774 F. Supp. 2d at 251; see 43 U.S.C § 1712(f) (2006). 
353 Douglas Timber Operators, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 2d at 257–59. Under FLPMA, the BLM 
“shall, with public involvement and consistent with the terms and conditions of this Act, de-
velop, maintain, and when appropriate, revise [RMPs].” 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (2006). The 
statute is silent as to “withdrawal.” See id. 
354 See Douglas Timber Operators, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 2d at 259–60. 
355 Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006)). 
356 Id. at 261. 
357 See Chandra LeGue, Judge: WOPR Withdrawal Needs New Process, Oregon Wild (Mar. 
31. 2011, 3:41 PM), http://www.oregonwild.org/about/blog/wopr-redux. 
358 See Zombie WOPR Still Alive, Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Center, http://kswild. 
org/get-involved/ActionAlerts/zombie-wopr-still-alive (last visited Jan. 10, 2013). 
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challenges to it.359 Although the WOPR remained among the living 
dead for another year, environmental groups finally succeeded in hav-
ing the WOPR RODs and RMPs vacated in May 2012.360 The western 
Oregon BLM districts have reinstated the 1995 ROD and RMP as the 
official land use plan of record.361 
V. The Secure Rural School Act & Payments In Lieu of Taxes: 
Propping Up County Governments with Federal Cash 
 Since the late 1980s and 1990s, Congress has authorized a variety 
of payment programs to help the Oregon and California counties 
(“O&C counties”) cope with the financial uncertainty caused by the 
spotted owl dispute and the resulting decrease in timber harvest reve-
nues.362 Initially, Congress provided funds to the affected counties un-
der the generic Payment In Lieu of Taxes Act (PILT), first authorized 
in 1976.363 Under PILT, the O&C counties receive payments per acre of 
land managed by either the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) or 
U.S. Forest Service (USFS) to compensate them for revenues lost due 
to the tax-exempt status of federal lands; however, this payment is re-
duced for counties that receive money through timber revenue sharing 
programs.364 In fiscal year (FY) 2011, Oregon counties received over 
thirteen million dollars in PILT funding.365 Congress scheduled fund-
                                                                                                                      
359 See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Mot. for Partial Summary Judgment at 2 
Pac. Rivers Council v. Shepard, No. 3:11-00442 (D. Or. May 16, 2012) (filed June 3, 2011). 
360 Final Judgment, Pac. Rivers Council, No. 03:11-00442 (D. Or. May 16, 2012) (vacat-
ing the 2008 RODs and RMPs for western Oregon BLM districts and reinstating the BLM's 
1995 RODs and RMP); see also BLM Western Oregon Plan Decisions Withdrawn, Bureau of 
Land Mgmt., http://www.blm.gov/or/plans/wopr/index.php (last visited Jan. 10, 2013). 
361 Final Judgment, supra note 360, at 2; Bureau of Land Mgmt., supra note 360. 
362 See Bureau of Land Mgmt. Overview of the Oregon and California Lands Act 
of 1937, at 2, available at http://www.blm.gov/or/rac/files/Oregon%20Flyer.pdf. Congress 
responded by establishing a funding floor above which counties would receive money annu-
ally. Id. 
363 Pub. L No. 94-565, 90 Stat. 2262 (1976), amended by Pub. L. No. 103-397, 108 Stat. 
4156 (1994) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6907 (2006)). 
364 Id. §§ 6901(1)–(2), 6902(a)(1), 6903, 6904; see also George Cameron Coggins et 
al., Federal Public Land Management and Resources Law 159 (6th ed. 2007). The reve-
nue counties receive under other revenue sharing programs such as the Secure Rural 
Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000 (SRSA) reduces PILT payments. 31 
U.S.C. § 6903(b)(1); 43 C.F.R. § 44.23(a) (2011); see 31 U.S.C. § 6903(a)(1)(C) (the SRSA is 
a “payment law” that reduces PILT disbursements). 
365 Payments in Lieu of Taxes: County Payments, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, http:// 
www.doi.gov/pilt/county-payments.cfm (search “Select State” for “Oregon” and search “Se-
lect Year” for “2011”; then follow “Search” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 10, 2013). 
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ing for the PILT program to expire at the end of the FY 2012.366 In July 
2012, however, Congress extended PILT through FY 2013.367 
 Recognizing that timber sales—and thus county revenues—had 
been greatly curtailed since implementation of the Northwest Forest 
Plan (NWFP), Congress passed the Secure Rural Schools and Commu-
nity Self-Determination Act of 2000 (SRSA).368 The SRSA provided ru-
ral counties—mostly in areas subject to the NWFP—with payments and 
established resource advisory committees (RAC) that organized pro-
jects at the local level.369 Two factors determined the amount of the 
payments: a base payment that considered historical timber receipts 
and USFS and BLM land acreage within a county, and an income ad-
justment for that county.370 Rural counties viewed the SRSA as an im-
perative, since they could not “generate this type of revenue at the local 
level [with their] small population and limited tax base.”371 In 2008, 
Congress passed an emergency, short-term reauthorization of the 
SRSA.372 Although Congress averted a funding disaster for rural coun-
ties in 2008, the reauthorization appropriated money only for FY 2008 
to FY 2011.373 The reauthorization provided the counties with a declin-
ing amount of funding during each year of the appropriation.374 Con-
gress chose not to reauthorize the SRSA in 2011, but in July 2012, re-
stored SRSA funding for FY 2012.375 
                                                                                                                      
366 31 U.S.C. § 6906 (2006). 
367 Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100111 
(noting extension from 2012 to 2013). 
368 Pub. L. 106-393, § 2(a)(8)–(10), 114 Stat. 1607, 1608–09 (codified as amended at 
16 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7153 (2006 & Supp. 2008). 
369 Id. § 101 (determining payment amount for eligible counties); id. § 203 (describing 
RACs). 
370 See U.S. Forest Serv., Title I- Secure Payments for States and Counties Con-
taining Federal Land: Calculating Payments (2012), available at http://www.fs.usda. 
gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5253425.pdf. 
371 See Nigel D. Graham, Advocacy Groups Plead with Congress to Reauthorize the Secure Ru-
ral Schools and Community Self-Determination Act, 13 Pub. Int. L. Rep. 194, 198 (2008) (quot-
ing Jim French, Vice President of the National Forest County Schools Coalition). 
372 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 601(a), 122 
Stat. 3765, 3896 (amending 16 U.S.C. § 7101 (2006)). 
373 Id. (amending 16 U.S.C. § 7111(a) (2006)). 
374 Id. (amending 16 U.S.C. § 7102(11)(A)–(B) (2006)). 
375 Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 
§ 100101(a) (striking “2011” in sections 101, 102, 203, 207, 208, 304, and 402 and inserting 
“2012” in its place). 
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VI. Congressional Responses to the O&C County  
Funding Deficiencies 
 The Oregon and California counties (“O&C counties”) no longer 
derive significant revenues from the Oregon & California Lands Act of 
1937 (OCLA) due both to the environmental restrictions of the North-
west Forest Plan (NWFP) and the unlikely prospects of the Western 
Oregon Plan Revisions.376 Therefore, Congress’ decision not to ap-
prove long-term funding for the Payment In Lieu of Taxes Act (PILT) 
and Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 
2000 (SRSA) has created desperation among several of the O&C coun-
ties.377 The O&C counties estimate that they need 110 million dollars 
annually to sustain county services.378 Recently, the sense of urgency 
has intensified, as several counties have faced the prospect of insolvency 
and the loss of critical public services, including jail closures and sheriff 
layoffs.379 Responding to the dire economic situation of the O&C coun-
ties, members of Congress have offered two separate solutions. 
 Under the first proposal—sponsored by Oregon Representatives 
DeFazio, Schrader and Walden—the lands from the Oregon & Califor-
nia Land Grant (“O&C lands”) would be split into a timber zone man-
                                                                                                                      
376 See supra notes 285–361 and accompanying text. 
377 Indicative of its dire economic situation, Curry County announced (and then re-
scinded) plans to develop a coast-side golf course in an effort to avoid insolvency. Lori Tobias, 
Curry County Pulls the Plug on Plan to Build Golf Course in Floras Lake Area, Oregonian, Sept. 28, 
2011, http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2011/09/curry_county_ 
pulls_the_plug_on.html; Lori Tobias, Curry County Officials Hope to Tee Off with Golf Course 
Plan, but Others Think They Are Out of Bounds, Oregonian, Aug. 28, 2011, http://www.oregon 
live.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2011/08/post_41.html. More recently, Curry 
County proposed a new sales tax to infuse county coffers. See Mortenson, Rural Oregon Coun-
ties Scramble, supra note 38. For example, the Lane County Sheriff recently indicated that he 
would have to close half of local jail beds and lay off three-quarters of patrol staff if the 
county does not receive extra funding by the summer. Charles Pope, Obama’s Budget Adds 
Funding for Counties, Oregonian, Feb. 14, 2012, 2012 WLNR 3224454 [hereinafter Pope, 
Obama’s Budget Adds Funding for Counties]. For a graphical representation of the counties’ 
funding predicament, see Eric Mortenson, Loss of Federal Forest Payments Has Oregon Counties 
Looking for Revenue While Having Millions That Can’t Be Tapped, Oregonian, Jan. 21, 2012 
[hereinafter Mortenson, Loss of Federal Forest Payments], http://www.oregonlive.com/environ- 
ment/index.ssf/2012/01/loss_of_federal_forest_payment.html. 
378 See Eric Mortenson & Charles Pope, Forest Plan Would Share Cost, Oregonian, Feb. 
2, 2012, at C1. 
379 Oregon Senate Urges Continued Federal Aid for Timber Counties, Argus Observer (Or.), 
May 19, 2011, http://www.argusobserver.com/news/oregon-senate-urges-continued-federal-
aid-for-timber-counties/article_ea09bc5c-463d-5716-ab2f-a74317304756.html; Eric Morten-
son, Because of Tax Levy Defeat, Josephine County will Release Prisoners and Cut Its Sheriff’s Depart-
ment, Oregonian, May 16, 2012, http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/ 
2012/05/because_of_tax_levy_defeat_jos.html. 
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aged by a private trust and a conservation zone managed by the U.S. 
Forest Service (USFS).380 Under the second proposal, a partisan group 
of legislators proposed a new county payments program and extension 
of PILT for five more years.381 Both solutions are inadequate. The for-
mer would not sufficiently protect the environment, would undermine 
the integrity of the NWFP, and would base economic recovery on out-
dated industrial forestry assumptions. The latter proposal fails to grasp 
the changed nature of the forestry economy in the Northwest and 
punts on developing a viable long-term solution that both addresses the 
O&C counties’ funding issues and respects environmental values. 
 Any viable, long-term solution to county funding problems must 
fall outside the timber-centric worldview that has pervaded for over 150 
years. We suggest a solution based on a combination of payments for 
ecosystem services like watershed protection and recreation;382 local 
sales tax initiatives similar to those in existence in two other Oregon 
towns;383 higher state taxation of log exports;384 increased county prop-
erty tax rates;385 possible federal management consolidation of the 
O&C lands;386 and direction of federal payments to the most needy 
counties.387 Future SRSA and PILT reauthorization should be condi-
tioned on implementing some or all of these alternative revenue gen-
eration initiatives. This broad-based revenue solution could finally at-
tain budget security for the O&C counties, while at the same time pre-
serving the unique natural resources of the O&C lands. 
A. The Trust Proposal: Divide and Privatize 
 In December 2011, Oregon Representatives DeFazio, Walden, and 
Schrader introduced their solution for breaking management gridlock 
on the O&C lands, creating jobs, and fixing the county budget issues.388 
                                                                                                                      
380 See infra notes 388–409 and accompanying text. 
381 See infra notes 410–420 and accompanying text. 
382 See infra notes 479–495 and accompanying text. 
383 See infra notes 496–505 and accompanying text. 
384 See infra notes 506–512 and accompanying text. 
385 See infra notes 513–516 and accompanying text. 
386 See infra notes 517–521 and accompanying text. 
387 See infra notes 522–525 and accompanying text. 
388 See Greg Walden, Peter DeFazio & Kurt Schrader, Oregon’s Forested Communities: Con-
gressmen Offer Bipartisan Solution to Fiscal Crisis, Oregonian, Dec. 17, 2011, http://www. 
oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2011/12/oregons_forested_communities_c.html. 
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In February 2012, the representatives unveiled their proposal, the O&C 
Trust, Conservation, and Jobs Act (OCTA).389 
 In order to avoid further mill closures, job outsourcing, and 
county budgetary collapse, the Oregon representatives proposed divid-
ing the O&C lands into timber and conservation trusts, with the timber 
tracts managed in trust for the O&C counties, and the conservation 
tracts protected from harvesting.390 The “timber trust” —1.479 million 
acres of land, with an average stand age less than 125 years—would be 
managed for timber harvesting.391 Although technically, the federal 
government would hold title to the lands, this timber trust land would 
be managed by a private board of trustees.392 This board of trustees 
would be bound by a fiduciary duty to produce “maximum sustained 
revenues in perpetuity for the O&C [] counties.”393 In order to fulfill its 
fiduciary duty to maximize revenues, the board of trustees could au-
thorize clearcutting of a substantial amount of timber-trust lands.394 
Commentators project that the OCTA would triple the amount of tim-
ber logged from O&C lands.395 Further, the lands in this “timber trust” 
appear exempt from the NWFP.396 
 In addition to creating the timber trust, the OCTA would transfer 
jurisdiction over all O&C lands not placed in the timber trust— ap-
                                                                                                                      
389 H.R. __, 112th Cong. (2012) (discussion draft), available at http://www.defazio. 
house.gov/images/stories/OCTCA_FINAL_02-16-2012.pdf. The bill was apparently never 
formally introduced in the 112th Congress, although the draft bill was widely circulated. 
390 See id.; see also Erik Fernandez, Oregon Wild, Clear-Cutting Western Oregon 1 
(2012), available at http://www.oregonwild.org/oregon_forests/old_growth_protection/ 
west side-forests/western-oregon-s-patchwork-public-lands/LoggingMandateMap2.21.12.pdf 
(mapping out the respective trusts). 
391 H.R. __ §§ 211(c)(1), 211(d)(1), 214. 
392 Id. § 212(a)(1)-(3). The trust would assume authority over the road system covering 
the trust land. Id. § 212(c). The United States would, however, retain title to subsurface 
minerals under the trust lands. Id. § 212(b)(1). 
393 Id. § 211(b). 
394 See Randi Spivak, Geos Instit., Summary Analysis and Critique of the O&C 
Trust, Conservation, and Jobs Act 1 (2012), available at http://www.oregonwild.org/ 
oregon_forests/old_growth_protection/westside-forests/western-oregon-s-patchwork-public- 
lands/Geos%20Institute%20Summary%20of%20O-C%20Trust%2C%20Conservation%20-
%20Jobs%20Act.pdf; Saul Hubbard, Lawmakers Unveil Forest Plan, Register-Guard (Or.), 
Feb. 17, 2012, available at http://projects.registerguard.com/web/updates/2762552455/ 
logging-defazio-oregon-federal-lands.html.csp. 
395 See Spivak, supra note 394. In a report reviewed by other groups, Spivak noted that 
510 million board feet (MMBF) would be logged each year—up from 186 MMBF per year 
currently. Id. This increase is the equivalent of thirty-three square miles of new clearcuts. 
Id. 
396 See H.R. __, 112th Cong. § 232(b) (2012) (discussion draft) (specifying that conser-
vation trust lands would be subject to the NWFP after making no similar mention in subti-
tle A of the bill). 
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proximately 824,000 acres—to the USFS.397 The lands in this “conser-
vation trust” would remain subject to the NWFP, with a focus on pro-
tecting old-growth forests.398 The OCTA also would designate ap-
proximately 89,000 acres of new wilderness areas399 and 128 miles of 
new wild and scenic river corridors.400 
                                                                                                                     
 In promoting the bill, the Oregon representatives claimed that 
without a new program for supporting rural Oregon counties, the O&C 
counties—already facing “depression-like unemployment” —would lose 
between three thousand and four thousand jobs.401 Further, Oregon 
business sales would drop by around $350 million, which would also 
result in the loss of another $230 million in indirect economic activity 
within the state.402 The representatives claim that their plan would pro-
vide western Oregon with a “predictable level of revenues in perpetu-
ity” and would create twelve thousand new jobs.403 Moreover, the repre-
sentatives maintain that the OCTA proposal is the best that conserva-
tion interests can hope for, claiming that they will never be able to 
defend old-growth protections against the current Congress and U.S. 
Supreme Court.404 Representative DeFazio recently predicted that if 
Congress does not act, county governments around the state would 
topple like dominoes all the way up to Multnomah County—home of 
Portland.405 Representative Schrader also pitched the proposal as a way 
to break through the “old timber wars” paradigm.406 
 In response, some commentators criticized the OCTA as catering 
to short-term political expediency over finding a sustainable, long-term 
 
397 Id. § 231; see Spivak, supra note 394. 
398 H.R. __ § 232(b). 
399 Id. §§ 501(a), 502; Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136 (2006); see 
Spivak, supra note 394. 
400 H.R. __ §§ 511–514; Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C § 1274(a) (2006); see 
Spivak, supra note 394. The bill would also provide additional protections for Rogue River 
tributaries. H.R. __ § 515. 
401 Walden, DeFazio & Schrader, supra note 388. 
402 Dawn Marie Gaid, Changing Federal County Payments and Rural Oregon Counties: Analysis 
of Policy Impacts and Responses from Loss of Secure Rural Schools Funding in Selected Oregon Counties 
27 (Or. State Univ. Rural Studies Program, Working Paper No. 09-04, 2009), available at 
http://ruralstudies.oregonstate.edu/sites/default/files/pub/pdf/RSP09-04.pdf; Walden, DeFazio & 
Schrader, supra note 388. 
403 See Walden, DeFazio & Schrader, supra note 388. 
404 See Eric Mortenson, DeFazio Touts Logging Plan to Help Finance Oregon Timber Counties, 
Oregonian, Mar. 11, 2012, available at http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index. 
ssf/2012/03/defazio_touts_idea_to_help_cou.html. 
405 Id. 
406 See Hubbard, supra note 394. 
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solution.407 But The Oregonian editorial staff endorsed the plan, arguing 
that the proposal would “fulfill the historical economic commitment to 
Oregon” by providing more logs, more jobs and more revenues to the 
counties, characterizing the DeFazio proposal as moderate and bal-
anced, and emphasizing that sustainable harvests can co-exist with envi-
ronmental protections strong enough to appease environmental con-
cerns.408 At the close of its 2012 session, the Oregon Assembly passed a 
joint memorial urging the President and Congress to allow the O&C 
counties to exercise full management authority over federal O&C lands 
within their county borders by passing the OCTA.409 
B. The County Payments Proposal: A Return to a Bygone Era 
 The Obama Administration’s fiscal year (FY) 2013 budget pro-
posed to fund the nationwide Secure Rural Schools and Community 
Self-Determination Act of 2000 (SRSA) timber payment program with 
270 million dollars.410 This amount, however, was far from the 260 mil-
lion dollars Oregon alone received at the height of the program in the 
early 2000s.411 After the President released the FY 2013 budget, Repre-
                                                                                                                      
407 See, e.g., id. (quoting Sean Stevens, spokesperson for Oregon Wild: “We’re seeing how 
people in positions of power are between a rock and a hard place . . . . They know how un-
popular (raising taxes) is, so they’ll throw a proposal out there . . . and when it fails, they can 
pin it on the environmentalists.”); Steve Pedery, Editorial, County Timber Payments: Put Public 
Lands Ahead of Politics, Oregonian, Jan. 28, 2012, at B9, available at http://www.oregon 
live.com/opinion/index.ssf/2012/01/county_timber_payments_put_pub. html. 
408 See Editorial Board, A Promising O&C Forest Plan, Oregonian, Feb. 20, 2012, at B4, 
available at http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2012/02/a_promising_oc_for- 
est_plan.html; Editorial Board, Down the Center Path on Federal Forests, Oregonian, Dec. 29, 
2011, at C4, available at http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2011/12/down_the_ 
center_path_on_federa.html. 
409 S.J. Memorial 201, 76th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2012). 
410 See U.S. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Fiscal 
Year 2013 Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2013, at 226 tbl.S-9 
(2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/ 
assets/budget.pdf; Eric Mortenson, Curry County Considering a Sales Tax, Oregonian, Feb. 
17, 2012, at A1 [hereinafter Mortenson, Curry County]; Pope, Obama’s Budget Adds Funding 
for Counties, supra note 377. The Obama Administration’s proposed budget also called for 
four additional years of federal funding of the SRSA, with the amount paid declining by 
ten percent each year. Pope, supra note 377. Importantly, the county payments money 
would be mandatory spending, and thus very difficult to reverse once approved. Id. 
411 See USDA Forest Service Payment to States Fiscal 2001, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (2001), 
http://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5341321.pdf (noting that in 
FY 2001, Oregon received 154 million dollars for USFS lands under the SRSA); FY2001 O&C 
Payments to Counties, U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt. (2001), available at http://www.blm.gov/ 
or/files/County_official_2002_payments.pdf (noting that in FY 2001, Oregon received 109 
million dollars for BLM land under the SRSA). 
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sentative Doc Hastings (R-Wash.) introduced the Federal Forests 
County Revenue, Schools, and Jobs Act of 2012 (“Hastings bill”) to re-
place the county payments program.412 The sponsors claimed this bill 
would create jobs and stimulate the economy by setting new minimum 
harvest levels and revenue targets for the Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM) and USFS.413 In particular, the Hastings bill would require that 
federal lands generate at least sixty percent of the income generated 
from the National Forest System between 1980 and 2000.414 This 
money would be deposited into a trust account to provide O&C coun-
ties with funding for schools, roads, and services.415 The bill would re-
quire minimum timber harvest levels equivalent to half the average 
amount harvested from federal forests between 1980 and 2000 and ex-
tend PILT payments until 2017.416 
                                                                                                                     
 Although the Hastings bill initially moved quickly through the U.S. 
House of Representatives, it has stalled in the Senate.417 Representa-
tives Walden, DeFazio, and Schrader did not endorse the Hastings bill, 
but focused their attention on integrating the OCTA and Hastings pro-
posals.418 A primary concern is that replacing SRSA funding under the 
Hastings bill would require increased logging by at least 400% over cur-
rent levels, increased timber prices of 400%, and augmented federal 
land management budgets by 300%.419 Moreover, all timber harvests 
authorized by the Hastings bill would be presumed compliant with fed-
eral environmental laws such as the National Environmental Policy Act 
 
412 H.R. 4019, 112th Cong. (2012). 
413 See Press Release, Natural Res. Comm., U.S. House of Representatives, Committee 
Passes Secure Rural Schools, PILT Legislation to Create Jobs, Stimulate Rural Economies 
& Restore Forest Health (Feb. 16, 2012), available at http://naturalresources.house.gov/ 
UploadedFiles/02.16.12-CommitteePassesSRS.pdf. 
414 H.R. 4019 § 101(1); see also Charles Pope, House to See County Payments Bill, Orego-
nian, Feb. 16, 2012, 2012 WLNR 3468920. 
415 See H.R. 4019 § 102. 
416 Id. §§ 101(8), 201. 
417 H.R. 4019: Federal Forests County Revenue, Schools, and Jobs Act of 2012, Govtrack.us, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr4019 (last visited Jan. 10, 2013) (noting 
that the bill was introduced on February 14, 2012, and was then referred to committee on 
February 16, 2012). 
418 See Hubbard, supra note 394 (noting that DeFazio called the Hastings bill “quite con-
troversial” because it would require suspending most environmental laws in order to increase 
logging); Charles Pope, County Timber Payments Plan Moving Fast in U.S. House, Generating 
Conflict and Worry, Oregonian, Feb. 15, 2012, http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index. 
ssf/2012/02/house_committee_to_consider_co.html (updated Apr. 19, 2012); see Pope, 
Obama’s Budget Adds Funding for Counties, supra note 377. 
419 See Clear-Cut Solution to County Funding?, Oregon Wild, http://www.oregonwild. 
org/oregon_forests/old_growth_protection/westside-forests/western-oregon-s-patchwork-
public-lands/clear-cut-solution-to-county-funding (last visited Jan. 10, 2013). 
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(NEPA), the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and National Forest Man-
agement Act (NMFA), and would not be subject to judicial review.420 
C. The Inadequacy of the Trust and County Payment Bills 
 Although the Hastings bill is not as extreme as the 1995 timber 
salvage rider,421 it includes similar provisions—such as precluding judi-
cial review and declaring all sales compliant with existing federal envi-
ronmental laws422—and promises to raise timber harvests in the region 
to a level not seen since the 1980s. The OCTA “trust” proposal does 
create a conservation trust and some new wilderness and wild and sce-
nic river protections.423 Beyond these fairly limited designations, how-
ever, the proposal eliminates NWFP protections on the nearly two-
thirds of the O&C lands outside conservation trust lands subject to in-
creased logging. Both proposals suffer from critical environmental and 
economic flaws. 
 First, the OCTA proposal’s assumption that the Oregon Forest 
Practices Act (FPA)424 will provide sufficient protection to the O&C 
lands is flawed.425 Second, both proposals fail to consider adverse water 
quality impacts.426 Third, given the changed Northwest timber land-
scape, the claimed economic benefits are likely greatly overstated.427 
Fourth, the affected forests may not have the timber volume necessary 
to support the funding the counties seek.428 Fifth, landscape-level eco-
systems need room for change, so statutorily carving up land into tim-
ber and non-timber areas leaves insufficient space for dynamic changes 
and responses to ecological shocks like fire or insect kill.429 These flaws 
are significant, and should give politicians pause before pushing 
through such a short-term fix. 
                                                                                                                      
420 H.R. 4019, 112th Cong. § 105(d)(4), (e) (2012). A proposed project would require 
an environmental report, although the requirements are vague and a carve-out is made for 
projects in response to a catastrophic event. See id. § 105(d)(2)(C). 
421 See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Assistance, for Anti-
Terrorism Initiatives, for Assistance in the Recovery from the Tragedy that Occured at Okla-
homa City, and Rescissions Act, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-19, 109 Stat. 194; H.R. 4019; supra 
notes 265–281 and accompanying text. 
422 See supra notes 267–268 and accompanying text. 
423 H.R. __, 112th Cong. §§ 501–515 (2012) (discussion draft). 
424 Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 527.610–.992 (2011). 
425 See infra notes 430–442 and accompanying text. 
426 See infra notes 443–449 and accompanying text. 
427 See infra notes 450–464 and accompanying text. 
428 See infra notes 465–470 and accompanying text. 
429 See infra note 471 and accompanying text in subsection. 
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1. The Inadequate Protection Provided by the Oregon FPA 
 If Congress were to enact either the OCTA or the Hastings bill, the 
O&C lands would no longer be subject to most federal environmental 
protections, including those afforded by NEPA and the ESA.430 Thus, 
under the OCTA proposal, the Oregon FPA would offer protection 
only for land included in the “timber trusts.”431 The Hastings bill does 
not even consider this dynamic. In promoting the OCTA, the Oregon 
delegation assumed that the Oregon FPA would be sufficient to protect 
the spotted owl and salmon.432 Because 1.9 million acres of O&C lands 
currently support strong salmon populations and are home to nearly 
sixty species of concern and nearly thirty percent of the listed marbled 
murrelet’s critical habitat in western Oregon,433 this is a critical as-
sumption. 
                                                                                                                     
 Unfortunately, the assumption is incorrect. For example, Oregon 
law permits 120-acre clearcuts and allows operators to harvest forests in 
a way that creates habitat fragmentation.434 In state forests, the Oregon 
FPA protects only thirty percent of land from clearcuts.435 Moreover, in 
 
430 H.R. __, 112th Cong. § 212(a)(2) (2012) (discussion draft); H.R. 4019, 112th 
Cong., § 105(d)(4), (e) (2012) (deeming existing documents sufficient). The OCTA pro-
posal does, however, require the board of trustees to comply with the Clean Water Act with 
respect to timber road run-off. H.R. __ § 212(c)(3). 
431 See H.R. __ § 212(a)(2). 
432 See id. § 214(j) (noting that so long as the board of trustees manages the timber 
trust in compliance with the Oregon FPA, its actions shall be considered compliant with 
the ESA). 
433 The Nature Conservancy & Wild Salmon Ctr., Atlas of Conservation Values 
on Bureau of Land Management Holdings in Western Oregon 5–7, 23 map 13 (2012), 
available at http://oe.oregonexplorer.info/ExternalContent/spatial_data_download/tnc/W_ 
OR_BLM_Atlas_full_print_version.pdf. The O&C lands contain over fourteen thousand 
miles of salmon-bearing river miles. Id. at 5. 
434 Or. Rev. Stat. § 527.740(1)–(2) (2011); Or. Admin. R. 629-630-0100(1) (2012) 
(noting that operators are given the discretion to choose the method by which to harvest 
forests); see Edward J. Heisel, Comment, Biodiversity and Federal Land Ownership: Mapping A 
Strategy for the Future, 25 Ecology L.Q. 229, 244 (1998) (“Clearcutting of [Northwest old-
growth] forests has severely compromised their biological integrity, resulting in the direct 
loss of biodiversity through habitat fragmentation . . . .”). 
435 See Or. Dep’t of Forestry (ODF), Northwest Oregon State Forest Manage-
ment Plan Revised Plan April 2010 S-17, 4-11 (2010), available at http://www.oregon. 
gov/ODF/STATE_FORESTS/docs/management/nwfmp/NWFMP_Revised_April_2010.pdf. Only 
15% of forests covered by Or. Rev. Stat. § 530 must achieve “layered” forest stand structure, 
and only 15% must achieve old-growth forest stand structure—the rest need only reach 
“regeneration” (15%), “closed single canopy” (5%), and/or “understory” (30%) stand 
structures. See id. Although 70% of Or. Rev. Stat. § 530 land is theoretically open to clear-
cutting, the actual percent of land open to clearcutting varies by timber district due to 
terrain (i.e., steep slopes, rocks, stream buffers, wetlands), a lack of road access, and/or 
varied growing conditions. See id. at 2-77, 4-19 to 4-20, 4-74. 
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most situations under the state statute, operators must provide riparian 
buffers up to only twenty feet wide.436 By contrast, the NWFP prevents 
harvesting within one hundred and three hundred feet of riparian ar-
eas, as well as within the one hundred-year floodplain and in landslide-
prone areas.437 Further, the NWFP imposes on-the-ground surveys of 
plants and animals prior to harvesting a parcel.438 Finally, the NWFP 
requires watershed analysis to assess current watershed conditions.439 
The Oregon FPA provides none of these protections. Numerous studies 
have detailed the insufficiency of the Oregon FPA to protect salmon.440 
In fact, in terms of protecting habitat for ESA-listed species, the Oregon 
Board of Forestry has acknowledged that “compliance with the Oregon 
Forest Practices Act requirements does not ensure compliance with the 
federal ESA.”441 
 Paradoxically, although The Oregonian endorsed the OCTA pro-
posal and credited its reliance on the Oregon FPA as a sufficient envi-
ronmental protection for the O&C lands, the newspaper also decried 
the management of state forests under the Oregon FPA as grossly in-
adequate from an environmental perspective.442 This internal conflict 
                                                                                                                      
 
436 Or. Admin R. 629-635-0310(1)(a); 629-640-0200(6) (2012) (affording small domestic 
use, non-fish streams only twenty feet riparian management areas, and ten feet riparian buff-
ers on non-merchantable timber). All other small streams that do not have domestic or fish 
use classifications only receive water quality protection and receive no riparian management 
area. Id. at 629-640-0100(2)(a)–(c), 629-640-0200(2)(a)–(c) (requiring that for fish streams, 
domestic streams, and large and medium unclassified streams, operators only retain under-
story vegetation within ten feet of a stream, trees within twenty feet of a stream, and all trees 
leaning over a channel). 
437 See 1994 ROD, supra note 21, at 9; 1994 FSEIS, supra note 238, at B-16, B-85 tbl.B6-1. 
438 See 1994 ROD, supra note 21, at 11; 1994 FSEIS, supra note 238, at B-143 to B-162 
(describing standards in detail). 
439 See 1994 ROD, supra note 21, at 10; 1994 FSEIS, supra note 238, at B-94 to B-95. 
440 See, e.g., Indep. Multidisciplinary Sci. Team, Recovery of Wild Salmonids in 
Western Oregon Forests: Oregon Forest Practices Act Rules and the Measures in 
the Oregon Plan for Salmon and Watersheds 34 (1999), available at http://www.fsl. 
orst.edu/imst/reports/1999-1.pdf ; Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., A Draft Proposal Con-
cerning Oregon Forest Practices 1 (1998), available at http://www.coastrange.org/docu- 
ments/NMFS_FP_pdf.pdf; Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. , Position Paper on the Oregon 
Forest Practices Act (1996), available at http://www.umpqua-watersheds.org/archive/ 
local/nmfs_on_ofpa.html. 
441 Or. Forest Res. Instit., Oregon Forest Protection Laws 38 (2d ed. 2011), 
available at http://www.forestresourceinstitute.com/images/ill_man_chap_2.pdf. 
442 Compare Craig Patterson, Editorial, The Mismanagement of State Forests, Oregonian, Jan. 
14, 2012, http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2012/01/adaptive_management_ 
or_managem.html (“[T]he State lands [are] exempt from the reality and [s]cience that af-
fects public lands”), with Editorial Board, A Promising O&C Forest Plan, supra note 408 (“If 
the[] [state Forest Practices Act standards] are solid enough to govern the private working 
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among The Oregonian editorial staff is indicative of a need to dig deeper 
to find a solution that adequately balances the counties’ economic in-
terests and forthrightly addresses the environmental realities that would 
result from executing the OCTA proposal. Simply relying on the Ore-
gon FPA as an environmental backstop seems wholly inadequate. 
2. Neglecting the Effect of Increased Timber Harvesting on Oregon’s 
Already Violated Water Quality Standards 
 High river temperatures currently cause the most violations of 
Oregon’s water quality standards and are Oregon’s most widespread 
pollution problem.443 Recently, the District Court for the District of 
Oregon concluded that the EPA failed to adequately review implemen-
tation of Oregon’s water quality standards for stream temperatures 
when reviewing the effects of logging, farming, and cattle grazing.444 
State law considers pollution sources from logging, agriculture, and 
grazing to be in compliance with water quality standards if certain 
mandatory management practices are fulfilled.445 A central flaw in this 
assumption, according to the court, is the fact that logging, grazing, 
and agriculture can raise water temperatures through reduced stream-
side vegetation, thus reducing shade, and adding sediment to the water, 
making streams shallower and less reflective of sunlight.446 
                                                                                                                      
forests of Western Oregon, shouldn’t they be sufficient for what the DeFazio bill envisions as 
public working forests?”). 
443 See Scott Learn, Judge Says Oregon’s River Temperature Standards Need More Scrutiny, 
Oregonian, Feb. 28, 2012, 2012 WLNR 4410304 (citing Nina Bell, executive director of 
Northwest Environmental Advocates); Nina Bell, Editorial, Risks to Salmon, Steelhead, Trout: 
Oregon Fails to Protect Fish from Warming Streams, Oregonian, Mar. 7, 2012, 2012 WLNR 
4996167. See generally Craig N. Johnston, Salmon and Water Temperature: Taking Endangered 
Species Seriously in Establishing Water Quality Standards, 33 Envtl. L. 151 (2003). 
444 Opinion and Order at 13, 15, Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 
3:05-cv-01876-AC (D. Or. Feb. 28, 2012) (“Given that many temperature impaired waters in 
Oregon are impaired in whole or in part by nonpoint sources of pollution, the challenged 
provisions could present a considerable obstacle to the attainment of water quality stan-
dards[.] . . . The EPA cannot choose to review and approve water quality standards while 
ignoring separate provisions which have the potential to cripple the application of those 
standards.”); see Learn, supra note 443. 
445 Opinion and Order, supra note 444, at 12–13. This is the situation under the Ore-
gon FPA. Or. Admin. R. 340-041-0028(12)(e) (2012) (determining that forest operations 
that comply with best management practices already required under the FPA are “deemed 
in compliance” with temperature standards). Similar standards exist in the agricultural 
and grazing context. See, e.g., Or. Admin. R. 340-041-0004(4)(a), (b) (2012); Or. Admin. 
R. 340-041-0028(12)(g) (2012). 
446 See Learn, supra note 443 (describing the motive underlying the suit). 
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 The district court ruled that the EPA’s approval of Oregon’s auto-
matic upward adjustment of stream temperature requirements did not 
protect salmon and steelhead447 and required the National Marine 
Fisheries Service and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to revise their 
programmatic biological opinion (“BiOp”) concerning the effect of 
Oregon’s water quality standards on ESA-listed fish.448 Thus, even with-
out significant increases in timber harvesting, the state is not ade-
quately protecting water quality or providing sufficient stream protec-
tion for salmon and steelhead. Since 2.3 million people live within ten 
miles of the O&C lands, and seventy-five percent of O&C lands are 
within Oregon Department of Environmental Quality designated sur-
face water protection areas,449 the quality of water flowing from the 
O&C lands matters for many Oregonians. With the large increases in 
timber harvesting proposed in the Hastings and OCTA bills, these wa-
ter quality concerns would only become more pronounced. 
3. The Mythical Link Between Increased Harvesting and Economic 
and Employment Increases 
 Another critical flaw in both the OCTA and Hastings bill proposals 
is the assumption that increased harvesting can solve the counties’ 
funding problems. Based on estimates from Headwaters Economics, an 
independent research group, logging would need to increase ten-fold 
to raise the money necessary to support O&C county governments.450 
Although both proposals claim that increased harvesting will add jobs 
and improve local economic conditions, changed market dynamics 
raise questions about whether there is market demand for an increased 
supply of Oregon timber and whether logging would provide sufficient 
economic benefits for the O&C counties. 
                                                                                                                      
447 Opinion and Order, supra note 444, at 24, 26–27 (granting summary judgment to the 
plaintiff). The regulation provides that where the Oregon Department of Environmental 
Quality (DEQ) determines that “the natural thermal potential of all or a portion of a water 
body exceeds the biologically-based [numeric] criteria . . . , the natural thermal potential 
temperatures supersede the biologically-based [numeric] criteria, and are deemed to be the 
applicable temperature criteria for that water body.” Or. Admin. R. 340-041-0028(8) (2012). 
Although the regulation calls for sixty-four degrees Fahrenheit for the protection of salmon 
and steelhead, DEQ regularly allowed temperatures up to ninety degrees Fahrenheit to pass 
muster under this provision. See Bell, supra note 443. 
448 Opinion and Order, supra note 444, at 36–42. 
449 See The Nature Conservancy & Wild Salmon Ctr., supra note 433, at 8. 
450 About Us, Headwaters Economics, http://www.headwaterseconomics.org/about; 
Clear-Cut Solution to County Funding?, supra note 419. Likewise, government management 
costs under this scenario would likely increase seventeen-fold. Id. 
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 Once robust, demand for Oregon Douglas fir timber has dimin-
ished.451 Since promulgation of the NWFP, many sub-equatorial nations 
have developed highly productive, short-rotation, low-cost timber.452 
Soon, timber imports will fulfill a significant portion of American de-
mand.453 Further, since timber stumpage prices are linked to housing 
starts,454 as housing starts decline, so does the demand for timber.455 
Because the recent economic recession produced a sharp decline in 
housing starts,456 Oregon timber prices are depressed.457 As a result of 
these new market dynamics, Oregon timber is less competitive in the 
global marketplace.458 
 Moreover, in the past, the Oregon timber industry developed a 
competitive advantage because a cluster of nearby businesses arose to 
support the forest products industry.459 At the heart of this economic 
web were the milling and forest product companies, with equipment 
manufacturers, distributors, and business services providing support.460 
Prior to the NWFP, most of this support infrastructure was located in 
                                                                                                                      
451 Jerry F. Franklin & K. Norman Johnson, Forests Face New Threat: Global Market Changes, 
Issues in Sci. & Tech., Summer 2004, at 41. 
452 Id. 
453 Id. 
454 See Or. Dep’t of Forestry, An Evaluation of the Achievement of all Nine Per-
formance Measures for Two Management Approaches on the Tillamook and Clatsop 
State Forests 3 fig.1 (2009), available at http://www.oregon.gov/ODF/BOARD/docs/ 
June_3_2009/3_Att_1.pdf. 
455 For example, in the early 1980s, the housing market declined precipitously, and 
housing starts sank from over two million per year to 1.07 million per year. Daniel Jack 
Chasan, A Trust for All the People: Rethinking the Management of Washington’s State Forests, 24 
Seattle U. L. Rev. 1, 10 (2000). By 1982, Washington timber that had sold for $337 per 
thousand board feet (MBF) in 1980 fell to $175/MBF. Id. 
456 In 2005, private housing starts in the United States reached a peak of 2.07 million 
per year. United States Census Bureau, New Privately Owned Housing Units 
Started: Annual Data 1 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/construction/nrc/ 
historical_data/ (follow “XLS” hyperlink at intersection between “All data” column and 
“Started” row). In 2007, housing starts numbered around 1.355 million. Id. As of 2011, 
annual housing starts had fallen to 608,800. Id. 
457 The average stumpage price for timber in Oregon was $348/MBF in FY 2007. 
Council of Forest Trust Land Cntys., State Forester’s Annual Report for the 
Association of Oregon Counties 9 tbl.5 (2009). In 2009, average stumpage prices had 
dropped to $211/MBF. Id. Prices climbed moderately in FY 2010 as Or. Rev. Stat. § 530 
land timber sold for an average of $257/MBF. Council of Forest Trust Land Cntys., 
State Forester’s Annual Report for the Association of Oregon Counties 12 tbl.5 
(2010). 
458 See Franklin & Johnson, supra note 451. 
459 E.D. Hovee & Co., Oregon Forest Cluster Analysis, at i (2005) (prepared for 
the Oregon Forest Resources Institute), available at http://library.state.or.us/repository/ 
2007/200708241527075/index.pdf. 
460 Id. at 6–7. 
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Oregon communities close to the forests, thus providing a number of 
localized “timber” jobs beyond just harvesting.461 Now, many of these 
formerly clustered customers and suppliers are no longer in Oregon.462 
In connection with the lessened demand for Oregon timber, this al-
tered market structure makes it even more difficult for Oregon timber 
and forest products to compete.463 
 As a result of these changed dynamics, Congress should consider 
whether a solution to county funding problems that is based on in-
creased timber harvesting is even economically possible in this very dif-
ferent global timber marketplace. Otherwise, the proposals may pro-
vide only a false hope to the struggling counties, while simultaneously 
destroying valuable forest lands.464 
4. Enough O&C Timber To Sustain Increased Logging? 
 It is possible that logging the O&C lands simply cannot provide 
enough timber volume to sustain the counties, because nearly one-
third of the O&C lands are classified as not part of the harvest base for 
purposes of allowable sale quantity,465 and much of the old growth has 
been logged.466 According to the estimates of an experienced BLM 
timber surveyor, when logging ground to a halt as a result of the spot-
ted owl injunctions in the early 1990s, only five percent of the O&C 
lands still contained old growth.467 A recent study found that forty-six 
percent of the timber stands on O&C lands are less than seventy-five 
years old.468 Knowing the timber volume available on the O&C lands is 
critical because although an old-growth tree may contain thousands of 
board-feet of lumber, a forty- or fifty-year-old tree may only have a few 
hundred board-feet.469 
                                                                                                                      
461 See id. at i, 88. 
462 Id. at 7. 
463 See Franklin & Johnson, supra note 451, at 41, 44 (“The United States will likely be-
come a minor player in the global production of common wood-based products, including 
lumber, pulp, and paper.”). 
464 See Bill Hall & Pete Sorenson, Editorial, Don’t Sacrifice Forests to Solve Financial Crisis, 
Oregonian, Feb. 28, 2012, 2012 WLNR 4343089. 
465 The Nature Conservancy & Wild Salmon Ctr., supra note 433, at 4. 
466 See Steve Holmes, Editorial, Logging Bill Fails to See Forest Through the Trees, Register-
Guard (Or.), Mar. 15, 2012, available at http://projects.registerguard.com/web/opinion/ 
27764259-47/lands-public-counties-plan-timber.html.csp. 
467 Id. 
468 The Nature Conservancy & Wild Salmon Ctr., supra note 433, at 25 map 15. 
469 See Holmes, supra note 466. 
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 The checkerboard layout of USFS and BLM land also makes large-
scale harvesting difficult—especially since over sixty percent of the 
O&C land parcels are less than 320 acres—and increased harvesting on 
the O&C lands could result in decreased harvests from adjacent USFS 
lands due to species and watershed impacts throughout the ecosys-
tem.470 As a result of these dynamics, the claimed economic benefits 
linked to increased O&C land harvests could be offset significantly. 
Thus, before making an “all-in” bet on timber under the OCTA or 
Hastings bill proposals, knowing the actual physical state of the O&C 
forests seems imperative. 
5. Statutory Divisions of Land: Ecologically Inappropriate on the 
Landscape Level 
 Landscape-level ecosystems are complex mosaics in need of the 
flexibility to adjust to disturbances and changes. Consequently, statuto-
rily restricting particular parcels of land to timber and non-timber 
uses—as suggested in the OCTA proposal471—does not ensure land-
scape-level environmental protection if non-timber areas suffer from 
fire, insect-kill, or other forest disturbances. Any viable future solution 
must create ecological buffers that account for future forest changes 
and should not impose inflexible, non-ecological statutory constraints 
on land uses. 
D. Mixed Sources of County Funding, Including New Ecosystem  
Service Markets 
 The potential environmental consequences associated with the 
OCTA and Hastings bill proposals seem ominous. Further, the eco-
nomic assumptions underlying the proposals may be wildly inaccurate. 
Although increases in ecologically-sensitive logging472 and short-term 
                                                                                                                      
 
470 See The Nature Conservancy & Wild Salmon Ctr., supra note 433, at 4. Because 
the O&C lands are adjacent to USFS lands in this checkerboard, and because timber sales 
from USFS lands would still be subject to NEPA’s “cumulative impacts,” NEPA’s “indirect 
effects” analysis, and NFMA’s species diversity requirements, it is possible that increased 
logging of the O&C lands could adversely affect species and watersheds throughout the 
contiguous ecosystem, so that future USFS sales might not meet environmental standards. 
See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (2006) (NFMA authority for diversity); 36 C.F.R. § 219.9 
(2012); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.7, .8 (2011) (NEPA regulations). 
471 H.R. __, 112th Cong. (2012) (discussion draft). 
472 Increasing harvests beyond current NWFP levels will not likely withstand judicial 
review of compliance with environmental laws. See Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Lyons, 871 F. 
Supp. 1291, 1300 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff’d sub nom. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 80 
F.3d 1401 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[A]ny more logging sales than the plan contemplates would 
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reauthorization of county funding programs like the SRSA and PILT 
could be a part of the solution, large-scale liquidation and privatization 
of the forests is not the long-term answer.473 The current congressional 
proposals ignore many environmental and economic issues. 
 In response to the 2012 congressional proposals, a coalition of 
Oregon environmental groups offered a counter-proposal aimed at 
“sharing responsibility” for solving the O&C counties’ budget crisis.474 
This counter-proposal suggested a combination of increased local 
property taxes, increased state export taxes on logs, and federal man-
agement consolidation to eliminate redundancy.475 These groups 
claimed that each of these actions could raise approximately one-third 
of the estimated 110 million dollar annual county funding shortfall.476 
Despite the Oregon congressional delegation’s quick dismissal of the 
environmental counter-proposal in light of the counties’ and state’s 
current economic situation,477 the environmentalists’ notion of shared 
responsibility, and several of their funding sources, should form the 
basis of a more comprehensive proposal. 
 We believe that a long-term answer lies in a diversified funding so-
lution that helps the O&C counties develop more sustainable revenue 
sources without sacrificing the NWFP, other federal protections, or 
Oregon’s already-compromised water quality. Such a solution would 
continue county payments, but tie those payments to a requirement to 
establish ecosystem service programs. Examples of potentially feasible 
ecosystem service programs include watershed protection, recreation, 
                                                                                                                      
probably violate the laws. Whether the plan and its implementation will remain legal will 
depend on future events and conditions.”). If the agencies increase harvest volumes under 
the existing plan, they will likely need a congressional declaration that the increases are 
compliant with environmental laws. 
473 See Hall & Sorenson, supra note 464 (“The loss of these federal funds leaves [the 
O&C counties] in a bind. But proposals to link county funding to expanded logging on 
federal public lands have significant problems.”). The authors of this opinion piece—two 
O&C county commissioners—suggest that forest thinning modeled on the Siuslaw Na-
tional Forest could be one way to achieve higher harvest levels without compromising en-
vironmental values. Id. 
474 See Randi Spivak, Geos Instit. et al., Shared Responsibility: The Conserva-
tion Community’s Recommendations to Equitably Resolve the O&C County Fund-
ing Controversy 2 (2012), available at http://www.oregonwild.org/oregon_forests/old_ 
growth_protection/westside-forests/western-oregon-s-patchwork-public-lands/GEOS_Shared 
Responsibility%20Download%20version.pdf; Hall & Sorenson, supra note 464; see also 
Chandra LeGue, A Bad Deal for Oregon’s Forests and Counties, Oregon Wild (Dec. 19, 2011, 2:22 
PM), http://www.oregonwild.org/about/blog/a-bad-deal-for-oregon-s-forests-and-counties. 
475 See Spivak et al., supra note 474, at 2. 
476 Id.; see Mortenson & Pope, supra note 378. 
477 Mortenson & Pope, supra note 378. 
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and aesthetics. Increased county-wide sales taxes would be an important 
revenue supplement, as would an increased state log export tax. More-
over, the O&C counties are currently property tax havens,478 and so we 
suggest raising county property tax rates to closer to the statewide aver-
age. Future SRSA appropriations should be conditioned on implement-
ing some or all of the above-mentioned alternative revenue generating 
initiatives. Further, we think that the USFS and BLM should investigate 
potential cost savings associated with consolidated management author-
ity over the O&C lands and adjacent national forest lands. Finally, if 
SRSA and PILT funds are reauthorized as part of a long-term fix, we 
suggest altering the award formula so the counties with the most 
need—and not the most acreage or historic harvesting levels—receive 
the most money. 
1. Generating Revenue from Forest Ecosystem Service Values 
 The O&C lands provide a host of values not currently sold in the 
marketplace. Ecosystem service schemes monetize the otherwise “free” 
service values that healthy, functioning ecosystems provide to hu-
mans.479 By monetizing the non-economic values provided by the O&C 
lands, and then selling these service values, the O&C counties might be 
able to generate significant new revenues without having to increase 
timber harvests. 
 Forest ecosystems typically provide four types of benefits: com-
modities, improved environmental conditions, cultural services, and 
supporting services that make these other values possible.480 Commodi-
ties include fisheries, wood, and fresh water.481 Forests also supply flood 
control, water purification, and carbon sequestration benefits for hu-
mans.482 Forests provide cultural services such as education, recreation, 
and aesthetics.483 Finally, supportive services include nutrient cycling 
                                                                                                                      
478 Governor’s Task Force on Fed. Forest Payments and Cnty. Servs., Final Re-
port 39 (2009), available at http://archivedwebsites.sos.state.or.us/Governor_Kulongoski_ 
2011/governor.oregon.gov/Gov/docs/toffp/final_report_020309_am_nobkmk.pdf. 
479 See Janet Neuman, Thinking Inside the Box: Looking for Ecosystem Services Within a For-
ested Watershed, 22 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 173, 188–89 (2007). 
480 See J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Services and the Clean Water Act: Strategies for Fitting New Science 
into Old Law, 40 Envtl. L. 1381, 1382 (2010). 
481 See Neuman, supra note 479, at 189. 
482 See Ruhl, supra note 480; Laurie A. Wayburn & Anton A. Chiono, The Role of Federal 
Policy in Establishing Ecosystem Service Markets, 20 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 385, 387 (2010) 
(“In the United States, natural systems currently offset nearly one-fifth of total [carbon] 
emissions, largely via forest sequestration.”). 
483 Ruhl, supra note 480. 
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and soil formation, which enables the other services to occur.484 Some 
of these services are more easily monetized than others. 
 Watershed-based markets close to urban centers are likely the most 
implementable ecosystem service from the O&C lands because they 
can take advantage of existing compliance mechanisms and broadly 
distribute investment charges among a denser, more populous area.485 
Healthy forest watersheds are essential to water users.486 Increased tim-
ber harvesting leads to increased sediment runoff and decreased water 
quality, which can increase water filtration plant operational costs, 
cause plant shutdowns, generally interfere with the operation of such 
systems, and cause ecological problems.487 Avoiding the sedimentation 
and water supply issues associated with a degraded watershed thus is of 
great value to municipalities, especially those within the states’ desig-
nated surface water protection areas.488 Among many success stories, 
the city of Portland has benefited economically from enhanced water-
shed protection,489 and the federal government has recently partnered 
                                                                                                                      
484 See id.; Wayburn & Chiono, supra note 482, at 388 (discussing need for “investment 
in the natural infrastructure that provides the basic ‘factory’ for producing these ecosys-
tem services”). 
485 See Jonathan Z. Cannon, Commentary, Sustainable Watersheds, 107 Mich. L. Rev. First 
Impressions 74, 77–78 (2008), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol107/ 
cannon.pdf (noting advantage when utilizing existing compliance mechanisms); Philip 
Womble & Martin Doyle, The Geography of Trading Ecosystem Services: A Case Study of Wetland and 
Stream Compensatory Mitigation Markets, 36 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 229, 244 (2012) (emphasiz-
ing increased ecosystem service values if closer to urban areas). 
486 Travis Greenwalt & Deborah McGrath, Protecting the City’s Water: Designing A Payment 
for Ecosystem Services Program, Nat. Resourses & Env’t, Summer 2009, at 9, 9 (2009) 
(“[F]low regulation; filtration; flood control; and protection against runoff, erosion, and 
sedimentation are critically important . . . .”). 
487 See Or. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, Turbidity Analysis for Oregon Public Wa-
ter Systems 1, 37–38, 40 (2010), available at http://www.deq.state.or.us/wq/dwp/docs/ 
TubidityAnalysisOregonPWS201006.pdf; J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The Law and Policy Be-
ginnings of Ecosystem Services, 22 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 157, 157 (2007) (“[D]evelopment in 
forested watersheds has degraded the service of water purification.”). 
488 See Or. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, Drinking Water Source Areas for Oregon 
Public Water Systems—Surface Water (2012), available at http://www.deq.state.or.us/ 
wq/dwp/results.htm (under “Maps,” follow PDF hyperlink for “Surface Water Drinking 
Water Source Areas in Oregon”) (last updated Nov. 28, 2012). 
489 See Keith H. Hirokawa, Sustaining Ecosystem Services Through Local Environmental Law, 
28 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 760, 790–91 (2011) (“In many cases, such as the protection of the 
Bull Run watershed by Portland, Oregon, evidence of the substantial economic value of 
local ecosystem services compels local governments to engage in ecosystem investments.”). 
The city of Portland spends nearly one million dollars per year to protect the Bull Run 
watershed (home to Portland’s water supply). Douglas J. Krieger, The Economic Value 
of Forest Ecosystem Services: A Review 10 (2001). The alternative is often much more 
expensive. For example, each year Salem, Oregon spends 3.2 million dollars to operate 
water treatment facilities. Id. at 12. 
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with the city of Denver, Colorado to protect key forested headwaters, 
distributing these costs among municipal water users.490 
 In addition, since healthy watersheds foster stream temperatures 
compliant with Clean Water Act (CWA) standards,491 the O&C counties 
could potentially sell temperature credits to larger government units 
whose water discharges exceed CWA limits.492 Although forest ecosys-
tems provide recreational, aesthetic, and carbon sequestration values, 
the federally-owned O&C lands would be ineligible for carbon seques-
tration credits under the new California cap-and-trade regulations,493 
and opportunities to monetize recreation and aesthetic values may be 
difficult because of the lack of large iconic natural attractions in the 
O&C lands. Thus, focusing on watersheds provides an opportunity to 
structure programs that address water quality and drinking water con-
cerns, CWA compliance, and fish protection. 
                                                                                                                      
490 Concerned about possible catastrophic effects on water supply from fire, Denver Wa-
ter—the supplier of water to 1.3 million people in the metro area—recently signed a thirty-
three million dollar cost-sharing agreement with the USFS for watershed restoration. See Neil 
LaRubbio, Communities Help Pay for Ecosystem Services Provided by Forests, High Country News, 
Feb. 20, 2012, available at http://www.hcn.org/issues/44.3/communities-help-pay-for-eco 
system-services-provided-by-forests. To pay for this restoration work, residential water users in 
Denver will pay an extra twenty-seven dollars over the course of the next five years. Id. A 
number of other communities around the world have successfully implemented a distributed 
watershed protection surcharge. See Tim Wigington, Comment, Wading Out of the Tilla-muck: 
Reducing Timber Harvests in the Tillamook and Clatsop State Forests, and Protecting Rural Timber 
Economies Through Ecosystem Service Programs, 42 Envtl. L. 1275, 1326–28 (2012). 
491 Healthy forests shade rivers, thus reducing water temperature, and helping communi-
ties comply with total maximum daily load (TMDL) limits set by states under the Clean Water 
Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C)–(D) (2006) (requiring states to set pollutant- and tem-
perature-based TMDLs for impaired water bodies); e.g., Or. Dep’t Envtl. Quality, Wil-
lamette Basin Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL), at C-14 (2006), available at http:// 
www.deq.state.or.us/wq/tmdls/docs/willamettebasin/willamette/appxctemp.pdf. Oregon has 
established temperature load capacity in TMDLs for some rivers basins, which are then relied 
upon to set temperature-based permit limits for municipal wastewater treatment facilities that 
discharge hot water into rivers. See, e.g., Alan Horton & Marley Gaddis, Pace & Scale: How Envi-
ronmental Markets Could Change Conservation for Good, Freshwater, Fall 2011, at 12, 16 (noting 
the TMDL set for the Rogue River, and the temperature limits set on Ashland and Medford’s 
wastewater treatment discharges). 
492 See Horton & Gaddis, supra note 291 (describing a scheme whereby the city of Med-
ford contracted with The Freshwater Trust to meet its permit obligation; The Freshwater 
Trust then contracted with riparian landowners in the river basin who leased their land for 
river-side shade restoration. Once the restoration work is complete, The Freshwater Trust will 
sell “temperature reduction credits” to the city, which the city can then use to offset water 
discharges from the point source). 
493 See Air Res. Bd., Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Compliance Offset Protocol U.S. 
Forest Projects § 3.6, at 17 (2011), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/ 
capandtrade10/copusforest.pdf (eligible projects are only those “on private land, or on 
state or municipal public land”). 
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 Successfully implementing a system of ecosystem service payments 
will require a shift in thinking and forceful leadership by the state and 
federal governments.494 To encourage this leadership, Congress should 
condition county payment appropriations on the development of these 
types of programs. For one, the PILT program reduces payments by the 
amount a local government receives from other revenue programs, 
such as the SRSA.495 Congress should specifically exempt funding re-
ceived from ecosystem-service programs from the payment reduction 
provision in PILT. Congress should also provide an incentive to the 
counties to develop ecosystem service programs by increasing PILT and 
SRSA disbursements to reward counties implementing these types of 
programs on a specified percentage of eligible acreage within their ju-
risdictions. 
2. Countywide Sales Tax Measures and Capturing Out-of-Town 
Revenue 
 Because the O&C counties house such large swaths of federal land 
and local government units cannot impose property taxes on federal 
land, the counties are at a revenue disadvantage.496 To make up for this 
disadvantage, Congress compensated counties under programs such as 
the OCLA, SRSA, and PILT. When implemented, these county pay-
ments provided a large portion of the O&C counties’ revenues each 
year.497 As these funds have dried up, the O&C counties must rethink 
their long-held position on sales taxes.498 
 Among Oregon counties, Curry County on the southern Oregon 
coast is the most affected by the O&C funding crisis. Although the 
county has considered declaring bankruptcy, disappearing, or merging 
with other counties, the first two proposals have been deemed legally 
                                                                                                                      
494 See Wayburn & Chiono, supra note 482, at 385–86 (“[W]hile voluntary markets for 
ecosystem services currently exist in the United States, these are unlikely to produce an 
efficient level of the ecosystem service due to insufficient demand and the persistence of 
free-ridership problems. Government regulation will be necessary to complement these 
market approaches, establishing compliance markets that induce demand for ecosystem 
service proxies, set standards, and foreclose on free-ridership. Many ecosystem services are 
difficult or costly to measure directly, thus the government also must establish rigorous 
standards and guidelines to ensure the veracity of the proxies used.”). 
495 31 U.S.C. § 6903(b) (2006); 43 C.F.R. § 44.23(a) (2011); see 31 U.S.C. § 6903(a)(1)(C). 
496 See Coggins et al., supra note 364, at 158–59 (noting that the OCLA was enacted 
because federal property is immunized from state tax laws). 
497 For example, in Curry County, timber payments from these federal programs made 
up 65% of the county’s operating budget and 60% of its road budget. Eric Mortenson, 
Crack in the Sales Tax Taboo?, Oregonian, Mar. 5, 2012, at A1. 
498 Id. (discussing meal taxation schemes in Ashland and Yachtas, Oregon). 
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impossible, and the third too difficult.499 Although the county commis-
sioners originally planned to place a general sales tax on its May 2012 
ballot, the county decided against the move and appears not to have 
pressed the matter further.500 As originally proposed, the county would 
have levied a three percent tax on the sale of all non-exempted goods 
in the county.501 The tax aimed to capture non-local, tourist revenue.502 
This county-wide sales tax would be the first in the state, although the 
Oregon cities of Ashland and Yachats impose a sales tax on prepared 
food and beverages.503 The tax could raise an estimated 7.9 million dol-
lars annually.504 Imposition of similar taxes by each of the O&C coun-
ties would solve a significant portion of their revenue problems. To mo-
tivate the counties to pursue this strategy, Congress should make any 
future long-term reauthorization of SRSA and PILT money contingent 
on the counties establishing sales taxes and, as discussed below,505 rais-
ing property taxes to certain minimum levels. 
                                                                                                                      
499 Id.; see April Baer, ‘Grim Decision’ Facing Curry County Commissioners, OPB News, Apr. 
12, 2012, http://news.opb.org/article/grim-decision-facing-curry-county-commissioners/ 
(last updated July 17, 2012) (noting that the Oregon Constitution does not allow counties 
to go bankrupt). 
500 Curry County, Draft Curry County Sales Tax, as of Second Reading (Mar. 15, 
2012), available at http://www.co.curry.or.us/commissioners/2012_03_15%20Draft%20Curry 
%20County%20Sales%20Tax_Second%20Reading.pdf; Eric Mortenson, Curry County Holds 
Off on Sales Tax Vote, Oregonian, Mar. 17, 2012, http://www.oregonlive.com/environ- 
ment/index.ssf/2012/03/curry_county_holds_off_on_sale.html. 
501 Curry County, Draft Curry County Sales Tax, as of Second Reading § 2(A)–
(B). 
502 See id. § 4 (exempting multiple items, including prescription medication; medical 
items; groceries; utilities; property sales, leases or rentals; vehicles; construction materials; 
manufacturing, timber, agricultural, and commercial fishing machinery and equipment; 
and boats and personal watercraft). 
503 The city of Ashland imposes a five percent voter-approved tax on food and bever-
age purchases until 2030. City of Ashland Municipal Code § 4.34 (2012), available at 
http://ashland.or.us/Code.asp?CodeID=2219; see Food & Beverage Tax, City of Ashland, 
http://ashland.or.us/Page.asp?NavID=9180 (last visited Jan. 10, 2013). The City of Yachats 
also imposes a five percent food and beverages tax. City of Yachats Municipal Code 
§ 3.12.020 (2012), available at http://www.yachatsdocuments.info/library/Download.aspx? 
docid=2246. From FY 2008–2009, until FY 2010–2011, the tax in Yachats raised over $210,000 
per year. City of Yachats, 2011–2012 Adopted Budget 20 (2012), available at 
http://www.ci.yachats.or.us/Budget%202011-2012/Budget%202011-2012%20Adopted.pdf. 
504 Mortenson, Curry County, supra note 410. 
505 See infra notes 513–516 and accompanying text. 
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3. Increasing the State Log Export Tax Rate 
 Oregon imposes only a minimal tax on forestry exports.506 As a 
result of this low tax and flagging demand in the United States, West 
Coast log exporters now send $900 million in raw logs overseas— 
twenty-two times more than just four years ago.507 The OCTA proposal 
would address this problem by forbidding the exportation of logs from 
the private timber trust.508 The environmentalist counter-proposal sug-
gested increasing the forest products harvest tax assessed to private for-
est owners from $3.25 per 1000 board feet to around $9.21 per 1000 
board feet.509 
 Ultimately, any solution must recognize that exporting logs also 
results in the export of jobs associated with milling, forests products, 
and the supporting cluster businesses from Oregon communities, even 
domestically to different regions of the country.510 Any solution to the 
O&C counties’ economic situation must attempt to prevent the North-
west from becoming a timber colony.511 Therefore, we suggest that the 
state raise the state export tax on private lands—as in the environmen-
talist counter-proposal—and impose a severance tax on lumber har-
vested from both the O&C and national forest lands in Oregon.512 This 
money could be invested in localized milling and thinning projects, 
thus creating local jobs. 
                                                                                                                      
506 See Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 321.005–.185 (2011). 
507 See John Kitzhaber, Governor Kitzhaber Testimony Before the Board of Forestry, Oregon.gov 
(Nov. 3, 2011) http://cms.oregon.gov/gov/media_room/pages/speechess2011/testimony_ 
boardofforestry_110311.aspx. 
508 H.R. __, 112th Cong. § 214(e) (2012) (discussion draft); Spivak, supra note 394, at 
3. 
509 Spivak et al., supra note 474, at 5. From 2004 to 2012, the average Forest Products 
Harvest Tax (FPHT) was $3.25/MBF. See Forest Products Harvest Tax, Oregon.gov, 
http://www.oregon.gov/DOR/TIMBER/2003_fpht.shtml (last visited Jan. 10, 2013). The 
average amount of timber harvested between 2004 and 2010 in Oregon was 3.77 billion 
board feet. Spivak et al., supra note 474, at 5. To raise $37 million annually (as proposed), 
the FPHT would need to be raised to $9.21/MBF. Id. 
510 See Kitzhaber, supra note 507. Roughly, for each MMBF of timber milled domesti-
cally, there are five jobs. Spivak, Geos Instit., supra note 474, at 8. In contrast, for each 
MMBF of timber harvested, there is only one export job. Id. 
511 See Kitzhaber, supra note 507. (“This amounts to nothing more than exporting our 
natural capital and our jobs. We are at risk of becoming a timber colony for Asia . . . .”). 
512 See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 613 624 (1981) (uphold-
ing the application of Montana’s maximum thirty percent severance tax on lessees of fed-
eral coal in the state, noting that “there can be no question that Montana may constitu-
tionally raise general revenue by imposing a severance tax on coal mined in the State. The 
entire value of the coal, before transportation, originates in the State, and mining of the 
coal depletes the resource base and wealth of the State, thereby diminishing a future 
source of taxes and economic activity.”). 
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4. Increasing County Property Taxes 
 Curry County has the state’s second lowest property tax—at sixty 
cents per $1000 of assessed value, as compared to the statewide average 
of $2.80 per $1000 of assessed value, and $4.34 per $1000 of assessed 
value in Portland’s Multnomah County.513 Homeowners in Portland 
pay over seven times more in property tax, even though the median 
home value in the two counties is very close, and both are well above 
the national average.514 The environmentalist counter-proposal sug-
gested increasing property taxes in each of the affected counties to a 
level near the current statewide average.515 This seems reasonable, al-
though there is significant resistance from local residents: Curry 
County voters soundly defeated a 2010 measure to increase property 
taxes, and Josephine County defeated a $12 million per year law en-
forcement tax levy proposal in May 2012, forcing the county to release 
75 prisoners and lay off 70 people in the county sheriff’s office.516 
                                                                                                                     
5. Consolidating the O&C Lands into the National Forest System 
 To achieve further savings, BLM could transfer ownership of the 
O&C lands to the USFS to avoid management redundancy.517 Officials 
have contemplated this proposal since the enactment of the OCLA in 
1937.518 The OCTA proposal promoted by the Oregon representatives 
suggests consolidation of the non-timber trust land into the USFS as 
well.519 Although opponents challenged the assumptions underlying 
their conclusion, the environmentalist counter-proposal argued that 
the federal government could save up to 113 million dollars per year as 
 
513 Governor’s Task Force on Fed. Forest Payments and Cnty. Servs., supra note 
478, at 43, 44 tbl.5. 
514 The median home value in Curry County is nearly $267,000, whereas the median 
home value in Multnomah County is $281,000. State & County Quick Facts, U.S. Census Bu-
reau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/41000.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2013) (select 
a county in the pull down box at the top of the screen for county-specific data). The national 
median home value is only $188,000. Id. 
515 See Spivak et al., supra note 474, at 6–7. 
516 See Josephine County Votes No on Law Enforcement Levy, Oregonian, May 16, 2012, available 
at http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2012/05/josephine_county_votes_no_on_l. 
html; Mortenson, Loss of Federal Forest Payments, supra note 377; Mortenson & Pope, supra note 
378. 
517 Spivak et al., supra note 474. 
518 See Hearings on H.R. 5858, supra note 16, at 14–15 (exchange between Mr. White 
and Mr. Poole regarding consolidated management of the O&C lands). 
519 See H.R. __, 112th Cong. § 231 (2012) (discussion draft). 
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a result of consolidation,520 savings that could be channeled to the 
O&C counties as additional payments in lieu of taxes. Although man-
agement streamlining could save money, consolidation could also result 
in lost jobs among BLM staffers, thus undercutting any potential em-
ployment increases gained elsewhere.521 Consequently, more study is 
needed before relying on consolidation. 
6. Reauthorizing SRSA and PILT Payments to Support Counties with 
the Most Need 
 Eighteen Oregon counties receive federal money under the SRSA 
for O&C lands.522 Not all of these counties are equally in need of this 
subsidy, however. Isolated, non-populous counties along the Oregon 
coast and southwest Oregon have fewer opportunities for economic 
growth and diversification than do other counties receiving SRSA 
funds.523 For several of these counties, federal payments constitute up to 
twenty-five percent of annual county budgets.524 For others, like Mult-
nomah and Washington Counties—home to the Portland metropolitan 
area—the payments are much less significant with respect to the coun-
ties’ ability to provide services. Thus, if Congress reauthorizes SRSA and 
PILT funding for the long-term, the funds should be prioritized for 
those counties that may not be able to survive economically without 
federal assistance. The funds should be diverted away from places like 
Multnomah and Washington Counties, which received nearly 1.9 mil-
lion dollars in SRSA payments in 2001 at the height of the program.525 
Conclusion 
 From their nineteenth century inception to the present, the lands 
from the Oregon and California Land Grant (“O&C lands”) have been 
                                                                                                                      
520 Spivak et al., supra note 474, at 4. The proponents of the environmental counter-
proposal based this estimate on statistics showing that the BLM spends over four times as 
much to manage an acre of land than does the USFS. Id. Opponents to the environmental-
ist proposal challenged their assertion, claiming that the difference is more likely two-to-
one. Mortenson & Pope, supra note 378 (quoting Douglas County Commissioner Doug 
Robertson). 
521 See Holmes, supra note 466. 
522 See FY2001 O&C Payments to Counties, supra note 411. 
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fraught with controversy. Beginning with the railroad grant in 1866, 
through the Oregon land fraud scandal of the early 1900s and the 
revesting of the remaining unsold lands to the federal government in 
1916, through the spotted owl controversy of the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the subsequent NWFP and the ensuing 1995 timber salvage 
rider, and the George W. Bush Administration’s unsuccessful attempts 
to weaken the plan in the 2000s, the O&C lands have been rife with 
strife and disputes. Today, history has once again repeated itself, as the 
O&C lands are at the center of a major county funding crisis that 
threatens to unravel a quarter-century of environmental progress. The 
Oregon and California counties (“O&C counties”)—long reliant on 
timber harvest revenue from the O&C lands—now face serious fiscal 
crises as a result of diminished timber harvests and sharply curtailed 
federal funding. In response to these crises, federal legislators have 
proposed to privatize the O&C lands into large-scale timber plantations 
(the O&C Trust, Conservation, and Jobs Act “trust” proposal), and to 
increase harvesting to unsustainable levels in order to increase county 
revenues (Representative Hastings’ Federal Forests County Revenue, 
Schools, and Jobs Act of 2012). 
 Both proposals suffer from serious environmental and economic 
flaws. First, both rely on the grossly inadequate Oregon Forest Practices 
Act to protect the forested ecosystems, exempting the land from federal 
environmental protections. Second, both proposals fail to assess ad-
verse water quality effects connected to increased harvesting, despite 
Oregon’s already compromised water quality status. Third, given the 
changed Northwest timber landscape, the purported employment and 
economic benefits of both proposals are quite overblown. Fourth, the 
O&C lands may simply not have enough timber to sustain the proposed 
harvest levels. Finally, statutory restrictions on land uses are inappro-
priate for dynamic, changing forest landscapes. These deficiencies sug-
gest that Congress should pursue neither proposal. 
 We instead suggest an approach that both upholds the integrity of 
the hard-fought, time-tested Northwest Forest Plan and provides the 
O&C counties with long-term fiscal and economic security. We recog-
nize that the O&C counties need additional revenue to support their 
local governments and economies, but this funding increase should not 
be achieved by sacrificing environmental protections or ignoring the 
irreplaceable natural values provided by the O&C lands. Moreover, it is 
hardly clear that privatization and/or liquidation of the forests would 
provide the counties the long-term economic security that they desire. 
 Any viable solution must provide long-term economic growth and 
security for the O&C counties, protect environmental values, and fairly 
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distribute the burdens of achieving these twin goals among the various 
stakeholders. The current congressional proposals assume that these 
principles cannot coexist, but we suggest that with the right combina-
tion of policies, environmental integrity, and economic growth, they 
can coexist and thrive. 
 The first step toward achieving this outcome is to monetize the 
robust ecosystem services provided by the O&C lands. Healthy forested 
watersheds provide cleaner, cooler, and less-sedimented drinking water, 
as well as improved salmon and aquatic habitat. Capturing and 
monetizing these values could provide the O&C counties with a consis-
tent source of revenue without liquidating the forest. In addition, the 
counties could capture out-of-town and tourist revenues through prop-
erly structured sales taxes. Further, the O&C counties could generate 
more revenue if they raised property taxes to a level in line with the 
state median. Future long-term reauthorization of funding from the 
Payment In Lieu of Taxes Act (PILT) and the Secure Rural Schools and 
Community Self-Determination Act (SRSA) should be conditioned on 
the counties achieving some or all of these initiatives. The state could 
also supplement these revenues with an increased log export tax to 
provide an incentive for logging companies to mill timber in rural 
Oregon. Moreover, the federal government should consider the cost 
savings associated with consolidating some or all of the O&C lands into 
national forests. Finally, Congress should restructure the SRSA and 
PILT revenue distribution formulas to support the neediest counties. 
Although there is no single silver bullet, these suggestions would spread 
burdens more broadly among stakeholders, while protecting the O&C 
lands’ unique environmental and cultural legacy. 
 In contrast to their contentious past and present, the pursuit of 
such an environmentally-sensitive and economically-sound strategy may 
provide the O&C lands, and those dependent on them, something en-
tirely new: long-term, sustainable peace. 
